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INTRODUCTION 
Since the close of the Second World War, the world's 
underdeveloped areas have commanded a wider degree of attention 
from thinking people the world over. Although the present trend 
of events has tended to focus such attention on certain areas of 
vital strategic importance, such as the Near and Middle East, 
Southeast Asia, and the Far East, it should be borne in mind 
that many of the circumstances, conditions, and pressures which 
have led to recent political eruptions in these areas are, even 
now, at work in other important underdeveloped areas. Latin 
.America is such an area, and :Brazil, the largest a.nd most pop ... 
ulous of the twenty Latin American Republics, eXhibits many of 
the characteristics common to the area. 
We, in the United States, have always been interested in 
the political and economic development of :Brazil because of the 
favorable position which she has traditionally maintained with 
respect to the balance of power situation in the Western Hemi~ 
sphere. An ally of the United States in two world wars,. :Brazil 
was the only nation in Latin .America to place an e:x:pedi tionary 
force at the disposal of the Allied Command in Europe during 
World War II. What is more, military observers agree that the 
:Brazilian government fs grant; to the United States of sui table 
air base sites along :SraziP:s Northeast coast greatly expedited 
iii 
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the Allied campaign in North .Africa. 
In recent years, :Brazil's rapidly accelerating economic devel-
opment has been shored up, ·to an appreciable extent, by a large 
influx of investment capital from the United States. This move-
ment of capital has greatly extended the area of mutual interest 
existing between the two countries. Just as :Brazil vitally 
needs new investment capital in order that she might fully 
realize her potential agricultural and industrial capacity, 
so too does the United States depend on :Brazil's ability to 
produce raw materials essential to her present mobilization 
effort • 
.After fifteen years of semi and full dictatorship under 
GetUlio Vargas, an influential group of l3ra~ilia.n army officers 
quietly obliged :Vargas to retire from the political scene in 
October, 1945. The victory of General Eurico Gaspar Dutra in 
th.e free elections of December of that same year) marked the 
beginning of a new political era for :Brazil. Dutra I: s election 
to office clearly indicated that most :Brazilian voters were 
intent on returning to political democracy. All knew that the 
next five years would be a period of tra.nsi tion during which 
the grit and fiber of l3razills renovated democracy would be put 
to the test. 
Economically, the initiation of the new era came at an 
extremely critical moment. :Brazil, as was true of nearly all of 
v 
the participants in the Second World War, was then entering the 
uncertain post-war period. It was to prove a period of significant 
economic readjustment during which swords would again have to 
be beaten into plowshares and the needs of those nations crippled 
by the second global holocaust would have to be given primary 
attention. Brazil ts role as a contributor of raw materials 
essential to war had to be materially altered. The world was at 
peace. Of course~ later events reversed this situation and during 
the final months of President Dutrats administration the forces 
of the United Nations were countering aggression in Korea. In 
short, .the Dutra period encompassed a variety of truly significant 
political and economic developments which, when reviewed in 
proper perspective, should contribute to an understanding of the 
process of change which present day Brazil is undergoing. 
The method of approach used in the development of this 
study has been essentially topical. Extensive treatment has been 
accorded the growth of Brazilts major political and'economic 
institutions as well as its geographic and ethnic makeup in view 
of the countryts general complexity and in order that the specific 
period covered in this work might be more readily comprehended. 
Particular att4ntion has been given GetUlio Vargas• first admin-
istration, covering the period 1930 to 1945, in__,a.s'Jmuch as many of 
the policies and programs adopted by Dutra were directly influ-
enced by similar plans initiated by his predecesser. In deal-
.., 
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ing with the Dutra period per se political, economic, and social 
developments were dealt with in that order. 
The presidential campaign of 1950, which marked Dutra• s 
exit from office and Vargast dramatic return to power, is treated 
in considerable detail in the final pages of this work. 
As for the sources used in the preparation of this study, 
a substantial number of commonly available general works and 
periodical articles were cohsulted. In addition, numerous 
:Brazilian publications available at the research library of the 
Department of Latin American Regional Studies at :Boston University 
were utili zed. Extensive use was made of two of :Brazil's leading 
newspapers, the Esta.do de Sao Paulo, published in the city of 
sao Paulo, a.nd the Correia dA Ma.nb.a, published in the city of 
Rio de Janeiro. The availability of this material bas made 
possible a more comprehensive presentation of the events leading 
up to Vargas• return to power than has yet appeared elsewhere~ 
at least in so far as the author has been able to ascertain. 
I am indebted to Professor Maurice Halperin, Chairman of 
the ~apartment of Latin American Regional Studies at :Boston 
University, for his competent guidance and advice in connection 
with the preparation of this work and to Professor William :B. 
Norton of the Department of History at :Boston University for his 
kind assistance as my secona reader. I am deeply grateful to my 
wife, Mar:Le, for her -help in lc:>ea.ting· aa:J.el. a"t>.stpaeting eertai1a 
. ·. - ·-- :~ 
,.J ·· ... -.. --. 
. L. . . ..~~ '\ik;.:i,i~ 
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materials used in this study and for her careful transcription of 
my first dra:ft. The Misses Isabel M. Appa.samy and :Barbara S. 
Sherman deserve mention for their censcientious efforts as 
typists andproofreaders of this, the final draft. Finally, I 
owe a special debt of gratitude to my parents f0r providing me 
with a working knowledge of the Portuguese language. 
:Boston, Massachusetts 
October, 1951. 
James A. Perry, Jr. 
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CHAPTER I 
BRAZIL.: LAND AND PEOPLE 
I know that this picture is not. cannot, be com-
plete. It is i~ossible to know Brazil, a world i~ 
itself, completely •. ~. • In spite of my eagerness to 
learn~~ • ·• my survey fails to be comprehensive; and 
I realize also that a life-time would not give one 
the right to sq: I know Brazil. 
STEFAN Z'OIG, BRAZIL ~ of ~ Future 
Brazil, with a total area of 3,286,169 square miles, co~ 
stitutes nearl.7 half of the continent of South Jmerica and is 
about a quarter of a million square miles larger than continental 
United States. This vast territo17 is currently inhabited by 
over 52,000.,000 people~ only about one third of the population 
of the United States, but nearly one half that of South .America. 
Brazilians have been increasi:ng at a phenomenal rate. The popu ... 
lation increase from 1920 ... 1950 was slightly more than 66 per 
cento Neverthelessj large areas qt Brazil maintain fewer than 
three persons per square mile;, 
.A. great deal of controversy has centered about Brazil r·s 
capacity for modern development. There are those who believe 
that Brazil m~ eventually support a population in excess of 
500,000~000 persons. They point out that only 4 perqcent of the 
total national terri toey is presently under cultivation, and 
only about 19 per cent is given over to pasture, while all but 
2 
3 
20 per ~ent of ~azills·to~al ~ea is potentially productive.l 
The optimist Will also point out that the introduction of newer. 
more productive ·agricultural end stoekraising techniques rill 
raise :Brazills output tremendously.. It is significant t0 note 
that these argtJments are postulated on potential or future 
developments·•-
On the other hand• there are those who maintain that ~aBil 
is currently o'ferpopulated in terms 0f the lo" standards of living 
endured by- the bulk of its population• They are quick to under-
line such sensitive measures of the "ell being of the Brazilian 
people" as the national per capita income and the infant mertali ty 
rat.J~ In 1946, Brazi1 1 s per capita income was $108, while in 
1947, an equivalent figure fer the Wni ted States was $1,40§; 2 
The last fignres available on ~azil' s infant oortality rate 
date back to 1941, and merely cover the principal urban centers'~ 
Manaus, with 303 infant deaths per thousand 11 ve births, had the 
highest rate recorded, while sio PaUlo 1fi th 135 had. the second 
lo"est rate. Curi tiba, with a rate of 12§, had the lowest rate 
of all• In 1942. the rate in the United States was forty and by 
1944 it stood at 39•4.3 Certainly these figures are distressing, 
1 Preston E. James, Latin Ameri~. p.355o 
2 Wendell c. Gordon. -~ :Ecopen, g! Lati.n .Ameni.ca? po. 355. 
3 
T. Lynn Smith, "The _People and lheir Characteristics," 
§Jjazil: P.Pftrai t 2!, I!!:1.t. ~ Continent, Alexander Marchant and 
T. Lynn Smith, editors, p. 16lh 
• 
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particularly since they deal with present or near ~resent 
reali ties:;o 
These contrasting interpretations of J3ra.zil 11 s a})ility to 
progress. serve to point up what is, undoubtedly, the most funaa.... 
• 
mental enigma which :Brazil presents to thinking people the world 
over. Why. after four hundred years of settlement. is :Bralil 1 a 
countey which is superlatively endowed in terms of mt.tural res our-
ees, still undeveloped? .Any effort to find even a partial anner 
to this and other related questions, must, of necessity, constltute 
an extremely complex task and can only be attempted within 
certain established frames. of reference. Let us, therefore, pq 
some little attention to such all-inclusive matters as Brazilta 
land and people .• and then proceed to examine its ~olitical and 
economic history. in somewhat greate~ detail• 
:Brazil ca:onot be said to possess a single all-inclusive 
climate &n1 more than does the United States. That most of the 
country lies in the tropics is not as significant as might be 
supposed, for within the tropics there are DJ8.DT varieties of 
climate. One of the factors affect~ng tropical climatic condi-
tions which is frequently ()verlooked, . is that of vertical 
variat.ion. Unless affected by' special condi tiona an increase in 
• 
5 
topographic .. elevation is. accompanied bT a proportional decrease 
in temperature• Since much of 13razillls terrain consists of u.p-
land or low mountain countey, climatic condi tiona are no~ nearly 
as oppressive as one might imagine. Speaking of'13radl's 
climate Professor Preston E. J~s, noted authority on Brazilian 
geography, ·makes the following observation: 
"Brazilian climates contain few extremes, either of 
temperature or of moisture.; yet they are by no 
means so monotonously uniform, or so unbearably · 
hot anti damp, . that the human spirit is deadened. 11 ~ 
The theo.ry that most of Brazil's difficulties can be att ... 
ributed to her tropical location thus appears to be ri thout any 
real foundation. If the people i~ certain areas of kazi.l appear 
to.be lacking in energy, this cannot be solely attributed to 
unfavorable climatic conditions• Other elenents such as diet 
and disease cannot be overlooked in this connection. Nor can 
13razil's climate be held responsible for its sparse population~ 
for some of the most densely populated areas in the world such 
. ,. ., ..... . 
. . . 
as Java and India., are located in lands with humid, ~ropical. 
climates. 
Brazil's surface configuration is distinguished by its 
relative lack of broad lowland areas. Save for a small portion 
of the lowlands of the upper Par~ and, of course, the U.PP.er 
'· . '· ;. . 
reaches of the . .Amazon :Basin, the greater part of the Brazilian 
! . 
4 James, gp_. 9:1· , p. 359• 
• 
• 
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territory consists of highlands• Even the Atlantic Costal Region • 
especially in the densely populated areas~ contains only ~mall 
disconnected lowland fragments; there 1~. nothing comparable to 
the costal plain of eastern North Amerie~ 
The two largest highland configurations are .. the Guiana 
Highlands situated nQrtll of the AmMo]]. Basin, and _the :Bralilian 
Highlands which lie to the south of the :Basin.o The :Bramili_an 
Highlands sheer off quite sharply as they approach_ the Atlantic 
coast.> From :Bahia southward to the state of Rio Grande do Sui. 
the coast is baclted b7 a steep geologic wall which, in. certain 
places. rises to an elevation of 2,600 feet above the sea..o5 This 
wall..-like slope is usuall7 referred t~ as the Great Escarpnent• 
Kost of the rivers which drain the :Bra.zilian Highlands 
flow westward to the ParanA and join that gre~t river in its· 
. circuitous. pa,ssege southward to the Plata Delta• :Between lati-
tudes 18o South and 30° South only two rivers, the Rio Doce and 
the Rio Parafba cut deep river valle7s tbrough the Great Escarp.-o 
ment • but neither river penetra.tes the interior to BJlT appreciable 
extent<. 
The Sio Francisco. one of :Brazills major rivers, which 
drains in a northerly direction. rises in the southeast and 
runs parallel to the coast for about a thousanQ. mil~s but turns 
eastward to form the northern boundary' Of the B.tates Of :Bahia 
• 
and Sergipe before des~ending to. the Atlantic. ~t the Paulo 
Afonso Falla. The gr~at tributaries o~ the Amazon, the Toca:nw 
tins, nngd., and Tapaj6z, e.ll.~low northlf!lrd and ~eseend over 
falls as they approach the Amazon. 0nly t,he Amazon itself 
can be followed far into the interior. 
What then 11 is the significance of th~se broad aspects 
of Brazil"s surface configuration? First of all, it must be 
noted that,.l·ave for the .Amaeon Basin areaJ the penetration of 
Brazi~ has been seriously impeded by formidable geographic 
barriers in the form of the GlU.ana and Brazilian Highlands, and 
partic~arly the Great Escarpment, :which of course, is an .. inte-
gral part of this latter geologic formation• 
. . . 
Secondly, and again excluding . the Amazon, nearly e.ll of 
Brazil's river systems fail to provide favorable routes into 
. 
tbe interior;· or to put it conversely, fail ~o.flow uninterr---
uptedly towards ~ sui table foci on the Atlantic. That such 
large cities as liio de Janeiro and sio Paulo have become great ·· 
terminal centers, despit~ the lack of &n1' natural convergenee 
of routes to these places, is largely the result of technologi-
cal developnent and certain normal economic pressures• , 
Natural Veget!ttJ_o~ sA Mineral Re!ource·a· 
:Brazil's Ml1azon. :Region contains t~e world's largest area 
of tropical rain forest or selva. This t1]8 of forest ~s char~ 
acterized by extensive stands of evergreen, broad leaf trees, the 
--~-------------------------------------
• 
branches of which are closely interlaced, so as to prevent most 
of the sun's r81's from reaching the forest floor. The soils , 
under such forests are usually very poor, since the heav.y rains 
which are prevalent in the selva regions dissolve the soluble 
minerals and other plant foods• 
South of the ADlason Region, in West Central ~~e.zil, the 
8 
natural vegetation is broadly labelled savannah, which is usuall7 
de,fined as an area of relativelT unproductive tropical or sub-
, : tropical grassland containing scattered trees and underbrush. 
A. strip of territory, about 300 miles in width. extendiJl€ from 
Erazilts Northeast hump wouthward to ~elo Horizonte consists of 
tropical scrub forest interspersed with savannah• Acc~rding to 
James, scrub fo~est is neither true forest nor true grassland, 
and is usuall7 found where the soils are less retentive of moist--
ure• In the interior of the Northeast, where droughts frequ.ent-
17 occur, is found the ~aati~.a or tharn farest composed of 
;:r 
scrubb.y drougbt•resistant deciduous ·treea•6 
South o~ the st~te of s;o· Paulo two types of vegetation 
prevail, which do not belong to the tropics. but rather to the 
middle latitude&\ These are the_ pine forests of the state of 
Parad and the prairies of Rio Grande du Su:t., 
6 Ibi_d. t :pp. 364-365~ 
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From the viewpoint of past performance :Brazil's best farm 
lands occur in areas of tropical., semi-deciduous forest notably-
along the D8.1T0W coastal strip from Recife to Salvador ancl the 
Para!ba Biver Valley- Region. inland fr9m Rio_ de Janeiro. 
AccordiDg to James. the extensive sel'f"a, savannah, and related 
regions of :Brazil t s interior., make up relatively 101f-grsde agri• 
cultural or stockraisiDg coUntry, while the traditionally- preo-
ductive semi~eciduous forest areas are in a state of decline 
as a result of exploitive agrictll.tural practices .. 7 The Southern 
Pine and Prairie Region, whil.e still undergoing a _certain amount 
of experimental developnent, looms large as a potential source 
of non-tropical agricultural products and top quality beef and 
cattle; + 
To B1llll up then, 13razil 1s vast westward terri toey does not 
seem to offer great opportunities f()r an expandi~ pioneering 
movement. such as occurred in the Wni ted States shortly after 
the eivil War. Recent geographic field studies have revealed 
that small, isolated portions of the interior do offer possibil ... 
ities for agricultural settlement; however, the limited size and 
remoteness of these newly discovered tracts greatly limit the 
~ospects for successful settlement.a 
7 Ibid; , P• 365-66; 
8 Ibid_;, p; 366• 
-
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:Brazil possesses an abundance of extremely valuable but 
poorly integrated mineral resources. Her coal and iron deposits 
offer the most outstanding examples. High-grade iroD"Ore d~s­
i ts ere found in the Serra do Espi~o (l3acl.tbone .Mountain . 
Range) where they consti tu.te entire mountain peaks • notabl7 
Cau' and Itab{ra. A certain amolliD.t of iron smelting. usiEg 
charcoal for fuel, had been goi!lg on in this region for a long 
time, but as nearby forests became depleted and the demand for 
. . 
iron increase<l, the use of charcoal became untenable an<l the need 
for coal becue increasingly apparent. Although the Serra do 
lilspi~o bas yielded large quanti ties of gold, mallganese, nickel, 
and diamonds, it has never been a source of coal. The onl7 
coal deposits in :Brazil which have merited systematic exploit• 
ation are to be found in the state{l. of Rio Gran<le do Su1 and 
Santa Catarina, about a thousand miles south of llinas Gerais• 
However, this coal is poor for smeltiDg since it contains 
large proportions of ash and sulphur• 
Y{.b.ile it has been estimated that :Bre:zil possesses approx: ... 
imately 6 per cent of the world•s oil reserves very little oil 
has as yet been breught to tbe surfac~~9 In this particular 
ease :Brazil lacks capital and technique and its failure to Jlro-<-
cure these can be attributed to political as well as economic 
difficulties. 
9 Ibi~. p. 367,. 
--
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Though Brazil has the greatest hydroelectric potential 
of any of the countries of Latin America, most of the sites for 
~-reposed power stations are so far removed from the centers of' 
settlement that, under present day techniques,, there is no wey of 
transporting the de'\reloped power to these centers. Cuba tao, the 
largest hydroelectric plant. in South America, was bui~t near the 
city of Sao Faulo. where water is dropped over the Great Esca~ 
ment fr~>IIll the head of' the Tiete River. In the Northeaat, hydro-
electric power installations are currently being develo~ed at the 
Paulo) .Af'onso Falls. about one hundred and fifty miles inland f'rom: 
where the Rio Sao Francisco drains into the Atlantic. 
TEE EEOPLE AND THEIR OHA.RA.OTIJ:RISTICS 
Racial_ Composition 
The popull.tion of Brazil is composed of _three baaic racial 
strains: caucasoid., negroid, and mongoloid, .or Indian. According_ 
,, ''I 
to the 1940 census (the 1950 census breakdown is not yet available) 
63.5 per cent of the ];l:Ol\)Ulation WaB classified as White; 14.6 per 
cent as black; 21.2 per cent as brown; and 0.7 per cent as yellow}0 
These figures must be viewed with some reservation, since the 
process of miscegenation has been operating in Brazil ever since the 
Portuguese landed there over four hundred years ago. 'Wha·t is 
lOSmi th, .9l?.~> .ill•, P• 150. 
................ ------------------~~---
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more, it must be noted that the census takers who were respon-
sible for classifying Brazil's population into these arbitrary 
color categories, were in a _position to exercise a wide degree 
of personal, subjective discretion. However, as a broad indica-
tion of the heterogeneity of the Brazilian people, these figures 
undoubtedly possess considerable validity •. 
In terms of skin pigmentation the composition of the 
population of the North and Northeast is the darkest in Brazil. 
In the states of Amazonas, Para, Marabhao, Piam, Rio Grande 
do Norte, Sergipe'and Bahei, Negro and mixed elements are 
dominant over the white, while in the South and Southeast 
the reverse situation is true. 
' Geogra~hic and ~ Distribution 
The significant thing about the geographic distribution 
of Brazil's population is the extent to which it is concentrated 
along the sea coast. Most of the large cities are located dir-
ectly on or close to the coast, while the greater part of the 
rural population is only slightly further inland. 
The most significant feature of the age distribution of 
Brazil's population is the high ratio of non-producers to prod-
ucers. If persons less than 15 years and over 65 years are class-
ified as non-producers, we find that in Brazil there are eighty-two 
dependents for every one-hundred producers, while in the United States 
13 
' the corresponding ratio is onl;y 46.s.ll The economic import of 
these figures is at once apparent. The average :Brazilian prod ... 
ucer is faced w1 th the prospect of ~ving to support trice as 
lii8.I1T dependents as his counterpart .in the United States• 
Nutrition S. BeaJ,.&A . 
In a SttrTe;y of dail;y caloric food consumption conducted by 
the Food and J&ricultural Organization of the United Nations, 
shortly after World War II, it was f'ound that :Brazilians averaged 
2,552 calories per dai• This can be sharply contrasted with a 
comparable figure of 3,249 ca].Qries for persons in the United 
States•l2 
It has been estimated that about two-thirds of ::Srazil:~s 
people suffer from chronic malnutrition, since the diet of the 
average ::Brazilian is sorely lacking in essential proteins, 
vitamins and mineralJo. Staple elements of the diet include 
black beans, manioc flollr a:nd dried beef, as well as coffee 
k 
and sugar• Conspicuously lacking are milk and vegetables, which, 
of course. are extremely high in food valu. The detrimental 
effects of such low nutritional standards, on ::Srazili,ans, were 
succinctly epi tomlzed by' Dr~ Hernane de Sa, when b.e wrote, 
ll Ibid. t pp. 154-56. 
12 Food and ~!cultural Or~ization; ProposBl.s for !:. 
World !9.2! ::Soat:4,. anC\ !. World Ew.: Suu!Y• p. 37., cited by Gordon a• cit_ •• p .. 30.. -
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•wa.l.nutrition creates an organic deficit, an inability to work 
hard, long hourls'. It also induces :fatalism and passivity in the 
indi 'Vidual.; al3 
In :Brazil, the handmaiden o:f malnutritian is diseas~~ 
Although such tropical diseases as malaria and haok1t'orm are 
rather pr~vaient i~ the raral areas. the sa-called "urban d1 sea-
sea" present an even more distressing prabl,_~ Tuberculosis is 
the greatest curse of the urban population, while pneumonia and 
syphilis rank high as killers. The rates o:f incidence o:f these 
diseases, in :Brazilian cities, is six or seven times higher 
than in American citie8~14 
Parasitic diseases 8 such as 4sentecy and typhoid :fever • 
are <il.if:ficult to bring under control since only three cities 
with over .20,000 inhabitants have more than 75 per cent o:f the 
houses connected to the sewerage system. Less than 10 per cent 
of the :Bruilian homes are equipped with running water or sam.,. 
tary :facil1tiei•15 
Liters 
l'igures on the rate of illiterae,- in :Brazil are extremely 
variable, and in certain instances are undoubtedl7 inaccurate=. 
13 Hel"lWle Tavares de. 5£, ~ :SryiJ.j.&l!.!?.t p. 84. 
14 . . Ibid,. , p. aa:. 
15 . Ibido,'PP• 82-83• 
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·.Estimates which appeared in 1940., range_ anywhere from 32-55 per 
cent • but ei the,r extreme clearly indicates that a siseable 
number .of :Brazilians lack one of the most fundamental tools for 
twentieth century livi~ 
In 1948, a at~ cond1!1Cted in one of s&o PauJ.ots ind'l.'I.BW 
trial plants revealed that 30 per cent of the worki~ force was 
illiterate; 68.5 per cent bad received less. than four years of 
schooling, and only 1 .. 5 per cent had gained UT· formal training 
in exeese of four years~16 
)4a:ey of :Brasil's eeon.omic and health problems can be traced 
to illiteracy. It is .exceedingly difficult to transform into 
industrialwerkers, or to free from tuberculosis and syphilis, 
men ·who cannot either read or write. 
By w.~ of conclusion., it thus appears that those who take 
a dim view of Brazil's ability to progress, haTe the 11present" 
on their side. As we haTe s~n,. Brazil is currently faced rlth 
a superabundance of knotty social and economic problems which 
mtUJt be solTed, if she is to take her place alongside the more 
.. 
·highly developed nations of the world.l7 
While nature has seen fit to provide Brazil ri th rich, 
natural resources, she has capriciously chosen to distribute 
.. _ ..... 
16 Ger07 Noqueira, I>!stribuacio · residenciat !!, opei-hi.ci!. 
~ ~ estA,bli .. cimento .industrial u Sio Paulo_. Sociologia, Vol. XI, 
No. 1, ?a£ PaUl.o, 1949~ · 
17 The phrase 11higbly developed," as used here, refers 
strictly to material developnent~ 
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them in sudQ a manner as to make commercial exploitation e~ceedw 
ingly difficult. While kazilians caa point with justifiable 
pride to their marvellously varied, cultural heritage, enriched 
as it is, by three major racial strains. the evolution of a truly 
national culture is made exceedingly difficult by this veey · 
richness and variety. 
The widespread exteniion of 11 ter8cy' probably offers the 
greatest single hope for the assimilation of the people of 
kazil into a more unified society'. Onee this obstacle is over-
come~ the attack on related problems will proceed on a far more 
rational aad effective basiso Admittedly, the problems touched 
upon in this chapter are not readily solved; but there is reason 
to believe tha~ tbq are not insurmountable. Jla.l:cy' men in lh"azil 
and throughout the world are busily engaged in the task of find• 
ing answers to these very problems; even more are looking eagerly 
beyond the period when to~ts problems will be solved and the 
utilization of :Brazil's great potentialities will have become 
a reality.. These are the optimists. to them belomg the future;. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ECONC»liC PATTERB 
Salvador, the first Portuguese settlement in-~asil, was 
founded in 1502; The settlers of Salvador had come to this re-
mote land with hopes of discovering vast sources of precious 
metals and gems comparable to those which their compatriots bad 
unearthed at an earlier date, in India. When it became apparent, 
to the ruling circles in Portugal, that the new lands to the West 
were devoid of easil7 procured riches, the7 ignored their eoloJle'> 
ial fledglillg and again focused their attention on India and 
other parts of the East. However, Portuguese interest in .13rasil 
was revived when the French and Spanish began making incursions 
along the northeast coast of Brazill~ Portugal was thus obliged 
to establish real, rather than nominal, control over this ntnr 
territort~· ana so the coast was divided into administrative 
units called capita.:a¢¥. granted in fief b)" the crown to Port~ 
guese notables. In most cases, the degree of successful settle-
ment was dependent on the personal abilit7 of the various 
administrators to consolidate their gainS; ~ of the eapitauiy, 
languished and failed, but effective settlements were finall7 
eatablishecL One, called Olinda, was set up in 1537, near the 
present site of Recife, while another. called si.o Vicente, was 
founded in 1522, near the now thriving port of Santos. The 
17 
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miasion settlement of sio Paulo was established in 1554, while 
Rio de Janeiro, a coastal fortress and naval base • was not 
established until 156? .• 
The rise and expansion of :Brazil's first great commercial 
crop, a~. tid not get underway until fairly late in the six-
teenth centu:ry;. After the middle of' the c.ntury it was discov-
ered that the lands along the :Brazil's northeast lowland coastal 
strip .. when cleared of their semi-deciduous ~ropica.l forest 
cover, were extremely well sui ted to the growth of sugar cane. 
Daring this period s-agar was very highl7 prized in Europe 
and lll9ll.1' of Port-aga.l t s weal tiq' landed lords were attracted to 
:Brazil's sugar country with the intention of establishing new 
· fe4q•J 
agricultural estates on the traditional_..pattern. The most no~ 
able contribution of these fidalgos to :Brartl"s new ngar 
eeon~ was capitaL. It was their wealth which covered the cost 
of the engeDhos, or sugar mills, and paid for the hordes of 
Negro slaves who were imported to till the soil, plant the cane • 
harvest it, and grind it in the engenhos.l 
The plantation owners of the Northeast prospered through-
1 Estimates of the ~ber of Negro slaves imported into 
:Brazil during the past four centuries, vuy_ from ·four to eight ... 
een millions. See Arthur :Ramos, "The Negro in :Brazil," 
:Brazil: Portrait 2!, !!!!:1!.!:. Continent. Ale.xander l4archant 
and T •. Iqnn ::mtth, edit0rs, p. 126'.; 
18 
• 
19 
out the seventeenth centur.y since_ they were operating on the 
bade of an air-tight monopoly and an ever expandiJJ& market. 
:Brazil's position as the world's chief sl'.lpplier ef S11g8.r was 
not seriously challenged until after the turn of the eigat-
eenth centUJ:7 when the Dutch,_ Spanish, lrrench, and English 
began te establish their respective sugar plantations in tbe 
West Indies~ As a result of intensive cultivation and improved 
processing techniques the sugar of the Indies sold at less than 
the prevailing market price W'i th the inevitable result that 
:Brazilian preduction soon went into a state of decline. 
While the sugar cycle was running its course in the 
Northeast, the settlers of the Southeast were buail)" engaged 
in the less lucrative business of exploration. Many of the 
early settlers of Sio Vicente and Sao Paule were people with-
out any great means and, therefore, were unable to establish 
and maintain large agricultural properties.a Rather than 
subject themselves to arduous labor on the lands of those few 
who had been able to carve out vast estates in the surrounding 
area, many of the dispossessed took to combing the bacldands 
for gold and Indians. The latter· were sold to the fazendeiros 
as slaves. The bandeirantes, as these slave hunters came to 
be called, plied their trade far into the hinterland extending 
2 Preston E. James, Latin .America, p. 371. 
• 
:Brazil• a western boundary and surveying its mineral resources• 
Though they discovered little ,gold in South end West 
Central :Brazil.· the bandeirante!, finally discovered rieh gold-
bearing ores in the vicinity of Ouro Prete. This was in 1698, 
just as the decli,ne in the Northeast was gettiDg under ~, 
with the result that ~ of the ariatocratie Nordestinos with 
their subJect retainers in to• migrated to :Minas Gerais to 
replenish their waniDg fortunes~3 The economic importance of 
Jlinas was furth:er heightened by the discoYery of diamonds in 
1729& at a site a little notth of the gold:fieldEk 
From the close of the seventeenth century to the beg-
inning of the nineteenth, :Brazil' a ecollOD'J,Y re"M"el ved around the 
gold and gems of the Minas area, ·but this great source of wealth 
proved to be finite and by 1820, the boom was definitely at 
an end. Thus :Brasil's second boom-bust cycle was over, but a 
third was alre~ unde~. 
~ Coffee !g. ~ ~ of Induatrr4 
Coffee, which still heads the 11 st of' fajor :Bradlian 
3 
Ibid• , P• 372. 
4 A1 though sugar • gold, and coffee represent the three· main 
products which have served as. the basis of :Brazil•a economic 
. developnent. other commodities such as' cotton, cacao. and rubber 
have also p1S¥ecl significant, theugh secondary, roles.; 
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experts t first achieved economic im:portBJlCe early in the ninteenth 
century, when a. coffee_ frentier was established inland from Rio 
de Janeiro and southward along the Pare!ba. River Valley. After 
1850, coffee prod~tion was largely concentrated in the state of 
sio Paulo;. This trend was intensified by the arrival of size-
able numbers of Earopeen imnigrants, most of whom went to work 
on the Paulista coffee fazendas as tenant laborers.5 
As in the case'of sugar. ~azil soon became the world's 
chief supplier of coffeeo What is more. the demand for this 
beTera&e was continuall7 on the upgrade and tremendous private 
fartunes were made overnight. :By 1914, :Braztlts coffee exports 
amounted to 70 per cent of the world total. The war period 
effected a great change, not only in the area of coffee prod-
uction. but in :Brazil's whole economic structure~ The sign!-
ficance of these changes, reinforced b,y the great depression 
and the secand world war, is still a factor to be reckoned w1 th 
in e.:ny consideration of recent economic developments in :Braril·. 
Prior to the advent of World War I, :Brazil • s econotcy" 
was firml7 rooted in the classical theories of national 
5 Since 1822, about five million persons have immigrat-
ed to :Brazil, the bulk of these coming fram south Europe after 
1900. About 34 per cent were Italians, 30 per cent were Port-
uguese11 12 per cent were Spaniards end 5 per cent were Germans. 
The remaining 21 per cent came· from JJl8Jly different lands 
including a sizeable group from Japan. Preston ll~ Janes, 
Latin America, p. 374• 
specialization and free trade. As far as articulate economic 
elements in Brazil were poncerned, the system had worked very 
satisfactori17• They fully recognized-that ~razil was intend~ 
ed for the production of primary products and operated accord• 
i:ngly. As long as manufactured items entered. the country 
freely, and as long as the f&zendeiros had the means to pur-
chase these 1 tems, all was well~i There lii8T have been some 
dissentiDg cr,ys but these could be stifled ri thout 8lQ" great 
difficulty •. 
Soon the Great War came, and it imnediately became 
apparent, even to the fazendeiras, that rl th the shutting off 
of the sourees of manufactured items Brazil was left in an 
extremely preeariaus position• The sole alternative was the 
developnent of home industries and this was done, albeit at · 
great cost• 
With specific reference to coffee, the war precipitated 
a great. shipping shortage and this, of course, led to higher 
coffee prices at the usual purchasing centers, with the resul. t 
that other Ls.tin American countries found it profitable to 
expand coffee production• Dnring the inter-l'ar period Brad.l' e 
coffee producers had a difficult time adjusting to new eond-
1 tiona and the great surpluses being prGdueed had to ·be 
bought up by the government and either stored ar destroyed;.. 
:By 1940, the situation had been largely corrected; indeed, 
present indications. are that tbe Job was too well done, for in 
the face of riai:ng demand Brazilian ·prad'llction has been steadily 
declining•G While rea.Bons fer this paradox are Dl8ll1' and vari4rd~ 
the following factors unist be ·considered:• Firstly, lll8!l7 of 
Brazil's coffee trees have been affected by diseastr, and second ... 
17, production costs have increased as new plantations bave 
been established further and further inland• However, the most 
significant explanation which can be offered is that more and 
more investors have abandoned coffee and have directed their 
capital into other channela;notably( urban real estate; and, 
what is llll1Ch more important., home ·i·ndustrt• 
This shift is S111l.Ptoma.tic of a profound chance in the 
attitude of Dl8JlY' Brazilianlfo CJntil ver;y recently Brazilian 
public opinioR has not been kind to llational, or h6me 1118n11-
faetured products~ Toward the close of the nineteenth cent-
ll'r7 a:nything that was produced locally was usually cansidered 
end, in fact, aften was inferior to a comparable item produced 
abroad. Hewever, this disparity ·in quality has been lessened 
and Brazilians have taken note of the chal2ge with an air of 
pride and confidence. This psychological intangible has served 
as a sollii.d basis far continuing industrial developnent';, 
:During the period from 1920 .... 1940, the number of indu-
trial establisbnents in Brazil increased f'rom 13,33E to 49,418 
6 Reynold E. Carlson, 11Tbe Bases of Brazil 1 s Econ01DY, 11 :Brazil: 
Porttp.it 2f.R!:!!. A Continent, Alexander lr!archa.nt and T. ~ Smith, 
========~iF=====adbt~~a~~P+=229~.==·================================================~======== 
while the number of persons employed .in sueh establishments 
rose from 275.512 to 9oo~ 633• 7 For the year 1940 • consid.ered 
in terms of the value of produetiGn, :Brazil's foodst1l:tf ina:ast-
ry headed the indutrial fielO.. Textiles c8111e second w1 th 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals being third; Metallurgy .• a 
fairly recent arrival Gn the industrial scene, was fourth.; 
Practically all industrial goods produced i~ Brazil were absorb-
ed by local markets.a 
The 1940 census stressed the industrial importance Gf 
Sao ·Paula. It noted that sio Paulo • s industries received 30 
per cent of all industrial ca.pi tal invested in Brazil and that 
34;.3 per cent of the people in industey were employed in Sio 
Paulo establisbmenta,. The ~apid develotment of Sao Paulo and 
other :tm.Portant industrial cities preeipi tated a serio~s popoo 
ulation problem 1~ .that literally theusands af rural workers-
dissatisfied with their lot in the country, rushed to the 
cities in hopes of bettering their economic sta.tuJ•9 
,The importance of the phenomenal growth of :Brazilian 
industry is often overemphasized primarily because of its 
7 Dorival, Teixeira Vieira ltThe Industrialization of 
Brazil," :Brazil: P=o;;.;r~t~r~ai:;:;.t.;;.. of Half a Continent. Alexander Mar-~ _..... ----=- ~ ~~~ ......... 
chant and T .. Lynn Smith. edito~, pp~ 244-64. 
8 Ibido t p. 255. 
9 . Ibid. , p. 256. 
25 
great possibilities for the economic future of :Brazil, b11t the 
ver;y fact that, in 1940,· 68 per ce~t of :Brazil's papulation 
WaD classified as rural serves to bring matters into proper 
perspectiTeo 
Another index of the fundamentally rural or agricul tux-
al nature of the :Brazilian economy was the percentage distri-
bution of principal exports in terms of value. During the · 
·period 1937- 1938; coffee was first with 43.7, next ceme 
raw cotton with 18.4, hid'es and &kins accoUn.ted. for 5.0 
. . 
while caca.o.f'W&s fourth with 4.4. Tobacco, castor beans, 
carnuba wax. and pine l'lllDber totalled 7.1 and textiles. the 
only manufactured item included in the list • accounted for 
only one ~lf of one per cent.lO 
Contr~sting these percentages wi ti ·comparable figo.r·es 
for the year 1929, one signif~cant change·can b~ noted~ In 
l929, coff~e accounted for 71.0 per cent o~·t?tal exports as 
compared with·43.7 for the period 1937- 1938. It t~U$}\ecomes 
apparent that while :Brazil' a economic base was still· essentially 
· ~icultural 8 in 1938, the-overwhelming importance of eoffee 
was not as great as it b.a.d once been and there were positive 
10 Reynold E. Carlso"n, ":Brazill·~ ~R~le .. in International 
Trade," Brazil: Portrait 2!. Hal!. !:.. [Qntinenj;.. Alexander Mar-
chant and T.· Lynn Smith, editors~ p. 284. As is indicated in 
the test, the statistics quo,ted in this section are, for the 
most part,_ based on the 1940 census. All of the figures given 
here are only for purposes of introductory anal~sis. More 
recent figures will be found in Chap. VIII. 
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indications· that Brazilts agriculture was being diversified to 
an appreciable ~xtent. · " 
Focussing our at~entien on· Brazil's industry once again 
we- may observe the following: 
While Brazilian industry is becoming increasingly import-
ant, particularly within the home market structure, it is never-
theless faced with many complex problems. Exc;I..uding such fo~-­
midable handicaps as the sca.rci ty of power, trans:portation, 
ca:pi tal and sui tabl~ 1a.bor, which matters lfill be subs~quently 
dealt with in Chapter VIII, ma.ny_ fundamental obstacles s~ill 
remain. 
First of all, industrial expansion must be based on an 
expanding consumers market. I~ Brazi 1 su.ch a market has been 
very slow to develo:p, primarily because of ·the low :purchasing 
:power of the bulk of the population. Secondly, many of the 
:peo:pl!!' trad.i tionally op:posed to the rise of native industry 
are still extremely influential, :particu.larly in t)le political 
s:phere. J.ny movement ·to erect effective barriers for the 
:protection of home ind.ustry is staunchly opposed by these 
economic interest grou:ps. However, there is a certain amount 
of validi~y _1~ -~heir contention that new barriers m~ serve 
to :promote inefficient and costly production at home. 
To sU]limarize then., Brazil' 8 e~oncimy has traditionally 
been harnessed to the speculative exploitation of one basic 
cr~p or.pro.duct. This monocult~a! ~orm 9f dev~lopment left 
.:Brazil almost exclusively dependent .on the vagar~es 9f world 
demand for· the product on which it was then concentrating. As 
long as world demand remained favorable all was well. Howevel':', 
if world demand slackened, or :Brazil• s prominence in the field 
was challenged by outside producers. the economic stracture 
would collapse like a house of cards and :Brazil would be reaq 
for a new form of speculative development. · This economic 
pattern was not seriousiy challenged until the advent of the 
First World War. 
With the country•s supply of man¢'acture~;.; temporarily 
cut off, her tremendous dependence on the outside world became 
apparent to even the most dogged advocates of economic spec-
ialization and free trade. Since that t~e the great depress-
ion and the Second World War have added considerable weight 
In . 
to the argument that :Brazil .mnst strive for economic ,dependence. 
Efforts to attain this goal have followed two basic courses, 
namely diversified agricultural production and industrialization. 
While notable progress has been effected along these lines, 
:Brazil's economy is still essentially pre~industrial and 
economic independence remains a goal yet to be achieved. 
~ 
I 
ORAPTER III 
KINGDOM, EMPIRE AND REPUBLIC 
~ Ki!!&d,?pt, 
Shortly after the beginning of the.nineteenth century, 
l?ortuga.Vs Royal HoUse of :Braganza ,found ~ts!3~f iA .the l:ln~nvi­
able position of being faced with almost certain annihilation 
at the hands of Napoleon :Bonaparte. The ::Britisht activ~ly 
eng~ed against the forces of the conquering Emperor, came to 
the aid of the future J'Oao VI by transporting him and his 
court of about 15,000 persons, to Rio de Janeiro. With the 
arrival of Joao, Rio became the capital of the kingdom and a 
new era for l3razil was at hand. 
:Brazil's trade took on new importance as a resu.l t of the 
tran~lantation of th~ Royal Court since its ports were Shortly 
opened to world trade. In 1815, seven years after his arrival, 
Dom Joio finally granted his adopted countey full constitution-
~ al rights equal to those of the homeland. :By 1821, Napoleon 
~. 
was safely tucked out of harm1 s way on the island of Saint 
Helena, and Portugal was jealously demanding the retun1 of its 
lawful monarch. Though Joio was reluct~t to leave, he finally 
realized that his crown was in je.upardy and so appoint~ his 
son and heir, Dom Pedro, to be his representative in :Brazil. 
9 
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Before leaving, Joao, conscious of Brazil's growing self-assertive-
ness, advised Pedro to place Brazil's crown on his own head 
should it become necessary, rather .than allow it to go by 
default to some foreign interloper. 
Joao's advice proved to be pure prophesy, for after his 
return to Portugal the Brazilian patriots began clamoring in ... 
cessantly for independence, infuriated by the mother country's 
new policy of relegating Brazil to its former colonial status.l 
The Emuire 
On September 7, 1822, Dom Pedro joined the patriots when 
he uttered the famed Gri to de Ypiranga to a small group of 
companions, thus proclaiming Brazil's independence of the 
motherland. Pedro conferred upon himself the title of Pedro I, 
Emperor of Brazil, having first sworn to rule Brazil as a con-
stitutional monarch. However, Dam Pedro proceeded to handle 
the new legislature in an extremely arbitrary manner, thus 
arousing the ire of the democratic forces led by the great 
Brazilian statesman, Jose Bonafacio de Andrade. Dom Pedro 
was further discredited on two other important count~. Firstly, 
many people could not overlook the fact that Pedro I was 
Portuguese by birth and inclination and might, upon the death 
of his father, attempt to reunite the Portuguese and :Brazilian 
1 Hernane Tavares de Sa, The Brazilians, p. 169. 
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~~wns. Secondly~ ~edro was_h~~d.r~sPQns~~l~ for.t~~ los~ of 
the cisplatine province (U~}, -~l:dctt :~err~ tory_~~~ .bro~ht 
under :Brazil's. control by his father .• Joio VI. SUbjecte,d_~o _. 
great popular pressure, Pedro I abdicated in 1831, in ffi.VO~. of . 
his five year old son, who at least had the advantage of having 
been born on Brazilian soil.2 
The new li'mperor, l!,edro II, was first placed under the 
tutelage a.nd regency of Jos~ Bonafacio. Daring this period, 
political confusion was rampant in :Brazil. On the one hand, 
there were those who were pledged to the est~blishment of a 
republic, while still others tried desperately to have young 
Pedro seated as soon as possible. Four times in seven years 
the regency challged hands , until finally Pedro was crowned 
Emperor of :Brazil on July 18, 1840, at the tender age of fifteen. 
I 
The climate o.f the :Empire under Dom_Pedro II was 
<iecid.edly liberal •. Freedom of speech_ f1Ild ~~e press !er~ assured 
and regular political parties were introduced. Oonservat~ves, 
Liberals, and Progressives formulated their own programs, and 
a Republican party, comnitted to .e.n~i~~ona.rchial and liberal 
principles 1 cm.ne into being .a.f.t~r .. l~7l• .. 
Mu.c:h has b~en wri ~te_n. abc;l~~ ~A~ . no,~l,~, c;tu~.~~~~:r of Brazil's 
enlightened Emperor,3 but a single definitive anecdote seems 
2 Stefan Zw~ig, ~~L: ~d of the Future, p. 70. 
tl: . 
. de sa, ~· cit~, p. 171. 
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wa.s located only ~-few blocks from the imperi~l pa.la.c~, ~ti 
nom J?ed.ro t prone to ~$king early ~orn;ng 1f~£J' -"!!~ n.o:t a.v~rse 
to passing this den of radicalism~ It i~. sai,d th&t when J:le 
passed by the establisbment, loitering republicans would promp..o 
tly doff their hats while the Emperor would return the courtesy 
by boring deep and low!4 
A great humanitarian, Ped:ro•s fall was the inevitable 
outcome of his stand on Negro slavery o Throughout his reign 
Pedro had worked indefatigably for the gradual abolition of 
~razil•s "peculiar institution." However, as a result of the 
adamant opposition of the plantation owners$ little real pro-
gress wu made,5 The »nperor was advised against taking strong 
measures by his oldest statesman. the Yiscount Rio ~ranco who 
knew well enough that such action would precipitate a grave 
economic crisis. 
However, Pedro finally made peace with his personal 
conscience when he inst!'llCted-his eldest daughter, Dona. 
Isabella, heiress to the throne, to introduce a bill calling 
3 For example, see Mary W. Williams, ~m. Pedro the 
!e.g:rgmimoa!_ • 
5 It. mast be noted that such oppositi9n cam~ from the 
owners of the sugar fa.zendas in the" North and not from the owners 
of the coffee fe.zendas in the South. The latter resented the 
unequal competition of slave labor and chaMpionned the · aboli t-
ionist cause. See Mary· W. Williems, ~ Peo;ples, and Politic·s_ 
2! Latin America, p. 7?6q 
for the complete •bolition of slaTery duxing a period when he 
was to be Tisiting in Europe. At last on~ 13 .• 1888. t}?.e 
long awa1 ted law was passed by the Chamber ~f Deputies and 
Isabella thus earn~d her title of A .Redentora or the Reaemp-
tress. Dom Pedro, although seriously ill, returned to :Brazil 
immediately after recei Ting news of. the passage of the ~ 
Aurea, as the abolition llllf was call ea •... 
Ypon his arrival in Rio, the Emperor found that nearly 
all political groups had turned against him. As had been pr~ 
dieted by Rio Branco, the economic crisis was indeed graTe. 
Many former slaves had fled from the plantations into the 
cities, and the plantation owners raised a great hue and cry 
because, having reeei ved 11 ttle or no compensation for the loss 
of their slaTes, they felt th~ had been swindled. 
These pressures were more than the aged Emperor could 
Withstand and so in November, 1889, Pedro II, as had Pedro I 
before him, abdicated. He then left for Europe where he was 
to die two years later, a lonely, heartbroken man. 6 
The Repa.bli.C
1 
Iumediately after the fall of Dom Pedro, a proTisional 
government was established with General Manael Deodoro de 
Fonseca at its heacL From December, 1889, until the following 
• 
November, a cormdttee of five was engaged in drafting a consti-
tution for the federal repu.b;tic of the "United States of 
Erazil." The comudtteets report~astly influenced by~ 
Earboaa, a. member of the provisional ministry-was .finally 
submi~ted to a :r&presenta.tive consiituent assembly, and thz;ee 
months later on February 24. 1891, the new constitution was 
officially promulgated. In its general orientation this docu-
ment closely followed the. Constitution of the United States 
of .AJnerica, proviciiDg for a president, a bwcameral legislature~ 
and an independent judiciary~ All powers not specifically, 
enumerated in the constitution were delegated to the twenty 
states• Suffrage was granted to nearly- all males who could 
read and wr1 te, but this limitaticm was most significant since 
the b1iilk of tlae papulation was illiterate. 7 :Before adjollrning, 
the assembly elected General Deodoro as President of the 
Republic .and Floriano Peixoto as Vic~President. However., 
Deodora proved to be a poor choice; his lack of faet and the 
high llanded ma:mer in which he dealt with Congres~ led to his 
resignation in November~ 1891. Peixoto, who succeeded him 
:Proved to be equally arbitrary and the democratic element.~ led 
by ~ l!arbosa., was nearl7 liquidated.. Peixoto remained in 
office until· late in 1894, when Prudente ldoraes of sio Paulo, 
· · · 7 Karl Loewenstein, Bra.zil Under Vargas, pp. 9 .. lg:~ 
was elected to succeed hiDi• 
·Moraes, Brazil's first civilian president, devoted most 
of his energies to uprooting military men :from civilian offices, 
and bettering Brazil's fil'l8llCial condition.; While he met with 
notable success with respect to his demilitarization campaign, 
he was obliged to leave the solution of the latter problem to 
his successor, llanoel Campos Salles. also a PaW.ist~t.. Salles 
succeeded in getting the House of Rothschild to underwrite 
Brazil' s outstandillg debts and so the critical financial si tuao;;. 
tien was eased. Salles• administration also witnessed the 
initiation of various bolm.Elal7 settlements, moat of which were 
ably- negotiated by the famous ":;.Ba:~en.t liio Branco. 8 
In 1902, · another Paulista, Bodriques Alves, was elected 
President of the Bepublic.. Alves, will long be remembered as 
the benefactor of the city of Rio de Janeiro. l!Tnder his 
guidance, the city was not only beautified, but what is per-< 
haps more impor-tant, was also rid of the dread yellow fever. 
The man directly responsible for this great achievement was the 
eminent Erad~a:n scientist, O.svaldo cruZ. 9 
:87 1906, politieal leaders ill.~ states combined :forces 
in an attempt to break the monopoly which sic Paulo bad held on 
8 Williams, 2:2.• cit., pp. 7ea;..ea. 
9 de S,, 21!.· cit.·, pp. 87-95• 
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the presidency fGr so JDBJlY. years• After a rousing e~ectoral 
battle, they succeeded in electing A!fGnso ~enn&, former gover-
nor- of the state of Minas Gerais, to the office. Penna's 
administration concerned itself primarily with. the atabiliza-
tion of Jh"azil 1s fluctuating currency but was only partially. 
successful}~ Penna"s term of office was cut short by his death 
in J1me,; 1909, and Nilo Pe¥anha, the Vice President ~ook owr 
a 
the reins of government for the remainpr of the term. 
The electoral campaign of 191~ waa one of the most 
exciting in the history of the republic. The conservative 
military candidate, Hermes de Fonseca, was opposed by the 
great Ldberal ~ Barbosa. Military versus civilian control 
was the leading issue al1d l3arbose. sttm~ped the co1llltry- in 
def.enee of tb,e latter.; The elec~ion went to Fonseca and altJ!lo... 
1lgh there were charges of irregular! ties at . the polls, Rtl1' 
Barbosa.failed to contest the elections• 
. j Herme'<~. term of office was soincident with the decl~ne 
of rubber production and a great financial crisis ensued~ 
Ey- 1914, the situation was so b&d that ~ Barbosa declined to 
run for office and tendered_his support to Wenceslau l3raz, a 
man who was acceptable to all factions. Bra.z was able to 
stabilize tpe situation somewhat by securing another loan from 
the Rothsehilds. With the adv~nt of World War I, -the- condit-
ions improved. con~iderabli •. 
========F====================================== ===================*======= 
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As a result of the siDld.ng _ of several :Brazilian ships by 
German submarines, the .Brazilian government declared war on 
Germany in October, 1917• .Brazit·•a contribution to the war 
effort was relativ.J.ly small but it was larger than tbat of ~ 
other Latin American natio~ 
In March, 1918, ex.-.President Rodriques .Uves was again 
elected the country• s chief executi:v..i~ However, he died in 
Janua:cy, 191911 before actually assuming control;. Special elect-
ions were held and once again Rtcy- :Barbosa was defeated, this 
tiiJ.Ie by :Epitacio Pessoa. Pessoa"s administration was subse-
quently plagued by th8 poSt'1'ar Sllllllp which hit most COUntrieS 
duriDg this period.. lfo economist, Pessoa follawed the line of 
least resistance by resorting to the printing press•10 
- .Arth'ar Eernardes, a lfi.neiro, (native· of Minas Gerais), 
was duly elected president in 1922;. However • prior to· his 
inauguration on July 5 11 192.2·. a gro~ or- diaatdent &.r'lll1' officera 
ran up the flag of revolt in the Copacabw Fortresa and began 
shelling the capital city. 
. #.. . . 
President Pessoa succeeded in· 
crushing tbe revolt but only after making martyrs of tbe major 
participants. 11 
:Bernardes became heir to the general discord which 
10 Will~sms. sm,. cit., p. 787 • 
11 de S,, S!lt• cit. • pp. 179-84. 
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attended the :lm:nediate post""W'ar slump and the feolharey econ-
omic. •remedies" practiced ~ Pessoa.. On the advice. of a special 
commission of ~rit~sh fine.neie.l experts. ~ernercles adopted a 
conservative economic policy of strict econ~ and retrench-
ment• RoW'ever~ this approach was opposed in many quarters and 
in July~ 19.349 an armed insurrection broke olll.t in Sic Paulo. 
It took the federal troops three we~s to bring the situation 
under control. Sporadic outbreaks were also suppressed in 
several of the nort}lern state!i• The :Bernardes gove~ent was 
able to complete its te~ of office~ but·not without establish-
ing martial law in many parts of . the country\~ 
In llarch._ 1~269 . another Paulista. Washington Luiz 
Pereira de Sousa was elected President• He also was obliged 
to suppress numerous ~sings.· particularly in the ·South and 
Wes-t:~ EconGmie conditions deteriorated still further with 
the onset of the great . depression but Luiz continued :f~llowing 
:Bernardes r policy of economic retrenclmient. 
The electeral campaign ef 193Gj"was ·extremely vigorous It 
often punctuated by violence. The opposition, seekiDg to break 
the PaulistBI""ldneiro a:rls, orge:oized a Liberal Alliance in 
support of the· governor of the state of Bio Grdde d"O: Sul 9 
GetUlio Dornelles Vargas. Election returns clearly indicated 
that the administration candidate from SiO Paulo, Julio 
Prestes~ had won by a large majority. Cries of fraud and 
. . ' . 
\. 
• 
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meddling immediately arose in the Liberal camp. Popular dis-
'satisfaction was rife and on October 3, 1930, the forces of the 
Liberal Alliance initiated a revolt which gained momentum as it 
rolled toward the federal capital. On the twentu-fourth, govern-
ment troops guarding the capital gave way to the rebel forces, 
a,nd a naval and military junta secured the resignation of Washing-
ton Luiz and·proclaimed GetUlio Vargas provisional president of 
:Srazil. 12 
After thirty-nine years of precarious existence the Rep-
. 
ublic had finally teetered and fallen, largely because of its 
failure to recognize the need for change. The Republican 
institutions, which had developed over the years had remained 
the exclusive province of the rich, the educated, and the well 
born. Little effort was made to improve the political and 
economic status of most of the people of :Brazil. The Liberal 
Alliance represented ma.:ny things to many ment but to all who gave 
it their support, it meant change. Frustrated in their efforts 
to inaugurate a new era by constitutional means, the liberals 
cho~se revolution and emerged victorious. 
The scene was now set for change but, as we shall sub-
sequently note, there was a wide divergence of opinion as to 
exactly what change~ should be made. How and by whom? Should 
12 Williams, .QR. ill·, :p. 790. 
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those now in control sever all ties lfith the pastt Should the 
representative constit-utional form of gc:,.vermnent be 8UI11118rilT 
abandoned! These· wer~ questions to which only the fu.ture 
ceuld previde answers. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE FIRST REIGN OF GET11LIO V.ARG.AS 
The Period of The National Revolution· 
In November, 1930, the Republican Constitution of 1891, 
was suspended and replaced by a decree law which amounted to a 
provisory constitution. Legislative and executive powers were 
combined in the person of the president, until such time as a 
Constituent .Assembly should be elected to decide on the. reorganize.-
tion of the country 1 s political life. In the meantime, Congress 
was dissolved, civil rights were ~uspended, and interventors, 
chosen by the president, replaced the governors of the states. 
In short, Brazil was now under dictatorial rule. 1 
Utilizing his newly acquired powers, Vargas did his best 
to stabilize the economic situation by imposing additional taxes 
•. 
to replenish the depleted treasury, and by eliminating interstate 
tariffs on food products and other necessities. Various attempts 
were made to limit sugar and coffee production in an effort to 
prevent further deterio~ation of the extremely deflated markets 
for these commodities. Certain concessions were made to Labor; 
notable among these were the establishment o:f the minimum wage, 
l Karl Lowenstein, Brazil Under Vargas, pp. 17-18. 
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the forty-eight hour week and the restriction of imadgration~2 
Political discontent began to be voiced over the fact 
t~t ne date had yet been set for the election of delegates 
to the Constituent Assembly, mentioned in the decree law of 
1930~ Finally11 in llq, 1932• Vargas yielded to popular pressure 
and set ~ 3 11 1933, as the election date. There was great 
indignation in ll18lJy quarters over the remoteness of this date -
and on July 9, 1932"~~ the state of Sio Paulo rose in opposition 
to Getihio VargaS:; Three months later. the govermnent 's forces 
emerged victorious and ·:many of the Paulista leaders were obliged 
to seek refuge abroad .. 3 
:8!,. Constitution 2!. 1934 
Delegates to the eo:asti tutional .Assembly were elect·ed on 
the scheduled date. The Constitutional Commission~ selected by 
Vargas 9 presented its report to the Assembly in November, 1933. 
Eight months and more than a thousand amendments later, the 
A.ssemblT finally adopted the second constitution of the Bepablie 
o:f :Brazil• 
A.ccordiDg to this document the presidentts term of office 
was to be for four years and his immediate reelection was 
prohibited. As in the case of the Constitution of 1891, there 
2llary if. Willians, ~People and Politics o:f Latin~;... 
ica, p. 790. · 
3 Lowenstein, 2E,c. cit., p. 20, end Williams, 2:1?.· £!!., :p. 79lo 
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was to be -a two-boUBe ·legislature, but an innovation was added 
in that fifty representatives, of various oceupati~Dnal· and pro-
fessional groups, were to be' chosen to sit w1 th the Chamber a:f 
Deputies. Several provisions :favoring Labor were also· included 
and federal control over state affairs was ·lessened. 4 On -July, · 
1934' .Vargas was elected President by the Ass~bly and elections 
:for Congress were held in October. The next three years wit ... 
nessed several astounding political dev~lopments which have 
co~ored Brazilian. politics down to the present9 Since·these 
events centered largely about Communism and F~lsm, it· is 
necessary that we discuss, at some length, these two ~t~Pects 
of political extremism with particular reference to their operw 
ations in Brazil, prior to March_, 1935 .. 
~razilian Comamni~ and. #,uiz Carlo~ Prestes 
The· legal :formation of the_. Communist Party of Bra~il 
dates back to ¥arch, 1922.. At that time the party ·sta1;ed c 
very :frankly that it was founded on Marxist principles.. The 
reader will recall that in July. of that year the Pessoa govern~ 
ment was obliged to suppress an incipient revolt led b,y a gro~ 
of young army officers who had been disaffected by the election 
of Arthur Bernardes. Suspecting Communist complicity in this 
_ 4 Lowenstein, !i• Q!i. , :pp.t 21-26, and W:illiams, !21?.· ill_._, 
p. !792-. 
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plot, Pessoa declared the Comnunist party illegal• The party· 
then went Underground, 5 wlllere it. remained until the promulgation 
of the Constitution of 1934., which by guaranteeing the freedom 
of political association allowed the Commnni~ts to organise 
the Al,iJ!:U!i.&o Nacional Libertadora (National Alliance for Liberty);. 
The movement succeeded in attracting Ill8DY' competent leaders. 
the most dynamic among them being Luiz C&rlQs Pre.stes•6. 
Prestes is one of t~e most fascinating and celebrated 
political leaders in all Brazil• Son of an~ officer, 
Prestes upheld· the famil;r tradition by becoming an army engineer~ 
Like so ma.ny young army lieutenants during the early twenties, 
Prestes participated in -several unsuccessful uprisings against __ the 
Bernardes government~ However, immediately following the 
Paulista uprising of 1924, Prestes wa..s able to keep a detachment 
of "fifteenburidred men·in.the'field for two years, despite 
strong government opposi tiarlo :During those years, Prestes and 
hiS men maT'Ched some twel. ve thousand miles Up and down the vast 
interior of Brazil, fighting government forces all alcilg the 
route. This remarkable militarY venture was mSde possible 
largely because of Prestes' astounding influence over his officers 
5 Pinto do Ce.rmo, Di~trizes Partidarias, p;. 303. 
6 Lowenstein. 2li,. cit.·, P:P. 30.:..31·. 
44 
The "March" enabled Prestes to observe, at first hand, 
the horrible living conditions endured by the rural masses. 
Wherever he went, Prestes <l:ld his best to alleviate the suffer-
ing of the ca.boclos, as the rural workers ere commonly_ called • 
. Nor did the caboclos forget Prestes• Years after the passage 
o£ the now famous Prestes Column, it was common to find in ,the 
straw covered huts of ~razilta hinterland, little al~ars de- · 
dicated to Prestes~ 
Finally. driven to the brink of .utter .despair, the 
. 
Column. crossed Brazil 1 s western border into Bolivia. While 
Prestes was able to .negotiate a general amnesty for his 
enlisted personnelt he and his fellow ~fficers were denied 
such beneficence~ F.leeing to Argentina. Prestes spent much 
of his time there parttsing ma:DJr standard works on Marxism. He 
returned to Brazil in 1930, to support Vargas• L1 beral Alliance-~. 
Luiz. Carlos had by this time become so enthusiastic about 
Scientific Socialism that he decided to 8o to Russia. There 
he 11 ved for four years, working as. an engineer in factories 
and on hydroelectric projects. There, too~ he met and marr-
ied a young German Oommonist named Olga Benar1o.7 
~-~-=-=-==-~~====~~===- ================================c========~4~===== 
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Bradli~ Fascism ~ Plinio Salgado a 
The Integralist movement, the Brazilian version of inter-
national Fascism,. came into prominence under the leadership of 
Plinio Salgado. In the mid.otwenties, Plinio . Salgado was en-
joying an enviable reputation as one of Brazil t s leadi:ng intell ... 
ectua1s and 11 tterateurs. later in the decade he temporarily 
forsook literature and began to focus his attention on politics. 
More specifically, he became extremely interested in the pol-
i tical ideas of Benito Mussolini. He soon began composi:ng 
lengthy dissertations on a socio-political doctrine which he 
termed Integral! sm.. Jut before the end of the decade, Salgado 
was doing p pretty good job of selling his wares to the younger 
intellectuals of Brazil!. Early in 1936, he went to Rome for the 
express purpose of visiting Il Duce. Fired with enthuslam. and 
intent upon vigorous action, Salgado returned to Brazil in 
October, only to find that the Liberal Alliance~ led by Getllio 
Vargas, had alreadJr stolen the scene. Plinio bit his tongue 
and sat back to bide his time. 
In February, 1932, the Society for Political Studies was 
organized in the city of Sio Paulo. This organization was 
founded for the purpose of coordinating the stu.dy of the RJ!rew 
8 The following ac,count is based primarily on Frederico del 
Villar's, 1 Lit'e and Death of Brazilian Fascism," Inter-.America.n 
[Monthly]., 2:16, June, 1943 • .Uso see Lowenstein, ll· cit., 
pp. 33-34. 
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Idea," and was endorsed~ forty of Brazil•s leading intellectual 
and literary personalities. ~ortly thereafter, Salgado under-
took a vigoreus lecture tour which teok him to all parts of 
Brazil. Soon, Integralist organizations sprang up in all of the 
major cities of Brazil. Numereus authorities on Integral! sm. 
delivered talks on the gabject to workers and students. 
By the middle of the year, unrest was rampant in the city 
of Sio Paulo. Many Paulists felt that the Integralists present-
ed a serious threat and anti•Integralist riots soon ~oke out. 
The plant of the Integralist party ergan, &, Q.ffensi VA• was 
sacked. However, when the .lio Paulo revolution brake out in 
July, the Integralists failed to capitalize on the confusion, 
mainly because they had been unable te gain mass support • 
. 
Early in 1933, the Integralists adopted certain political 
trappings similar to these of their colleagues abroad. Active 
memberl!l of the various Integralist groups were to wear, on 
certain occasions as determined by the national leadership, 
white trousers and green shirts rl th the Greek letter sigma on 
the left sleeve. The official. salute was to be the same as 
that used by the Fascists' in Italy; while the official greeting, 
borrowed from the Tu.pi Indians, was Anaue which roughly trans ... 
lated, means Greetings, or Hail. 
In .1\pril, the .Movement for National Integralist Action 
was reco¢.zed by the Brazilian Ceurt of Electoral Justice aa a 
====--=-=-=-======================---==--=~--- ~r=-==-===== 
legally constituted party. The Integralis_t .let~ on __ proceeded 
to grew phenomenally. In the ~outhern stat~s of Rio Grande do 
&11. and Santa Cata·lfina~ IJl8llY' of the German settlers end their 
children. first gen~ration Brazilians., rallied abou1i the Inta-
gralist banner. Toward the end of 1933, sio Paulo"s :S~a.zilian 
National Socialist Party, as well as its Brazilian Fascist 
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Party, overseas branches of the German Nazi and Itali$.U Fascist 
parties respeeti vely, made cormnon cause ri th Salgado *s 
~ 
Integralists .. 
'flle extent to whieh Nazi ideology permeated_- Integralism 
is revealed by the anti-Semi_tic activities of the Integralist 
Action. Gustavo :Barroso,. Salgado's rightooob.and manct penned 
voluminous quantities of anti-Semetic propaganda comparable to 
any of ~ Goebbelt most vituperative material. Nor did the 
Integralists merely voice their anti--Semitism; their .raid o1!l 
the Jewish colony of Porto Al~e is a mat~er of record. 9 
The Communist. Uprisig, of 1936 
Early in November, 1935, Olga and Luiz Carlos Prestes 
returned to Brazil. On the seventeenth of that month, elements 
of the army and navy began revolts in Rio and Pernambuco. These 
uprisings,. supposedly engineered by Prestes, were suppressed 
with considerable bloodshed.. Vargas utilized the situation to 
9 Ibid. t p .. 19. 
-
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obtain from Congress the right to declare a "state of war" and 
subsequently ta establish a special· tribunal ~or dealing with 
pol1 tical offenders. Shortly thereafter • Preste~ and his wife 
were taken into custoccy-•. Luiz Carlos was ·sentenced to seven--
teen years of penal servitude, and Olga, though pregnant, was 
deported to Ge~ where she eventually met. rl th death at the 
badds of the Nazis. Hundreds of other suspected Communists 
were arrested, and many of these were either incarcerated, 
deportedc.,-in the case of al:i:eruiryr e:rlled.lO 
~ ~ d1~tat !t November 1e, 1937 
In October, 1937" "{argas again secured fJ>om Congress the 
right to detlare a •state af war" on the grounds that the Reds 
were again threatening to overthrow :Brazil's social and political 
institutions.. It must be noted that_ the electeral campaign 
pre4eding the elections, which had been scheduled for Janua17, 
1938, was currently in full swing. The Conservatives had 
chosen Jos!S Wl'ico de .Almeida, former Minister of Public Works 
' . 
under Vargas; while the Liberal- Democrats had nominated· the 
former governr:>r of the state o£ Sio Paulo, Armando Salles de 
Oliveira. Al sr:> very mllCh in the rlml'li.ng was the ::Sra£1 lian 
"Fuehrer," -Plinir:> Salgado; who .had publicly pledged to previde 
Vargas with lOOc,OOO wellatrained. Integralii!t!l to aid in the 
10 Lowenstein, !12.· cit., p .. 31, and Williams, ~· cit. 
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fight against Oo!Jll!lUD,ism. 
It was obvious to all that Brazills constitutional inter-
lude was abou.t to come to a close. However-. only Vargas. his 
chief of staff G8es Monteiro, and his Minister of' War Eurico . 
Da.tra11 knew precisely what measures wo~d be taken. Some Gbser~ 
vers believed that the Integralists were waiting to take Rio by 
phone. Vargas made no commitments but proceeded to act with 
consummate skill. 
On November 10 11 193? it federal troops . surrounded the 
Palacio Tiradentes, seat of the Chamber of Deputies. All depu-
ties arriving for· the session were politely but firmly turned 
awq. Vargas then took to the airw~s and announced to the 
people of :Brazil that 11 in response to public opinion and with 
the support of the armed forces t he was to continue in office 
as president, that Congress was to be dissolved, and that the 
Constitution of 1934 wa.S to be replaced with the already .drafted 
Constitution of the Estado ~ (New State). In one fell swoop 
l3razills political structure had been completely altered and not 
·a single shot had been firea.ll 
The Constitution of the Estado Novo was •lmost exclusively 
the work of Vargas1 .Minister of Education, Fre.ncis~o Campos. 
According to its proVisions the president•& term was extended 
11 Ibid.~ pp. 36-37. 
-===H==== 
50 
frem four . to six years and his powers ·were increased tremendously. 
A National Economic Council, chiefly consultative, was to be 
composed of representatives of various branches of national prod~ 
uction., to be elected by professi<;~nal groups or syndicates. 
This clearly indicated Vargas' preoccupation with"'**- corporat ... 
ivistic concepts such as were currently being put into operation 
in Fascist Italy end Portugal. The section on Economic Life, 
besides providing for minimum wages, and the eight hour ~, 
also mentioned annual holidaTs with p~, social security, 
medical assis'tence for workers and expectant mothers, and the 
restriction of night work and child labor. Vargas promised that 
the Constitution would be submitted to a naticma.l ple~seite 
but failed to set a. specific date, end indeed he never did 
fulfill his promise. As in the peried immediately fallawing 
the revolution of 1930, Vargas again ruled by decree.12 
The In.tegralists Curbed. 
Following the November, .1937 ~ £2!m,, Vargas knew that he 
had little to fear from the ald constitutional·parties but the 
Integralists were still active and constituted a. real·'threat. 
Their hopes had run high immediately after the coup, but it soon 
became apparent that Vargas had na intention of letting these 
people into the ruling circle. 
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In December, Vargas issued a d&'cree law· outlawing all 
poll tical parties. This dealt the Integralists. a· heavy blow. 
During the following months, acts of individual ·violence and 
terroriSin occurred~ and arrests went on apace~ · The situation 
reached a climax in May, 1938, when a group of. di~gruntled 
Integralists staged a £Q!I£ with the aim of assassinating Vargas 
and seizing power by force. · The plot was foiled when GetUlio 
and his daughter i Alzira, held off the attackers of Guanabara 
Palace with revolvers and rifles until help arrived. 
After this incident, Vargas really applied the pressure·. 
1ntegralism became anathema end hundreds of conspirators were 
sentenced to the penitentiaries and penal colonies. In due 
course .. Salgado left :Brazil for Port-ugal, where he remained until 
the end of the European phase of World War 11.13 
Consolidation ~ ~ Second World W8.ll. 
~ing the period. 193&-1940, Get..Uio Vargas concentrate a 
on consolidating his position at home and abroad. He surrounded 
himself with m&n7 capable cabinet officers and advisors. :By 
and large, all of these people worked vigorously to promote the 
Vargas program which underlined such matters as. the developnent 
of natural resources, manufacturing and industry; the tighten-
ing of control over foreign business in :Brazil, and the 
13 Ibid. J :pp. 141 ... 144. 
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implementation of a broad social welfare pr0gram. 
With the outbreak of World War II~ Vargas, after a 
rather brief period .of "fence walking," decided to c!!l.St his lot 
with the Allies. Early in 1941, negotiations between Brazil 
and the United States resul tt:~d in the strengthening of old 
naval and air bases on :Srarl:il' s East coast, and in the building 
of others. These and later bases not only served as .impGr,ta.nt 
outposts for defen•se but subsequently became vi tal links i.n 
supplying allied troops in North Africa and Europe. In exchange 
for these concessions, :Sra1il received substantial loans tram 
the United States Export•Import :Sank to further her growing 
industrial establishment. 
On January 28, 1942, at the Rio conference of American 
Foreign Ministers, :Brazil announced the severance of relations 
with the .Axili~ On August 22, 1942, largely because of' Nasi 
submarine actions against :Brazilian vessels, the Vargas govel"n-' 
ment declared war on Gel'!Dally' and Ital;yo 
During the war years, Vergas was faced with a rather 
serious problem with respect to certain large German elements 
of the population, in the southern part of the country. As it 
turned out this problem was handled very effectively albeit 
arbitrarily. 
:Brazil was the only Latin American country to provide 
the Allied Command with an expeditionary force. The officers 
and members of the Brazilian Expeditionary Fo.rce gave an excell-
ent account of themselves in the fierce and bloody Italian 
campaign. While Brazilian saldiers were fighting and dying 
in the cause of freedom and democracy • their own government 
remained paradoxically dicte.torla.l;. It was said that 
Brazil was awa1 ting the ret-urn of democracy. but there were 
those who. were skeptical. inspi te of· the fact that as early 
as November • 1943, Vargas· had announced. that after the war the 
people would be consul ted amply and definitively regarding 
readjustments of the counteyts poll tieal straeture.l4 
/ 
14 Williams, Ql?. cit., pp. 194-96• 
PART TWO 
CIU.PTER v 
PBELUilE TO DUTRA 
~Return af Political Liberties 
Wi tb the European phase of World War II r~pidly coming to 
e. close, :Brazilian democracy continued to await further devel ... 
opnent s. On September 7 • 1944, the. occasion of :Br~zil' s one-
hundred@twenty-second anniversary of independence from Portugal, 
Vargas reiterated his earlier promise of a return to the princi-
ples of democracy~ It will be recalled that the representatives 
of the big three, plus China, were then meeting at Dumbarton 
Oaks~ thrashing out a specific program in preparation for the 
proposed San Francisco conference. Vargas undoubtedly knew very 
well that the 1J18.D7 undemocratic aspects of his regime would 
mUii;:a.te against Bra.zilfs chances of playing a leading role 
among the United Nations • 
.A.t home~ anti ... Vargas forces were becaming increasingly 
articulate. There had been talk of a Uniao Democr!tiea 
:Brasileira (:Brazilian Democratic Union), and a limited amount 
of political literature was being circulated clandestinely. 
It was said that many- important political leaders. former'~ 
Vargas associates as· well as pre-1930 Constitutionalists ,were 
directing the new opposition movement. As early as November. 
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1943, a. mimeographed manifest(;') appeared, which had been signed 
by a group of outstanding Mineiro intellectuals, including 
Odilon Braga, former Minister of Agriculture und~r Varg~s. and 
Affonso Penna, former president of the old Liberal Alliance. 
In part, this manifesto read, 
If we are fighting against fascism alongside the 
United Nations so that freedom and democracy may 
be established in all countries, it is certainly 
not too much to claim for ourselves the rights 
and guarantees which characterize democracy .1 
In SSG Paulo there were indications that certain leading· 
industrialists were joining opposition forces sine~ they were 
fearful that Vargas would yield to post1'a.r economic pressures 
and mollify ~razilian labor at their.expense.2 
Early in January, 1945, an- incident occurred which clearly 
revealed that Vargas was losing his grip. Jose Am~rico de 
Almeida, conservative presidential candidate in the elections 
scheduled for January-, 1938, which, of course, were cancelled by 
Vargas in October, 1937, ran a signed editorial in the widely 
read Rio daily, the Correio ~ Ma.nhi in which he severely cri ti-
cized Vargas for failing to live u~to his prc:mrl.ses concerning 
1 Underground docunents cited by Jose Alvarez del Vayo, 
"Brazil Has an Underground," ~ Nation_. ~58: 249, Febru.ary 26, 
1944• 
2 Frederico del Villar, 11:Srazil Turns the Corner," Inter-
American [Monthly J , 4: 13 ff. , May, 1945. · See -ai"se Samuel Wainer. 
"Vargas in Modern Dre~s, 11 ~ Nation~.r. 160:277, March 10, i945. 
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the return to democratic principles. 
This was of particular significance becauae it had been 
released_ despite the strict censorship of Vargas' Department_ of 
Press and Propaganda, usually referred to a15 the DIP. What is 
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more important still, is that the DIP faile~ to take s:ny action 
against either Jose Americo or the Correio ~Manhi. The 
opposition had broken through Vargas 1 defenses and the old 
pU.Cha (natives of Rio Grande do Sul are often referred to as 
ga-ilchos) had failed to make aey effort to close the breach, which 
as we shall see~ grew incr,asingly wide with ·the passage af time. 
On February 25$ 1945, Vargas probably realizing that it 
would be better to yield a little more if he were not ta lose 
-- all, publically confirmed the. return af freedom of the press and 
promised that elections would be held soon. On the same ~ 
Vargas decreed the "Additional Act, n an amendment to the Con-
, 
sti tution of 1937, which was to pave the w~ for democracyts 
return. This act endorsed the republican form of goverEment 
and proclaimed that all literate Brazilians over the age of 
eighteen would have the right to vote in subsequent elections.3 
It also provided for the direct election of the president, thus 
abolishing the old electoral college system. There were no 
3 In a. subsequant~decreed electoral law, beggars, military 
personnel on active duty? and persons without political rights 
were also disqualified. See "Brazilian Elections Jell," Inter-
American, [Monthly} 4:6, June,_l945. 
c, 
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provisions limiting Vargas' extensive decree powers or abolish-
ing the DIP. 4 
During the period immediately following the promulgation 
of the Additional Act, there began a flurry of pol~tical organ-
izational activity such as had never been seen in Brazil. 
Perhaps the most cohesive and experienced group was that represent-
ed by the enemies of the revolution of 1930, the Paulista 
revolutionaries who had severed relations with Vargas in 1932, 
and thousands of democrats opposed to the Est ado Novo. These 
were the people who read the underground publications distri-
buted by the group, which was spoken of as the Uniao Democratica 
Brasileira. It was generally known that the acclaimed leader 
of the Uniao was Air Brigadier Eduardo Gomes~ ·about whom we 
shall have more to say later. 
Many of the people associated with the press were oriented 
toward the Uniao and we soon find many of Brazil 1 s leading dailies 
deroand.ing that Vargas decree a general amnesty which would allow 
exiled leaders of the Uniao to return home. The Communists 
were also vitally interested in an amnesty, since their leader, 
Luiz Carlos Prestes, had been in prison for nine long years. 
4 11Democracy by Decree, 11 Time 1 45:48, March 12, 1945 . 
.Also see 11Erazil Uncensored," Inter-American [Monthly}. 4:12, 
April, 1945. The DIP was finally abolished on May 30, 1945. 
See Frederico del Villar "Brazil and the Gagmen,n Inter-
American [Monthly}, 4:15, July, 1945. 
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There were indicatimns that Vargas might~ indeed. he more 
favorably disposed to l?restes, in view of certain conn:n.unica::tfons 
which Prestes had been releasing to his underground followers 
via his attorney, who acted as an intermediary between Prestes 
and the rank and file. In a letter, intercepted by the autho-
i ties, Prestes indicated that Vargp;s merited the supp:ort of 
all conn:n.unists since he was engaged in the war against fascism 
in alliance with the Soviet Union.. The communists, in pleading 
for Prestes' release made conspicuous use of this document.5 
This sort of propaganda proved effective, for Prestes was 
released on the nineteenth of April, 1945· 
.At the other end of the ideological spectrum the Integ-
ralists awaited word from their leader in exile, Plinio Salgado. 
Early in May, Salgado, writing from Portugal, addressed a letter 
to his followers, urging them to be ready to organize once 
again as a legal party~ Leaders of the movement in Brazil, then 
launched. a newspaper campaign cl.esigned to convince Btr-azilians 
that Integralism was neither Nazi nor Fascist, but purely 
Brazilian.6 
From the first, Eresicl.ent Vargas had. stated that he 
would. not be a candidate to succeed himself and had unoffically 
encl.orsed Minister of War Eurico Dut#a. Sp.eaking at a May Day 
5 "Brazil Uncensored, 11 loc. cit. 
(,6 "What is it?" Inter-American ~onthl~. 4t9, May, 1945, 
and also see "Integralismo,"' Newsweek~:70, Ma~ 28, 19~. 
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rally in ltlo. Vargas tald sixty thousand. workers assembled at 
the Vasco d&_Gama S~adium, "~mission is compl~ted~ I shall 
return to prd."Vate life, placing the government in the hands of 
those whom the people may lawfully elect ·-. • • Gener~ Do.tra 
deserves all the consideration of the nation."? Did this exelude 
the possibility of his being drafted by his old Sllpporters? No 
one knew. 
On M!cy' 3, an electoral law, supplementing the· Ad.di tional 
Act of Februa:ry, was published in the Official Gazette. One of 
the more importan_t provisions was that de~ing with the org-
a.nizationr,"'. of political parties. The lBlf merely required that 
one hundred signatures be collected and that the duly registered 
party must poll one hundred votes in any: election~ in order te 
retain recognition. <me interesting and significant qual.ifica .. ••/. 
tion was that ne party could be registered if its program viol ... 
ated democratic principles.B As can be imagined, this posed 
something of a problem for the extremist groups. However~ as 
we shall see 9 both groups were finally able to overcome this 
obstacle. 
The scene was n01f complete. The proper stage directions 
had been issued and all the principal characters with their 
respective supporting casts, were on stage. Soon the announcement 
7 "Mission Completed," Newsweek • 25: 64, May 14, 1945. 
8 !!2£.. £!i. t 
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that elections would be held on December 2, 1945, would officially 
raise the curtain on one of the most vigorous electoral campaigns 
ever witnessed in Latin America. 
Before proceeding with an account of the campaign let us 
first examine, in some detail, the basic orientation and leader-
ship of the major political parties, which by this time had 
become fairly well organized. 
The U:.D.N. Party Program 
The party fundamentally opposed to Vargas, the Uniao Demo-
cratica Brasileira, subsequently registered as the Uniao Democratica 
Nacional (National Democratic Union) and commonly referred to as 
the UDN, based its program on what, for lack of a more sui table 
term, may be called democratic conservatism. A few excerpts taken 
from the official UDN party program will serve to highlight the 
fundamental principles underlying the UDN 1s raison d'etre. 
[Preamble] 
The National Democratic Union recognizes the need for 
and supports a process of democratization for Brazil, 
for the purpose of promoting the political and econ-
omic well-being of all Brazilians. 
Democracy 
I -- to attain a true democracy; b) by a represent~ 
ati ve, consci,entious and legi tima.te regime based on 
universal suffrage and the secret ballot ... 
Capital 
I -- To appeal for foreign capital, which is necess-
ary ••. for the development of our still unexplored re-
sources, and to ensure such capital of equitable treat..;. 
ment as well as liberal interest rates. 
.e 
Land 
II .-. The agrarian policy shall include the follow-
ing obJectives:. c) on each large property en area 
sufficient for the cultivation of cereals necessary 
for the subsistence of the worker must be reserved 
and he must be _given sufficient time to-cultivate 
such an area •.• 
.... Foreign Policy 
I - The foreign relations of 13razil sho11ld be based 
on: b) the postulates of the ~nited Nations; c) the 
integration of the community of the American 
nations. ~L 
~:Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, Leader of ~ UDNlO 
sa 
In :Brazil, Air :Brigadier Eduardo Gomes is aptly consid-
ered a national hero. Indeed~ his early exploits as a young 
army lieutenant are almost legendary. In July • 1922, Gomes was 
one of the Dozoi to 9£, Forte 2:!t Oopacaba.ns. (eighteen of the Copa.-
cabana Fortress.) This brings us to an historical narrative 
which is familiar to every schoolboy in 13raz11.11 
On July 5. 1922, the Copacabana: Fortress, which dominates 
the harbor of Bio de Janeiro, began shelling the only two 
battleslUps 13razil had, the Sio Paulo and the Minas Gerais. 
What happened was that the garrison of the Cope.cabana. Fortress 
had revolted as a sign of protest against the newly elected 
9 J.A. Pinto do Carmo, Diretrizes Pe.rtid.a.rias, p. 48. 
10 Frederico del Villar, "13re.zilian Air Chief, 11 Inter-
American [Monthly], 2:15, August, 1943. 
11 ~, chap. III, p. 36. 
63 
Bernsrdes government. In view of the imp~~ble position of 
the jortress. the government forces were unable to dislodge the 
revolutionaries by force and so a t:bree week stalemate ensued. 
On July 31, 145 disgru:ntle9- and hungry tro!1)P.J surrendered to the 
government forces. However, eleven officers and six enlisted 
men chose to remain in the·fortreas.l2 In a few minutes Lieuten-
ant Siqueira Campos rang up the .Army Chief of Staff and informed 
him that the remaining seventeen meR were coming out, fighting! 
A few minutes later, true to his word, Lieutenant Campos and his 
sixteen companions filed out of the fortress to meet three full-
strength government regiments. After being repeatedly ordered· 
to halt~ the bold little band opened fire and was in turn fired 
upon. Only two men s-urvived the onslaught and ·only one, Air 
Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, survives taday.l3 
After the Oopacabana Fortress episode, Gomes spent his 
time alternately between hospitals and jails. ·The year 1930 
found him in the Liberal Alliance, fighting for ·Vargas. For 
years, Gomes, a :first'"'t'ate aviator, had dreamed of establishing 
an air mail system in Brazil. Under the tutelage of the new 
president.1 Gomes founded the llrazilien Military Air Mail System 
12 The eighteenth member of the heroic group was a Brazil• 
ian expatriate named Octavio Correa. Correa joined the seven-· 
teen recalci trents when they :fina.~ly left ~he :fortress. · 
13 The other survivo:. was Lieutenant Campos. He was 
killed in a.n airplane accident in.l930. 
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early in 1930. Under ~is inspiring leadership ::Srazills new 
system .as soon acclaimed by experts as one of th~ best in the 
world. The sio Paulo revolution of 1932 faund Gomes in the 
government camp. 
In 1941 i ;t.n ac~ord.a.nce rl th a plan drBJm up by Gomes, 
:Brazil t·s Army • Navy~ and ci vi lien aviaUon were welded into _a. 
::Sra.dlian Air Force. This Air Fo_rce was to be directed by a 
Minister of Aerona.utics. While a. civilian was chosen to head 
I 
the new Ministry, Gomes was made Military Chief of the new 
·Air Force. 
During World War II, Gomes was put in charge of Brazil• s 
northeastern coast, which was the area most vulnerable to 
attack. Under his direction, this sector of :Brazil's coa.at 
was mightily strengthened. As Commander of the Second Air 
Zone_, Gomes also played a very important role in establishing 
the vi tal air-route from the United States to North Africa via. 
Na.tal. Taward the close of the war~ because of his criticism 
.of Vargas, Gom~ was ·relieved of his field command and given 
a. desk job in Bio. 
The ~ Party Program, 
When General Eurico Gaspar Du:tta relinquished hDs post 
as Minister of War in order to become a. cmididate for the. 
presidency, his supporters immediately began organizing a 
new party which came to be.calied the Partido Social Democratico 
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(Social Democratic Part:r) commonly referred to as the PSD. An 
examination of the official PSD part:r program reveals that the 
PSD endarses the fellowi~ propositions: 
Domestic Policy 
3 -- Electoral Justice and the Secret Ballot. 
11 ~Freedom of the Press, qualified onl:r by its 
responsibility to the general public. 
Social Organization 
5 -. Preserving the minimum wage • • as a: necessity 
for ~ntaining adequate living standards for the 
worker and his family. 
9-- Extending social security te all citizens ••• to 
cover such expenses as are incurred at the time of 
birth, marriage, death, and ill health ••• the cost te 
be defncy-ed jointly by the state and the individual. 
Financial and Ecene~c Policy 
11 -w Establisaing tariffs for the purpose of defend~ 
ing the national economy-, particularly during its 
consolid$tion ••• 
14 -- Stimulating the creation of national capital 
and sa;feguerding foreign capital ••• 
Foreign Pol~.cy 
2 - A regime based on mutual cooperation with 
all natiens, recognizing the principle of compul-
so~ arbitration as the sound means of settling 
in~e~ational disputes~ 
3 -- Scrupulous respect for all treaties and 
repudiation of all wars waged for conquest.l4 
14 Pinto do. Carmo, QP_. cit., pp .. 71-78. 
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From the foregoing it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the PSD is committed to a program somewhat similar to ths.t of 
the UDN save for a somewhat greater emphasis on Social Security. 
General Eurico Dut!:!,, Leader. 2!, ~ PSD15 
General Dutra enjoys an honorable reeo~d as a military 
man. Joining the arDJY at the age of seventeen. Do.tra was 
commissioned a Second Lieutenant eight years later, and was 
promoted to the rank of First Lieutenant at the age of twenty-
nine. 
Cautious and conservative by nature • Datra made it a point 
to steer clear of the 1D8llY revolutions .which shook Brazil during 
the late twenties. However, after the Liaeral Alliance came 
into power in 1930, Dutra became a fai tbf'ul follower of GetUlia 
Vargast and was rewarded for his support by being elevated to 
the rBllk of Brigadier General_ in 1932, and was appointed Minist-
er of War in 1936~ A devout Catholic and hard worker, General 
Dutra1 s honest,- has never been questionecL After the outbreak 
of World War II, it was reported that General Dutra adopted 
an attitude favorable to the Nazis. When Brazil entered the 
war on the side 9f the Allies in 1942, Dutra's ~leged pro-Nazi 
sympathies caused the Vargas administration considerable 
15 "Sh - h - h! Listen to the Presidential Campaign," 
Inter-American [Monthly], 4:7., July, 1945. Also see Edward Tom-
linson, "Dictatorts Choice," 116:76, ~ovember)24, 1945~ 
. . 
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embarre.SBment. General Dutra sought til> clarify his position by 
stating that his admiration for the German war me.chine had been 
purely military~ and did nat reflect his political point of 
view in a.ny manner, whatsoever. In &.Icy' event, his record as 
Minister of War, during the ~ period, was certainly above 
reproach. With respect to his political orientation ~e has been 
described by some as a conservative "liberally bent." In the 
campaign of 1945, General Du.tra was supported by certain import-
ant business interests. the Catholic hierarchy~ and towards the 
close of the campaign, by a sizable number of incumbent govern-
ment officials. 
~Campaign 
It is generally recognized that the campaigns conducted 
by Air Brigadier Gomes and General Dutra were rather colarless 
affairs. Neither candidate could be .characterized asr. a ~c 
personality with strong mass appeal. It is also true that both 
men were stressing many similar campaign issues. 
Gomes ca1led for higher wages, honest government, and 
more education for all and increased state autonomy. Du.trats 
views on all of these matters coincided with those of Gomes. 
One significant point of difference between Gomes and Dutra 
centered about the future status of the political 11 ins." 
Gomes was pledged to tlllrn them out while Du.tra avoided the issue 
with great care. Both men also took opposing stands on the 
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question of organized gambling. Dutra promised to outlaw gambling; 
Gomes said nothing. 
Far more dramatic hap~enings were taking place in the 
background, centering around President Vargas and Communist leader 
Luiz Carlos Prestes. While Vargas insisted that he would not 
become a candidate there were positive indications that he might 
succumb to 11 popular demand11 and allow himself to be drafted. 
The 11 popular·demand11 for Vargas assumed tremendous pro-
portions and took on all of the characteristics of a well organized 
movement. Rio was deluged with propaganda calling for the contin-
uation of Vargas as president, and pro-Vargas demonstrations were 
staged with startling regularity. Many of the Queremistas, or 
literally, the 11 We Wanters,11 as the Vargas partisans were called, 
came from the lower ranks of the bu~eaucracy, which GetUlio had 
built up over the past fifteen years. Many important ~oli tical 
11 ins 11 were also very active in promoting Vargas' cause and, of 
course, it must be conceded that many ordinary citizens who had 
enjoyed the fruits of Vargas' social security program, were also 
anxious to keep Getulio in Guanabara Palace. 
·In the meantime, the activities of Luiz Carlos Prestes 
and his newly resurrected Communist party clearly indicated that 
he and Vargas were moving in the direction of a working agree-
ment predi~ted on mutual benefit. 
As early as May 23, 1945, Prestes, addressing a crowd of 
50,000 persons assembled at Rio 1s Vasco da Gama Stadium, had 
-, 
J 
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affirmed the fundamentally democratic character of tne regime 
which had kept him imprisoned fc:>r nine years. Re also called 
for the union of all political, economic, and social groups in 
order to aveid "disorder," and finally ne declared that the 
promised elections should be held solely for the purpo~e of 
electing delegates to a Constituent Assembly, to be Charged 
with the duty of drawing up a Constitution to replace that 
decreed by Vargas in 1937. Presidential elections should not 
be held until after the creation of the new constitution.l6 
It weuld hardly seem that Vargas would object to such a 
plan since it would ass111re his continl'l.B.tion i:n office far at 
least anotb.er year and almost anything might appen in the 
interim. An alliance with Vargas would present Prestes Yi th 
a distinct ~ossibility for seizing pawer. Of course, such was 
not Vargas' intentian, but it was jast possible that Prestes 
would fool Vargas instead ef vice versa. 
A Brief~~ the Int~alists 
The integralists did nat participate in the campaign 
as an organized party until September, and when they did register, 
certain chal'lges were effected.· However, these changes proved to 
be mpre apparen.t than real.; For example, the party was officially 
registered as the Partido 9£. Representacio Popular (Popular 
16 "Sh-h-h! Listen to the Presidential Campaign," loc. cit. 
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Representation Party) or simply the PRP, and the official party 
program no longer spoke of the integral state but rather dealt 
with a third position between the extremes represented by 
Capitalism and Communism. The similarity between this and 
General Juan Peront s 11 Justicialismo 11 is rather striking. However, 
a statement by Plinio Salgado to the effect that the PRP did not 
represent Integralism but that all Integralists could feel at 
ease within its ranks, certainly clarified the general orienta-
tion of the llnewlt PRP.l7 
United States Intervention? 
Early in October, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., then United States 
Ambassador to Brazil, delivered an extremely controversial 
speech before a large group of Brazilian reporters in Petrop-
olis. Mr. Berle said, in part: 
11 Never were relations between Brazil and the United 
States closer than they are today ... Now that we have 
fought together in the battle for human freedom. 
Our long friendship is bound with the common sacrifice 
of blood ..• By her essential help in the democratic 
cause, Brazil has now reached a height of inter-
national prestige unparalleled in her history. n He 
then went on to express the eager interest that the 
American public took in BraziL 11 That public opinion 
has rejoiced over the steady Brazilian determination 
to develop and use the democratic form of government, 
and has acclaimed the steps taken by the Brazilian 
government to reach the goal of constitutional 
democracy •.. The pledge of free Brazilian elections 
set for a definite date by a government whose word 
17 Pinto do Carma, .QE.· cit. , p. 156. 
the United States ·has :found inviolable, has been 
hailed with -as mUch satisfaction in ti1.e United 
States' as . in Brazil' itself . ~ . , The happiness 
with which the strong march _towards_ constitution-
al democracy has been welcomed is based on Amer-
ican experience. We have learned that the only· 
way to be a democr~y is to practice democra.cy.l8_ 
71 
Public reaction to these statements was mixe_d and gener-
ally followed political lines. PSD and UDN partisans interpreted 
the speech as a congratulatory message to the Brazilian govern-
ment for having adopted a policy favoring free elections. If 
pressed further, most would probably have admitted that since 
the speech reflected official United States interest in the 
forthcoming elections, the chances that they would be cancelled 
were diminished to some extent. 
The Qaerimistas charged :Serle with meddling in Brazilian 
politics, slandering the President by inference and inci ti:ng his 
enemies to move against htm. In view of the fact that Vargas was 
subsequently ousted from office, the significance of Berle 1 s speech 
has been widely debated both in Brazil and here in the United 
States .19 
18 Hubert Herring, 111lrazil," ~Review, 36:304, December, 
1946. 
19 Sumner Welles in his widely read book Where Are We Headiag -l, 
flatly asserts that Mr. llerle 1 s activities constituted intervention 
in a solely internal dispute. having no international implications 
what soever. On the other hand, Hubert Herring, writing in the 
Yale Review in December, 1946, _contends that :Serle was obliged 
to deliver his speech because it was known that Vargas was planning 
to cancel the elections and that the army would move to prevent 
him from taking such a step. This would mean civil war and United 
States forces stationed in Brazil would most certainly become 
involved. 
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The ~ of Vargas ZO 
J3y and large, the electoral ~ampa.ign was conducted in 
orderly fashion through the months of July, August, and September, 
but toward the close of October, there were indications that 
certain elements in the army were becoming inc!easingly concerned 
about the possibility of a Vargas-Prestes pact. It was rumored 
that a~ d'etat, engineered by Vargas, and Prestes, to cancel 
the elections, was imminent. On October 22, 1945, Vargas took 
what appeared to be a preliminary step in this direction. On that 
date his Minister of Justice, .Agamemnon Magalnaes asked Police 
Chief Joao Alberto Lins de 13arros to tender his resignation to 
the President since the latter was desirous of appointing his 
brother 13enjamin, to the post. 
Jofio Alberto then told Magalhaes that he would be unable 
to do so without first informing_ the Minister of War, Goes 
Monteiro, about the President's request, since he and the General 
had agreed that if one were forced to resign the other would do 
so voluntarily. Magalhaes then asked him not to do so without 
first seeing the President. 
On Friday', the twenty-sixth of October, Joio Alberto 
went to the Guanabara Palace to see the President. Vargas 
immediately came to the point stating that he was determined to 
ZO The follSwing account is taken from Herna.ne Tavares 
de Sa's, ~Brazilians, pp. ::no-17. 
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appoint 'Benjamin as Chief of' Po],i,.c;:~~ At the same. _ti,.me he referred 
to a letter he had recently received froJ:!l- the 'Brazilian ambass-
ador to J3uenos .Aires, in which the ~ba.ssa.dor described the 
evol u.tion of the Per6n regime in glowing terms. 11You. see,'' sa.id 
Va.rga.s, ttthere everything is solved by the police and, the people. 11 
Joao Alberto countered by reminding the Preside~t tha.t Per6n 
was being supported by a large part of the army. Vargas then 
indic@:ted that his position with the army wa.s extremely sound, 
a.nd that rumors of_a planned army ~were without foundation. 
Joao Alberto then repeated the story he had told Minister of 
Justice Magalhaes. Vargas wa.s visibly affected by this statement 
and a.sked Joao J.lberto not to contact GOes Monteiro until Sunday, 
since he might possibly change his mind about appointing 'Benjamin 
as Chief of Police. If he did not hear from him by Sunday Joao 
Alberto could a.ss1lme that things were to proceed as I>la.nned a.nd 
he could then advise GOes Monteiro that 'BenjM.J.~n W!!,_S taking over. 
Saturday and Sunday came and Joio Alberto heard nothing 
from Vargas. The next ~, he contacted the Minister of War and 
gave him the whole story. G<>es Monteiro became incensed, and 
promised to resign immediately. He also indicated that he wa.s 
ready to· take strong measures against Vargas. On the advice of 
the Minister of Justice, Joao Alberto again visited Vargas in a. 
last minute effort to convince him of the folly of his intended 
course o:f action. Vargas remained adamant, however, and took this 
occasion to dismiss Joao. Alberto of:ficia.lly. 
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This turned out to be the g9~e~ s~gna:t. That afternoon 
Air :Brigadier Eduardo Gomes began. organizing the. Air Force and 
Navy for an uprising~ but he could accomplish li tt:te without. the 
support of the .A:rmy. A.t 4 p.m. he received a mes~age from Goes 
Monteiro asking him to report to the War Ministry. U:pon his 
arrival, Gomes found General Monteiro surrounded by most of the 
Senior Generals including General Eurico Dutra •. Vargas• fate was 
sealed. His sole remaining hope was that Prestes and his follow-
ers would come to the rescue. Finally, word was received from. 
Prestes that he had decided to abandon Vargas ·to his fate. 
The situation moved toward a climax when Joio Alberto 
received a. message from :Benjamin V~gas asking him to return as 
Shief of Police. This turned out to be a tremendous blunder 
since Joao Alberto, who up to this time, had hesitated about 
joining the generals, finally realized that Vargas had lost his 
grip. Joao Alberto accepted :Benjamin's offer but his first 
gesture was to substitute army units for the shock troops which 
had been defending Guanabara Palace. 
Immediately following this action, a.rrny tanks were sent 
out to take strategic positions all over Rio. Machine gun nests 
were set up in certain important buildings. However, no resistance 
was offered and the £2J!R. was carried out without bloodshed. 
The insurgents sent Minister of Justice Magalhaes and 
General Dutra. a.s emissaries to the presidential palace to demand 
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Vargas 1 resignation. '&etUlio had a counter proposal which was 
relayed to GSes Monteiro by the War Minister who dismiss~d it 
summarily. .A. resignation was drafted and emissaries were again 
sent to Vargas. This time Du.tra remained at the Ministry. 
Magalhies presented the resignation draft to Vargas and commented 
rather sheepishly: "This was the best I was able to get. It After 
reading the document, Vargas signed it. He then turned to those 
present and said: "As there is nothing more to do, letfs all go 
to bed •.. 11 
After~~ 
With Vargas out of the way, the insurgents bowed to consti-
tutional procedure by installing Supreme Court Justice Jose 
Linhares as provisional president. Li:nhares was charged with. the 
task of guaranteeing that the elections in December would be 
conducted in an atmosphere of freedom and order. Linhares also 
took it upon himself to make certain administrative readjustments 
on the local level, in an effort to eliminate the tremendous 
influence which the Vargas supporters maintained over the lower 
echelons of state and municipal governments. 
The CommuRists effected a startling political change after 
the ~· Three d.a;ys before the election, Prestes, declaring 
that the election should be a test of power for the resurgent 
party and not a demonstration of his personal prestige, launched 
the candidacy of the politically unknown Yeddo Fuiza. It watt 
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generally conceded the. t Fui za, . an engineer ~y profession, was 
not a Communist l?ut a. self-~tyled lib'?re.l_ democ::rat .. 
Another noteworthy post-eaup oc,cu.:{ence centered about the 
victim of the £2:S2. himself, Vargas. He had stated that he was 
planning to return to his native state of Rio Grande do Su1 for 
a much needed rest, but upon his arrival r he immediately began 
mending his political fences and soon emerged as a senatorial 
candidate from the gaUcho state. 
Election ~ !;lld. ,tp.e Aftermath 
At 11:30 p.m. on December 1, 1945 , the registration of 
voters officially came to a close. Approximately seven million 
persons were eligible to visit the polls the next day. Some of 
the more cynical observers expected trouble at the p~lls, but as 
it turned out the day 1 s proceedings m<:>ved along with a minimum 
of friction. It was reported that an atmosphere of freedom and 
dignity prevailed throughout the ~. 
Election returns were compiled rather slowly, by United 
States standards, but the earliest count pointed in the direction 
of a Dutra victory and this early trend proved to be correct 
when the final count was tabulated. 
Out of a total of approximately six million votes cast, 
General Dutra polled nearly 3,500 ,000 and Air Brigadier Eduardo 
Gomes ran second with about two million. The Dutra vi.ctor;r 
proved to be something of an upset since many polit~cal observers 
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had bef3n q~ th~ op1:~io!l. tba,t_~mf3_S -~-o_ul~ emf3rge _ !~~to;r~o~~ .. 
Immediately a!ter it had become. appar~n~ ~~t. Dll.t!_a ha<l w9~.:• . 
political analysts set about trying to _explain_what had ~ppened. 
While the explanations were many and varied most of them took 
cognizance of the following: 
1. Just before the close of the campaign Vargas had made 
a speech in which he championed Dutra's cause. 
2. The Catholic hierarchy _also came out very strongly 
for Dutra just as the campaign neared its close. 
3. The span of time between the deposition of Vargas and 
election ~was very short; too short to uproot Vargas 1 tremend-
ous influence on the state and municipal levels. 
4. After the £.2JBl dLetat of October, the g,ueremistas 
were left rl thout a leader. However, they were well aware of the 
fact that Dutra had long been a Vargas adherent. Consequently a 
great many of them came to seek refUge in Dutrat s Social Democra-
tic Party.21 
Significant Sidelights 
One of tbe most significant things revealed by the December 
elections was the relative strength of the Partido comwunista. 
~rasileiro (the Communist Party of ~razil, or simply the PCB). 
The party candidate. Yeddo Fui za, polled 600 ,000 votes or 
21 "There 1 s that Man Again," Inter-American (Monthly], 
5:5, January, 1946. 
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approximately ~0 .:per c.ent of the t_ot~l and_£:ourte~n Comm.1!1llist 
deputies plus one senator (Luiz Carlos Prestes) were elected to 
Congress.22 
.After the elections, Prestes cle.imed t~t . tl:te _600 ,000 
votes received by Fuiza were only a fraction of those he 
commanded in the nation since the bulk of his sympathizers was 
among the twenty million illiterates in Brazil, and the electoral 
law allowed the vote only to those who could read and write. 23 
·.··' 
The fascist Popular Respresentation Party did.~ot fare at 
all well in the.elections. It failed to elect a. single federal 
deputy .24 
Perhaps the most significant sidelight was the election 
of Get~io Vargas as a senator from the state of Rio G-rande do 
Sul. This clearly indicated that Vargas was still every inch 
a poli tic!an of the most adroit variety. 
22 Hernane Tavares de Sa, 11 .A. personal Interview With Luiz 
Carlos Prestest" United-Nations World-, 1:22, July, 1947. See 
also Pinto. do Ca.rmo, .Q:Q.· £!!.., p. 305. 
23 Hernan& Tavares de. Sa, loe •. ill· . 
24 Pinto do Carmo, 21?..· cit. , p. 156. 
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CEAPTER VI 
THE NEW GO'VEBNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 1946 
Any fear that President Dutra would become ~ p~ppet of 
his former mentor was dissipated by the fact that army officers 
guarding the polls. carried out their duties iri a very proper 
manner, and made not the slightest effort to interfere while 
the electorate voted Dutra into power.l ~e army, having been 
responsible for Vargas' removal, certainly would. not have tol-
erated a situa.tion whereby the deposed p~esident would be able 
to control the new government from behind the scenes. It would 
seem, therefore, that Dutra had conviuced the country's military 
leaders of his intention to steer an independent course during 
the ensuing five years. SUbseque:n,t events proved_ that the con-
fidence of the military had not been misplaced, for the new pres-
ident•s relations with his former chief were decidedly cool but 
devoid of a:ny a.cti ve hostility. 
The composition of the Congress)elected in December, did 
not give President Dutra's Social Democratic Party an absolute 
majority. It did, indeed, have 115 seats in CongTess. as com-
pared with the ¢nety seats won by :Brigadier Gomes • National 
1 Austin F. MacDonald, Latin .American Politics and 
Government, p. 159. 
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Democratic_ Union, but an. alliance effec~_ed between the _Gomes 
group and the thiry deputies of the Vargas dominated Labor P~ty, 
could override the government's 115 votes. Should the fourttllen 
Communist deputies join with the opposition forces the govern-
ment•s chances of getting its measures past Congress would be nil~ 
However, the three opposition parties held such widely divergent 
political views that all efforts to organize a solid coalition 
in opposition to the government were unsuccessful.2 
In due time, it became apparent that the National Dem6-
cratic Union, by far the largest single opposition party, was 
in rather general agreement with the government • s program and it 
soon became known as the 11 loyal opposition". With the S1Zpport 
of the Gomes faction, the government was able to maintain effective 
control over both houses of Congress, thus ensuring the passage of 
much of the legislation proposed by the administration. It,is not 
to be assumed, however, tha~ the National Democratic Union slav-
ishly:. endorsed all government inspired proposals. There wer.e 
occasions when the administration was obliged to go it alone and 
endure the criticisms heaped upon it by the Communist and Labor 
factions.3 
After the elections of 1945, there was little dis~~~ent 
2 Ibid., p. 160. 
3 Ibid .• p. 161. 
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among the various parties as to the desirab,il; t~ gf pr~ar~ng ~ 
new and more democratic constitut~on for Era.zil. to. r~_:ple.ce the 
fundamental lBlf' of the :Esta.do !2.!£, which Get~io Vergas ~a.d pro-
nro.lgated in 1937. Congress convened on January 31, 1946, anfil: 
two da;ys later it declared itself a constitutional assembly and 
undertook the task of drafting the new document. After more than 
six months of what often proved to be acrimonious debate, the 
Assembly on September 18, 194Eh presented the nation with its 
fifth constitution. Although certain features of the Constit-
utions of 1934 and 1937 were retained, the new law represented 
' 
a return to the liberal democratic tradition established in the 
Constitution of 1891. Approximately three times as long as the 
Constitution of the United States. Erazil 1 s Constitution of 1946 
contains 217 articles grouped under various subject ~eadings. 
These include federal organization, so-called pre~imi~ dis-
positions, and legislative, executive, and judicia.! powers. 
Subsequent titles deal with state judicial powers, declarations 
of the rights of individuals, statements of policy on the econ-
omic and social order, provisions governing the armed forces 
and civil service, and government provisions of a general nature. 
The chapter promises that Erazil will have recourse to war 
only when all other means have failed. It also pledges that 
13razil will never undertake aggressive war alone or in alliance 
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with any other power.4 
Preliminary Disnositions 
The chapter on prel~minary dispositions asserts that 
certain powers are reserved to the Federal Union. such as: 
Rights to declare war and peace. proclaim and lift the 
state of siege, maintain armed forces, grant permission to foreign 
troops for the use of Brazilian territory in transit, or for 
temporary bases, produce armaments and munitions, supervise 
maritime, border police and aerial forces, print and coin money, 
institute banks, oversee the operations of credit capital, and 
insurance establishments, establish a national plan of develop-
ment of transportation., maintain postal end national air mail 
services and expand all inter state and international telegraph 
and radio communications, radio broadcasting and telephone serVices, 
directly or through concessions. 
The federal government will also control aerial navigation 
and those rail lines which link maritime ports with national 
borders or cross state lines. Permanent defenses will be organ-
ized against drought. floods, and disease in rural areas, grant 
amnesty, legislate on civil., commercial and criminal, aeronautical. 
a:nd labor matterS}, production and consumption aims, and bases of 
4
"Constitution of the United States of Brazil,"" Constit-
utions 2f. Nations, ed.i ted by .Amos J. Peaslee, Vol. I, pp. 181 -. 
228. 
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national education, public registries and commercial erga.n.izations, 
military police, civtl a.nd military requisitions (during time of 
war), coastwise trade and ports, interstate commerce, foreign 
trade, credit institutions, exchange and transfer of valuables 
outside the country, subsoil riches, mineral deposits, metall-
U:rgy, waterw~s, electric energy, flora and fauna, fishtries, 
the monetary system~ naturalization, the entry, extradition and 
deportation of foreigners, immigration, requiranents for exercise 
of technical, scientific and liberal professions, use of national 
symbols, and the incorporation o:f aborigines into the na.tienal 
5 
.community. . 
Federal. Taxation 
The Constitution provides that the Federal government may 
levy taxes on income, on imports from abroad, on production, 
commerce distribution and consumption, and on business trana-
actions.6 
Exemption from taxes is extended to the under privileged 
with limited economic capacities and applies to the consumptien 
of articles o:f minimum necessity such as housing., clothing, food 
and medical treatment. V 
5 Art. 5, Nos. I ~ XV. 
6 Art., 15, Nos. I - VI. 
7" Art. 15, Sect. 1. 
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The general .provisions at the end of the Constitution 
state the general principle that all taxes sho~d be levied acc-
ording to ability to p~. 8 and specify that for the next twenty 
years~ 3 per cent of all federal revenue should be spent to develop 
the .Amazon area. The .Ama;zonian states, territories and municipal-
ities are required to make similar donations of their revenues 
for the same purpose, turning the funds over to the federal 
government.9 
A unique provision of the Constitution is that no taxes 
shall be levied on authors 1 royal ties or on the renumeration of 
teachers and journalists.lO 
States Bights 
The new Constitution restored considerable autonomy to 
the states of the union. They m81' now unite~- subd.iTide or dis-
member themselves or form new states. Territories mS7 become 
states through special legislation; they IIl!cy' be divided into new 
territories or be restored to states from which they were separ-
ated.ll The states may now use their traditional flags, seals, 
and other symbols of autonomy, and have the right to exercise 
8 Art. 002. 
9 Art •. 199 .. 
10 Art. 203. 
11 Arts. 3-4. 
\ 
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all powers not specifically forbidden by the Constitution.l2 
State tax powers are extensive·. A state mq not levy 
taxes en city real estate but may tax all land, farm property 
over twenty hectares (fifty acres) in size~ inheritances, all 
property transfers, and sales and eonsignments, made by- business-
men and producers, including industrialists. It may tax -uPfo 
5 per cent ad valorem on exports to foreign ceuntries and the 
federal Senate may authorize an increase to 10 per cent for a 
stated period of time, if the state requests.l3 
Federal Intervention 
The president mq in an emergency, intervene in states to 
proteet national integrity, repel foreign invasion. prevent inter-
state conflicts, suppress civil war. guarantee free exercise of 
state powers, assure the carrying out of court decisions, and . 
prevent the re-election of governors and mayors to consecutive 
terms.14 Presidential intervention will be through a federal 
int erventm~~~_.15 
12 Art. 18, Sect. 1. 
13 .Art. 19. 
14 
Art. 7. Nos. I-VII. 
15 Art. 12. 
c 
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Federal District 
The president is empowered te appoint and remeve t~e pre-
.fect of the Federal District who is its executive officer and is 
assisted in governing the district by a GeGeral ~istrict Council. 
Tax powers similar to those enjeyed by the states are granted to 
the district.l6 
Municipalities 
Article twenty-eight guarantees the autonomy of municipa~i­
ties and provides that prefects shall be elected, except in state 
capitals or in municipalities of exceptional economic importance, 
in which case they can be named by state gavernors. In municipal-
ities designated by the National Security Council as important 
military bases, prefects ~be so appointed. 
The tax powers· of municipalities extend to real estate 
licensed businesses, industries and professions, amusements and 
transactions within their jurisdiction and competance.l7 
Legislative Powers 
The Constitution provides· that the legislative pawers of 
the Federal Senate .and Chamber ef .E>eputies ma.y net be delegated 
to any other 'branch of the government, and that coBgressional 
16 Art. 26. 
17 Art. 29. 
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elections must be held simultaneously in all parts of the country. 
In order to qualify for election to the Senate or Chamber, one 
must be a~razilian citizen in full possession of his political 
rights. For the Chamber, the prospective candidate must be at 
least twenty-one, and for the Senate, thirty-three.l8 
Congress convenes between March 15 and December 15, unless 
called in for special sessions by the president of by one third of 
the members of one house.l9 Majority rule is to prevail in all 
legislation and legislators are declared immune from punishment 
in discharge of their duties, in their opinions, pronouncements 
and in their voting. This immunity applies to all arrests except 
for flagrant crimes. 20 Deputies and Senators get the same p~ 
and both are forbidden to enter into contract with business or 
commercial enterprises, or to hold other public offices. They 
may • however, undertake special missions rl th the permission of 
their respective chambers. Legislators Who become Ministers of 
State, Federal Interventors, or Secretaries of State (in the 
states) do not lose their seats.21 The term of a federal 
deputy is four years, while that of a senator is eight. 
18 ,hits. 37-38. 
19 Art. 39. 
20 Arts. 42, 44, and 45. 
21 Art. 47. 
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Chamber of De:Q.uties 
Members o~ this body are elected by the proportional repres-
entation syst~. from states~ territories, and the Federal Eistrict, 
in a manner to be fixed by 1M4 However, when on the basis of 
this ratio, a territorial division would acquire more than twenty 
deputies, each additional deputy beyond twenty is allocated on the 
basis of 250,000 people. 
Each territory must be represented by at least one deputy 
and each state and the Federal District at least seven.22 To 
the Chamber is allotted the duty of inaugu.rating impeachment pro-
ceedings against the president and cabinet.,23 
Lists ef alternates to serve as 1JUbstitutes are elected at 
the same time as the deputies)~4 
~Senate 
Each state and the Federal Districts have three senators, 
serving eight years with one-third of the Senate renewed after 
the first ~our years, and two-thirds renewed after eight years. 
Alternates are elected as in the case of deputies.25 The Vice-
22 Art. 56-58. 
23 Art. 59. 
24 Art. 52. 
25 .Art. 60. 
89 
President of the Republic serves as President of the Senate.26 
The upper house judges in impeachment proceedings and must regis-
ter a two-thirds vote to convict; it approves high appointments 
by secret ballot~ authorizes loans floated by states, federal 
territories and municipalities, and supports the execution of 
laws declared unconstitutional by the Federal Supreme Court.27 
Congressional Powers 
The Congress must vate budgets and taxes, control the 
pUblic debt, and armed forces, sanction treaties negatiated by 
the president, grant amnesties, approve state legislation on 
changing state territories, authorize presidential or vice-
presidential absen~es from :Brazil, and fix salaries and allow--
ances for executive officers and Congresmnen.28 
~s m~ originate with the president or with a member of 
Congress. All leJfs controlling military· or financial affairs 
must be initiated in the Chamber.29 All presidential legislative 
proposals should begin in the Chamber, but laws must pass both 
houses and ell modification must go back to the original house 
for sanction of changes.30 The president ~t exercise total or 
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or partial veto. if he so desires, within ten days after receipt 
of new legislation; his silence means approval and his veto may 
be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the Congress in joint 
session. Vetoed legislation may be received31 in the same session 
by an absolute majority ~te of the Congress.32 
~ Presidency 
The presidential succession is $.8 follows: President, Vice-
President, President of the Chamber of Deputies, Vice-President 
of the Senate, President of the Federal Supreme Cou.rt.33 
The •president and vice'"'President IIIIl.St both be native born 
Brazilians in full possession of their political rights, and they 
must be at least thirty-five. 34 These two officers must be 
elected simultaneously, 120 ~s before the presidential term 
ends. 35 They hold office for five years and are not eligible 
for consecutive terms, nor may any of their blood relatives be 
elected to the same office immediately. The president promulptes 
and publishes laws and decrees, exercises veto powers, names 
ministers, the ~or of Rio de Janeiro, members of the Nati<mal 
Economic Oo1.meil and other high officials, maintains relations 
31 Art. 70. 
32 Art. 72. 
33 Art. 79. 
34 Art. 80. 
35 Art~ 81. 
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with foreign powers, negotiates treaties, declares war (with 
Congressional approval, if in session; without it if Brazil is 
attacked)~ negotiates peace, exercises supreme command of the 
armed.forces 1 proclaims a state of seige 7 decides federal inter-
ventions. grants permission to citizens to accept foreign govern-.. 
mental pensions, employment or commissions, sends the budget to 
the Chamber of Deputies within the first two months of the legis-
lative session~ opens Congress .tth a message on the state of 
the union, and grants pardons. 36 The president may be impeached 
for overstepping these powers.37 
The cabinet 
Ministers must be native born Brazilians at least 25 years 
of age. 38 They Imli.St make annual reports· on their departments to 
the president and report to Congress at its request.39 The.y m~ 
be judged for malfeasance by the Federal Supreme Court.40 
Federal Judie!~ 
The Federal Judiciary consists of the Federal Supreme 
36 Art. 87. 
37 Art. 88-89. 
38 Art. 90, No. I. 
39 Art. 91, Nos. III-IV. 
40 Art. 92. 
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Court, Federal Court of ,A;lpea.ls, and military, electoral and 
labor tribunals. 41 The. Supreme Court is composed of eleven 
justices who are named by the president~ with Senate approval 
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and who must be native born Brazilians over thirty-five with good 
reputations. 42 They may be tried for malfeasance by the Senate. 43 
The Supreme Court is empowered to try the president for comnon 
crimes, and other high officials· for crimes of reaponsibility or 
common crimes. 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over. cases where states 
are in conflict 1t'i th the federal government and where there is a 
question of extradition requested by a foreign state. It may 
exercise habeas corpus rights, decide the constitutionality of 
f edera.l or local leJrs and hear appeals on criminal cases. 44 
The Constitution goes into consi<lera.ble detail on the 
subject of the Federal Court of Appeals and electoral tribunals, 
before taking up the duties, rights and privileges of labor 
courts. 45 The labor tribunals include the Supreme Labor Court, 
Regional. Labor Tribunals and Conciliation JJoards. 46 
t 
41 Art;, 94, Nos. I-V. 
42 .Art. 99. 
43 Art. 100. 
44 Art; 101, No·s. I-IV. 
45 Cha;. p. IV, Sects. 2, 4, and 6. 
46 Art.· 122. 
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Powers of the last two are to be regulated by law to give them 
jurisdiction over local disputes between employers and labor. 
except in accident cases, which must go before ordinary courts. 4 7 
Economic~ Social 0rder 
The Constitution pays particular attention to the future 
economic and social order of the Republic, stating that the eco-
nomic order shall be organized to conform to the principles of 
social justice, harmonizing48 free enterprise with appreciation 
for the value of human labor. It assures employment to all in 
order to· make possible a decent life, and assumes that work is a 
social obligation.49 
Specific provisions are that the Federal government m~ 
intervene in the economic spher~ and take over any industry or 
activity therein; property shall be used for social well-being, 
just distribution of property and goods shall assure equal op-
portunity for all, and no abuse of economic power will be tol-
eratea_.50 
47 Art. 123. 
48 The word used in the original Portuguese text, ~­
ciliando, literally conciliating, is not readily translated in this 
context but suggests understanding, appreciation, or harmony. See 
Constituicao da. Republica ~ Esta.dos Unid.os do Brasil 1946. Biblio-
teca da. Livraria Acad;mica 1948, Edicao Sara.iva, Sio Paulo. 
49 
.Article 145~ 
50 
.Arts. 146-48. 
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The law will regulate banking, insurance and capi ta.li-
zation.51 Mines and other subsoil riches, as well as bodies of 
water, are declared to be properties distinct from real estate 
used for industrial developnent. 52 Industrial authorizations 
and concessions will be granted to Brazilians only, or to enter-
prises organized in the country, giving preference (in exploita-
tion) to the owner of the land. Owner's rights over mines and 
mineral .'deposits shall be regulated by law • according to the na-
ture of the deposits. 53 Usury will be punished by law.~ Coast-
wise trade is reserved for Brazilian vessels, except in eases of 
urgent public necessity. The owners, commanders, and two-thirds 
of. the crews of Brazilian ·:boats must be Brazilians. 55 
The law will aid the colonization of the public lands, 
giving preference to nationals who live in underprivileged areas, 
or who are unemployed. The sale or concession of public lands 
exceeding 10,000 hectares (24,710 acres) shall not be permitted 
without the sanction of the Federal Senate.56 
51 Art. 149. 
52 .Art. 152. 
53 w 
__£, cit_. 
54 .Art. 154. 
55 Art. 155. 
56 Art. 156. 
95 
Labor Legislation 
Minimum salaries must guarantee the necessities of life 
to workers and families. No salary differentials may be based 
on age, sex, nationality or civil status. salaries paid to night 
·, 
workers must be higher than those paid to daytime workers, and 
there must be direct participation of the worker in the returns 
of the enterprise in such a wa:y as the law- shall prescribe. A 
maximum working day of eight hours shall be enforced except as 
the law otherwise provides, and all workers shall receive one day 
off per week, preferably Sunday, and shall receive paid annual 
vacations. Workers 1 health and safety on the jub must be im-
proved by employers. Employers must carry accident insurance on 
their employees. 
Child labor is prohibited. The minimun working age for 
daytime work is fourteen, and for night work, eighteen. Motheiis 
shall b·e granted rest periods before and. after giving birth, with-
out loss of salary or position. Management is required to recog-
nize labor grievance committees, syndicates or unions, and to 
provide health services, including preventive medicine, hospital-
! zation and other social .security aida·. 57 
The federal government shall give aid to the unemployed 
57 Art. 157, Nos. I...;.XVII. 
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and provide other social security measures. The right to strike 
is recognized and guaranteed subject to regulation by law. 58 
Foreigners 
Article 160 carries ~ important provision affecting 
foreigners. It provides that ownership and operation of journal-
istic enterprises must be restricted to native born Brazilians 
and they alone are eli§ible to hold editorial positions. 
Family, Education and Culture 
Provision is made for the federal government to lend 
special protection to the family. Marriage shall be civil and 
without fee, but a religious ceremony shall be valid if civil 
requirements are also met. There is no provision for divorce.59 
Special aid shall be granted. to mothers and childrel!l. every-
where and protection of the government given to large families. 60 
Compulsory free elementary education::shall be given in Portuguese 
and shall be provided for all. Industrial &l.d commercial enter-
prises must offer apprenticeship to their non-adult workers with 
adequate respect for the rights of the apprentices. Religious. 
instruction ·is permitted in accord with the student • s belief. 
58 Art. 158. 
59 Art. 163. 
60 Art. 164. 
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Secondary teachers must be selected by competitive examination 
and they, as well as other teachers, shall enjoy academic freedom. 61 
The federal Government is obliged to spend not less than 
10 per cent of tax revenues collected from the states and not less 
than 20 per cent of revenues collected from the Federal District, 
for educational purposes. 62 It is the responsibility of the 
Federal Government to organize a federal teaching system in the 
territories. Each state of the Federal Union may organize its 
own educational system and ~ expect financial assistance from 
the Federal Government to help maintain elementary schools.63 
Civil Rights ~ Guarantees 
Tax distinction and state support of any religion are 
outl~ed. Churches are exempt from taxation, howevert as are 
the properties of political parties. schools, charities and pub-
·lie service institutions. Taxes ma.y not be levied on paper des-
tined for use in books, newspapers or periodicals.64 
All persons born in Brazil of parents who are not in the 
service of a foreign government, and children of Brazilian mothers 
or fathers born abroad, if the parent is in Brazilian government 
61 Art. 168, Nos. I-VII. 
62 
.Art. 169. 
63 Arts. 170-71. 
64 Art. 31, Nos. II, III, & V, (b)-(c)~ 
-- ---
98 
service or returns to 11 ve in :Brazil, are considered_ Brazilians. 
All fereigners desiring citizenship must be naturalized 
except the· Portuguese, who acquire Brazilian citizenship through 
one year's uninterrupted residence in Brazil, provided they have 
good moral character and physical health. 65 
Voters of beth sexes must be eighteen and must register 
in accord with the law governing registratien of electors. Suff-
rage is universal and direct; the ballot is secret and proportion-
al representation assured. Suffrage is denied only the following: 
illiterates, those who cannot express themselves in Portuguese; 
those who have lost their political rights; and privates in the 
army, not in training for officers rank.66 
All are equal before the law and none can be forced to 
act or be prevented from acting without due process of law. 67 
Freedom of religion, thought, speech, and press is guaranteed. 
The only pnhi bi tions along these lines are bans against war 
propaganda, subversive activities. and incitement to preach race 
or class prejudices. 68 The privacy of correspondence, the right 
65 Art. 129, Nos. I, II, and Iv'. 
66 Arts. 131-34. 
67 Art. 141, Sects. 1-2. 
68 Art. 141, Sects. 5, 7-8. The provision dealing with 
race and class prejudices is the only such provision to be found 
in any of the Constitutions of the Western Hemisphere, if not 
the Western World. 
- . -·--=-""iF= 
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of peaceful assembly and association, and the right of petition 
for redress of grievance, are all assured .• 69 
Political parties opposed to demacracy. to the plural 
party system, or to fundamental human rights, are J>rohibi ted. 70 
(This clause, pushed through over the vigorous ~otest of the 
Communists, was invoked to justify the outlawing of the CoiB!IlUll-
ist Party in M~ 1947.) 
The sa.ncti ty of the home and the right to own property 
are affirmed. Propert-y may be expropriated by the government 
only in the public interest and then only when proper inde:m:aity 
is J>a.id. 71 
. Authors 1 rights to their works ·shall. b:e protected. 72 
Unlawful arrests are prohibited and the right ef habe:.as COfPU$ 
is affirmed. 73 Jury trials shall.be the right of th~·aceused 
and only the persons fo1md guilty· shall be punished. 74 · No death 
sentence, banishment or perpetual confiscatian ef J>raperties shall 
be a.llowedc The death penalty m~ be inflicted only by mill tary 
69 Art. 141, Sects. 6, 11~ 12 and 37. 
70 Art. 141. Sec •. 13. 
71 .Art. 141t ·Sects. 15-16. 
72 Art. 141, Sects •. 17•19. 
73 Art •. 141 t Sects.· 20 and 23. · 
74 Art. 141, Sects. 28 and 30.· 
tribunals during wartime.75 There must be no imprtsonment fer 
debt and no extradition for political crime or opinion. 76 
Free peacetime entry, residence, and exit fri!mi. national 
terri tory is guaranteed to alL :But the Federal Government may 
expel any foreigner who menaces the public order unless he is 
married to a :Brazilian or has a Brazilian child dependent on 
him for support.77 
National Economic Council 
Article 205 establishes the National Economic Council 
whose members are named by the president with Senate approval. 
This Council is empowered to study economic life and recommend 
measures for improvement, to the proper authorities . 
.Amendment 
The final proviso of the new charter is that amendments 
100 
may be considered on the suggestion of one-fourth of the Chamber 
or the Senate, or by more than one half of the state legislatures.78 
Summary 
The detailed nature of the present constitution follows a 
trend which seems to characterize similar documents which have 
75 .Art. 141, Sect. 31. 
76 Art. 141, Sects. 32-33. 
77 Art. 142..;.43. 
78 Art. 217, Sect. 1. 
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been prepared in many parts o£ th~_world. since the turn of the 
present century. This is in direct contrast to the old theory 
that a constitution should consist of brief, succinctly presented 
assertions of general principle. In this regard the present 
Constitution differs markedly from the Constitution of 1891. 
However, in its provisions dealing with political libertiest 
the reconstitution of the traditional governmental branches 
essential to the operation of representative democracy,and the 
restoration of a wider degree of autonomy to the states; the lsw 
can be said to hark back to the Republican Constitution of 1891. 
In the social and economic fields the new government relies 
heavily on the Constitution of 1934. Indeed, the chapter on 
the economic and social order in the present constitution incor-
porates nearly all of the features contained in a similar section 
of the 1934 document. 
Certain features of the anamolous Constitution of 193? 
were also preserved, although in most instances they were modified. 
For example, the National Economie Council is now merely an 
advisory group engaged in the study of various econemic problems. 
and net the important third force which th~ creators of the 
Estado ~ envisaged. Economic nationalism~ extensively treated 
in the Constit~tion.of 193? and s~sequent decrees. did not 
. 
figure promine~tly in the present censtitution. restrictions 
against the ec9nomic rights of foreigners being limited only in 
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the fields of mineral exploitation, communications,and shipping. 
Broadly considered, then, ~razil 1 s new constitution~ 
be termed a fairly democratic document from the political point 
of view, with orientation in social and economic matters towards 
a mild form of the "welfare state." 
---=== 
CHAPrER VII 
THE DEMISE OF THE COMMUNISTS 
The ~: A,, Natiaaal Party? 
Whea the newly reorganized Partido e0lll'Wlista ~ Brasil 
(the Communist Party of Brazil- PCB), applied to the Superior 
Electoral Tribunal for legal recogBitian in 1945, it was obliged 
to declare itself. a truly national party free of any foreign 
control. 
• • • Being a Communist party sui-gen.eris; espousing 
a Communism free of all. ide0logical substance, viz. 
a Brazilian .00nmrunism; a party .whose program in no 
way resembles tlat followed in the U.s.s.R., and 
also termed Cemmunisnr; in short, a party without 
Marxism, without Lenl.IO.sm, without· a dictatorshi.p 
of the Proletariat, with noae of the features char-
acteristically associated with Communism the world -::~ 
over •••• 1 · 
The. Constitution of the Party als0 avoids any reference 
to the principles of international -Marxism.- Article two of this 
Constitutien is devoted to the. ailns and objectives of the party. 
In part, the article reads as fellows: 
The C0mmunist Party of Brazil, guardi:an of the . 
iaterests of the working class, ••• obliges all 0f 
its members. to adopt. and pursue a program ailned at 
the complete economic, political, and social eman-
cipation of Brazi1.2 
1 Pinto do Canno, Diretrizes Partidarias, p. 303. 
2 . ~., p. 306. 
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No mention is made of the means and methods to be employed in 
achieving the ncomplete economic, political and social emanci-
pation" of the nation. 
While these declarations may have satisfied the Superior 
Electoral Tribunal. most observers took a cynical view of the 
POE's new position. However, the party's national loyalty was 
not seriously challenged until March, 1946, when Luiz Carlos 
Prestes, leader Qf the POE, then a duly elected senator and 
member of the Constituent Assembly, declared: 
"In the event that :Brazil is dragged.into a war against 
the Soviet Union, a war which from our point of view 
can only be an imperialistic war, •.• we shall be 
against that war and will fight against the govern-
ment which w0uld envolve our nati0n in such a war. n3 
The anti-Communist forces were incensed by Prestes' state-
ment~ and demands that the party be outlswed were voiced in several 
quarters. One federal deputy formally requested the Superior 
Electoral Tribunal to outlaw the party on grounds that Prestes' 
statement "endangered national security. 114 The issue was widely 
discussed in and out of government circles, but no official action 
was taken at the time. 
The Communists again aroused the ire of the administration 
by manipulating a series of strikes calculated to deal the nation's 
3 ~·, p. 306. 
4 11 The Yankee Menace," Newsweek, 27:53, April 8, 1946. 
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none too heal thy economy a heavy blow. On the twenty-seventh of 
M~, for the second time in a month, the stevedores at the vi-tal 
port of Santos. walked out on strike. tying up sixteen ships. 
The strike was said. to be a pr0test against the arrest of a group 
of dock workers, who earlier in the month, had. refused to unload 
Spanish ships. The railroad workers were also out en strike in 
an effort to gain higher wages. The gravest threat of all occurred 
early in Jtme when employees of the Rio Tramway. Light and Power 
Company, voted to strike fer higher wages. At this juncture, the 
government, charging that the strike had been called for political. 
rather than economic reasons, called out the troops and ordered 
the workers back tottheir jobs.5 
.Again, in May, a crisis developed when the Communists 
attempted to celebrate the first anniversary of their legal 
existence. A mass demonstration was scheduled to take place at 
the Largo do Carioca Square, in downtown Rio de Janeiro. Presi-
dent Dutra, fearing trouble~ ordered Rio's Chief of Police Jose 
Pereira Lira. to prevent the expected 150,000 partisans from 
meeting at the Largo Carioca. Lira, thereupon informed the Comm-
unists that they would have to hold their meetings in Ipenema, 
a remote beachside suburb. The Communists took this as a challenge, 
and began circulating handbills urging all would-be celebrants to 
5 
"Red Star's Decline, 11 Int~r-American [Monthly J, 5:45, 
July 11 1946. 
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meet at the _Largo a.s planned. 
:By six o • clock on the evening of' the twentY?:-third, the 
Largo was thronged with demonstrators.. some bearing placards de-
manding ".:Bread," "Democra.cy" and "Freed.om. 11 ·soon the inevitable 
happened ~-shots were fired and the police moved in. · Order was 
finally restored albeit at the cost of' three lives and numerous 
other casualties~6 
Public opinion was split over the government's treatment 
of the Communists in this situation. Some people were shoCked by 
the incident, others felt that the police were obliged to take 
strong action in order to preserve law and order. In any event, 
the government•s anti•Commnnist campaign subsided for a time, 
particularly since elections for local and state officers and 
some members of Congress, were to be held the following January. 
Congressional Elections of ~ 
The elections of 1947 were considered important for two 
reasons. Not only did they serve to mirror public sentiment on 
the Oomrrnmist issue, but they also provided GetUlio Vargas with 
an opportunity for gauging his political strength on a nation 
wide scale. During the campaign, Vargas a.nd Prestes again reveal-
ed that they could combine forces for purposes of' mutual gain. 
:Both the PO.::B and Vargas• Partido Trabalhista ::Brasileiro (:Brazilian 
6 "Exciting Place," ~. 47:40. June 3, 1946. 
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Labor Party or PTB), joined forces in an effort to elect various 
f - 7 candidates in the state o Sao Paulo. 
Although President Dutra's Social Democratic Party and 
Air Brigadier Eduardo Gomes• National Democratic Union managed 
to maintain control over nineteen of Brazil's twenty states, the 
Co:mmnnists and Laborites did fairly well at the polls. The Comm-
unists polled 800.000 votes or 200,000 more than they had received 
in 1945, and succeeded in electing seventy state deputies,B while 
the Labor Party elected ~ty such officials.9 
The Government ~ 
The gains registered by the Communists undoubtedly served 
to intensify the feeling within government circles that the 
party should be outlawed before it became a real threat. Less 
than a month after the elections, President Dutra had the public 
prO~ecutor pres~nt a formal petition to the Superior Electoral 
Tribunal requesting the suppression of the Communist Party on 
the grounds that it opposed democracy and took orders from a 
foreign power. Particular· reference was made to Prestes 1 state-
ment of March. 1946. concerning the position which the Communists 
would take in the event of a war between the United States and 
7 
"Partners on the Make," Time, 30:48, November 17, 1947. 
8 
.Austin F. MacDonal.d, Latin American Politics and Govern-
ment. p. 164. 
9 Pinto do Carmo, ~· £11., p. 113. 
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the Soviet Union. The prosecut~r also cited the clause in the 
Constitution prohibiting political parties whose programs or 
activities are "contrary to the democratic form of government. ftl0 
While the government 1 s case was awaiting action by the 
Superior Electoral Tribunal, another incident occurred which 
served to intensify the already hot debate over the future status 
of the OolmiWlist party. 
Following a pattern established by Communist parties in 
other parts of the world, the PCB organized a militant youth 
organization cal;led the Unii.o da Juventude Oo~ista (Union of 
Comm:unist Youth). Luiz Carlos Prestes described the union as 
llan ampl-e movement of Brazilian youth connected with the Oomm-
unist Party but independent and capable of uniting young people 
of all categories.nll 
On April 15, 1947, President Dutra issued a decree suspend-
ing the activities of the Union. The President alleged that the 
movement sought to instill Brazilian youth with the principles 
of a doctrine which sought to destroy the nationls democratic 
institutions .12 
Events were rapidly moving to a close and the government 
10 Constitution of 1946, art. 141, sect. 13. 
ll "Red Episode," Newsweek~ 29:54, May 19, 1947. 
12Pinto do Carmo, £E.• clt., p~ 307. 
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prosecutor intensified his efforts to secure a decision from the 
Superior Electoral Tribunal. Finally, on May 7, 1947 • by a vote 
of three to two, the Tribunal declared the party illegal. Defend .... 
ing the majority opinion. Judge Candido. Lobo stated, "The Commu:rrlst 
Doctrine is absolutely contrary to the concept of democracy set 
forth in the Constitution.t113 
When informed of the Tribunal's decision, L-uiz Carlos Prestes 
is reported to have.commented, 11 It is not the first time that we 
have been officially annihilated but somehow we always manage to 
be a little stronger than·b~fore~ul4 He urged his followers to 
remain calm, ana.·stated that the Tribunalfs decision would be 
respected pending an appeal to the country's Supreme Court. 
Meanwhile, President Dutra ordered the police to close all Communist 
headquarters, bra:nch offiees, and clubs. This operation was 
carried out without incident. The first phase of the government's 
campaign against the PCB was over. 15 
Expulsion of Co~st Legislators 
From the legalistic point of view the decision of the Superior 
Electoral Tribunal merely served to deprive the PCB of its exi~tence 
as a party. The exact status of duly elected Communist legislators 
13 "Communist Party Outlawed in Brazil," Bulletin !.f.~ 
~.American ~. 81:·453~ August, 1947. 
14 
MacDonald, ~· '£it+, p •. ·165.· 
15 11The Outlaws , 11 ~. 49:37, May 19, 1947. 
====iF=-· ----··-
110 
remained undefined. President Dutra was of the opinion that 
these men shoUld be expelled by Congress and new officials appoint-
ed to take their place. 
When the President_rs proposal_was taken up in the Chamber 
of Deputies it was vigorously opposed. by members of the .National 
Democratic Union. Throughout the critical perio~ preceding the 
outlawing of the ColiUII\lilist Party the .UDN had argued that. since 
such a move would oblige the Communists to go underground more 
problems would be created than solved. It is therefore not surpris-
ing that many UDN deputies were loath to vote for the expulsion 
of legally elected representatives of the .people. However, by 
January~ 1948, UDN opposition collapsed and the government 
sponsored bill was passed by a vote of 181 to 74.16 
Communism was now as defunct as the law could make it, 
but it could hardly be considered dead. Though forced into hiding, 
Luiz Carlos Prestes continued to operate as the country• s chief 
exponent of the Communist Doctrine. The elections of 1950, were 
to prove that he and his followers w4re able to make the necessary 
adjustments for meeting the new situation and thus succeed in 
functioning rather effectively as an extra-l~al political 
faction. 
16 "Reds on the Run," Time, 15:40 • January 19, 1948. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS UNDER DUTRA 
~ Inflationgry Problem 
When President Dutra took over the reins of government in 
January, 1946, Brazil 1 s economy was already readjusting to meet 
new world conditions brought about by the close of World War II. 
Many of the problems of readjustment were, of course, born of the 
war it self. The most far-reachi-ng problem was that of inflation. 
Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in 1939, 
sources of essential imports began drying up or disappeared com-
pletely .. 
Throughout the war period, the United Sta.t'Ss, itself heavily 
committed to war production, became the most important supplier 
of Brazilian needs. Serious shortages and dislocations in the 
Brazilian economy became inevitable as a result of this situation. 
On the other hand, the value of Brazil's imports, sent primarily 
to the United States, increased phenomenally with the result 
that huge Brazilian credits were built up in the United States. 
Meanwhile in Brazil, the demand for consumers' goods forced 
prices to skyrocket thus stimulating high cost production at 
home. The Vargas government, caught in the ever increasing spiral 
of inflation, and failing to take adequate measures to remedy 
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the si tua.tion, followed the line of least resistance b7 resorting 
to the ~rinting press. In 1940, there were approximatelY' 
4,800,000~000 cruzeiros in circulation. By 1945, this figure 
had risen to approximately 17,000,000,000.1 
The close of the European phase of the war found Brazil 
short of machinery, industrial chemicals, coal and oil, and con-
sumers1 goods. Those who now turned to the United States for pay-
ment of the balances accrued over the preceding five years, found 
that increased costs in the United States appreciably decreased 
:Phe purchasing power of such balances. What is more, allocation 
procedures, established in the United States during the war, to 
assure Brazil of a fair share of available goods. were subsequently 
abolished, with the result that Brazilian b~ers were forced to 
compete with domestic United States b~ers and with the more 
effectively organized buying staffs of other nati6hs.2 The resulting 
situation not only served to irritate many Brazilians but, of 
course. created stronger inflationary pressures. .The on~y ~right 
spot in the picture was the prospect of stable or increased demands 
for Brazil's major export products based on anticipated world 
economic recovery. 
The discontent evoked by the inflation created very serious 
1 11 Letter from Brazil," Fortune, 35:207, February, 1947. 
2 Laurence Duggan, The .Americas, p. 124. 
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problems for the newly elected government. The great mass of 
people were not at all concerned with rational analyses explain-
ing the whys and. wherefores of inflation. They, being victims of 
it, were interested in obtaining relief. In Rio de Janeiro 
speculation, the h~dmaiden of inflation, forced the prices of 
such staples as bread, rice and beans, to increase 200 to 300 ]>er 
cent over the 1939 leve1.3 
Early in September, 1946, food riots, led by high school 
students, swept Rio. Retail grocery shops were demolished. 
Housewives organized to demand a 50 per cent cut in food prices. 4 
Later in the month, when wheat shipments began to arrive from 
Argentina, the price of bread dropped appreciably, not entirely 
because of the new shipments but also because panicky speculators 
dumped hidden flour stoCks on the market.s 
.Another source of urban discontent was the critical housing 
shortage which developed as a. result of real estate speculation 
during the war. In the strict sense of the term, a housing short-
age did not actually exist since it was estimated in February, 
1946, that there were approximately 17,000 vacant units in the 
city of Rio alone. However few of these were being rented save 
3-''Letter from :SraziJ!1, loc. cit. 
4 
"Razor Edge 11 , Time, 48:40, September 9, 1946. 
5 
II Letter from Brazil"> loc. ill· 
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at outrageous rates. Dealers in rea.l estate were busy b"l:o/ing and 
selling new apartment buildings and making enormous :pro:fi ts on 
each turnaver. 
Early in Augu.st, the government undertook the task of 
alleviating both the food and housing c~~sis. Price ceilings 
' . were imposed on a long l1st of essential food items and limits 
were :placed on wholesale and retail profits. The who~esalers 
immediately cancelled 80 :per cent of their food stuff orders, 
claiming that they could not operate profitably under the new 
gove~ent ceilings. They demanded a minimum profit of 23 :per 
cent. This forced the government to take drastic action. The 
army was obliged to buy, transport, store and then sell food 
stuffs, at a fair price. 
With respect to the housing situation the government levied 
an eight per cent tax on profits from the sale of real property.6 
This served to strengthen a government ruling, passed in February, 
requiring that all new buildings must be occupied within sixty 
~s after completion. This ruling had been flagrantly side 
stepped by the simple process of postponing the installation af 
such minor items as door knobs.? 
6 "Brazil attacks Price Spiral, 11 Bu.siness ~. August 10, 
1946. p. 101. 
7 11:Boom, 11 Time, 47:36, February 25, 1946. 
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Looking beyond the immediate disturbances created by the 
inflation, what were the needs and the prospects fer the :Brazil-
ian economy, shortly after the war? 
The Office of inter-American Affairs in a study of :Brazil-
ian import needs, published early in 1945, concluded that plans 
for Brazilts development would require at least 2.5 billion 
dollars over a ten yee.r period. Much of this amo1.11Ilt was to be 
used for developing more of :Srazil•s potential hydroelectric 
power. Also in need of further expansion were Brazil's higlwray 
and railroad systems, which had been sorely neglected during the 
war. The iron and steel, minimg, textile and cement industries 
were all in need of new·plant facilities. According to the 
study, the need for equipment and machinery from the united States 
was estimated at $1,307,000,000. Equipment and material for 
power, communications and·transportation was expected to absorb 
more than half of the total. Many projects already ini tie.led 
were often delayed because of equipment shortages abroad.B 
One of the most optimistic analyses of prospects for 
Brazilian exports was prepared by the United States Department 
of Commerce, just before V-J Day. This optimism was based on 
the following expectations: 
1. Large quantities of coffee, brazil nuts and fruits 
would probably be shipped to countries which had not suf'fered 
8 "Brazilian Market for Capital Goods," Inter-American 
£Monthly], 4:44, February, 1945. 
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wartime devastation. 
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2. Liberated European countries would soon previde large 
markets for.Brazilisn foodstuffs and textiles. 
3. New wartime uses for Brazilian vegetable oils and 
waxes, as well as for essential minerals, should continua, since 
pre-war sources of supply would not be available immediately and 
since many permanent markets had been found for certain Brazilian 
substitutes. 
4. Brazilian exports of manufactures to other· South 
American countries would not encounter immediate ma.ximwn compe.-. 
ti tion from former European suppliers end might become mere firmly 
entrenched. 
The department also considered long-term prospects as 
«good. 11 Future export possibilities for cotton and rubber were 
not considered clear at the time, but Brazilian manufacturers 
were expected to make extensive use of these cemmoditiea. 
Development of the manufacture of cocoa butter and caff-
eine, extraction of vegetable oils within the country, and 
tanned hides among Brazil's hide exports, were considered in-
dicati ve of a new trend. Finally, the United States was expected 
to provide a market for several exports~ and continental Europe 
would need commodities for relief and rehabilitation. However, 
the Latin American countries were not expected to account for as 
much of Brazill s export trade as they had during the war years. 9 
9 "Prospects for Brazilian Exports, u Inter-.American [Monthly], 
4,~~1-,~~j;_,_l~A5,. =====--===-~-=1-lt=== 
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Trade Control Policies 
The implementation of a sound economic policy for the 
country, given the existing circumstances, proved to be a.n extrem ... 
ely difficult and complex task, one which presented the adminis-
tration with its grea.t.est challenge. Early in 1946, the President 
ordered the sua~ension of Braz11 1 s import licensing syst~, and 
on March 1~ 1946, President Dutra issued a decree simplifying and 
liberalizing Brazil's exchange control system. The avowed aim of 
the administration in issuing this decree was to stimulate foreign 
investments and to reduce inflationary pressures created by un~ 
diminished exchange holdings. The decree provided for: 
1. The application of the free exchange rate to all 
capital tra.nfers. 
a. Removal of restrictions against the withdrawal of 
foreign capital invested in Brazil. 
3. The transfer of profits and dividends up to 8 per cent 
per annum of capital invested in the country. Excess over 8 
per cent to be withdrawn over a five year period. 
4. The reduction of the established 5 per cent exchange 
remittance tax to 3 per cent. 
5. The extension of more liberal selling rates on foreign 
exchange for all kinds of payment abroad.lO 
10 "Exchange Eased," Business Week, April 20, 1946 , p. 110, 
and 11Brazil Eases Up On Foreign Oa:pi tal, 11 Inter-American [Monthly], 
5:41, April, 1946. 
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While this new government policy undoubtedly served to 
attract much needed capital there is some question as to whether 
it achieved its secondary goal of curbing inflation and promoting 
internal productive development. By July, of the following year, 
import licenses were again required for certain commodities con-
sidered non-essential, in order that more important items such as 
machinery and equipment might be imported to boost domestic industry. 
Commodities requiring licenses were precious stones, art objects, 
jewelry, perfumes, toilet articles, shoes, wallets and purses.ll 
By March, 1948, the liberal policy adopted by the govern-
ment in 1946, underwent still further revision. All of Brazil's 
exports and many imports were made subject to license control. 
This step was taken to cheCk the flow of dollars from the country. 
Dollar imports for the year came to f625,000,000 for the first 
eleven months of 194?, almost double· that for the same period in 
1946. The new import licensing program provided that ?5 per 
cent of the available exchange should go to absolutely essential 
imports which would not require licenses. About 20 per cent of 
available exchange should go for relatively nonressential imports 
and only 5 per cent for non-essential luxury goods.l2 
In his 1948 annual message to Congress, President Dutra 
11 "Brazil," Bulletin of ~Pan American Union, 82:455, 
August, 194?. 
l2 "Brazil Licenses Imports , 11 Business ~' April 24, 
1948, :p. 126. 
• 
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stated that Brazil had been utilizing its wartime reserves to 
purchase foreign goods to meet the backlog of domestic demand, 
but that it had failed to make these purchases on a selective 
basis.l3. 
This interpretation was given further emphasis by Dr. Jose 
Garrido To!res, Brazil's top ranking economist, when he stated 
in March, 1949, that Brazilian post-war purchases from the United 
States had contributed little to the rebuilding and strengthening 
of the country's economic development. He indicated that Brazil~ 
ian officials had finally realized that they must stop the out-
ward flow of money, and the inward flow of non-essentials, if 
they intended to foster continued industrial expansion.l4 
Plans for Economic Develo~ment 
One rather interesting plan for Brazilts post-war economy was 
contained in a report prepared by the president of the Federacao das 
Industrias do Estado de Sao Paulo (Federation of Industries of 
the State of Sao Paulo) in early 1945. The report defined under-
consumption as the number one problem, and concluded that the 
national income must be increased if Brazilrs standard of living 
was to reach a reasonable level. According to the report, the 
key to increased real income was industrialization and collateral 
agricultural development. The report proposed a series of five-
13 11Message of the President of :Srazil, 11 Bulletin of the Pan 
American Union, 82:522, September, 1948. 
14 11 The Economic .Anatomy of :Brazil, 11 United Nations World, 
3:44, March, 1949. 
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year economic development plans to be based on a five billion 
dollar expenditure. The bulk of the funds should go into hydro-
electric power development and other energy sources~ transportation 
fa.cili ties, and the mechanization of agriculture. It was suggested 
that the program could be launched successfully if one half of the 
country's blocked bilences in the United States 7 'Were earmarked 
for its implementation. 
It was also suggested that existing commercial policies 
(based on extremely high markups) would have to be abandoned 
during the period of constructive effort. On the other hand, the 
program should not be jeopardized by the admission of cheap, 
mass~produced foreign goods.l5 
While this proposed development plan did not represent 
government policy, it did serve to stimulate official thinting 
and its influence was clearly revealed in the SALTE plan adopt ... 
ed by the government early in 1950. T.he much discussed SALTE 
plant initially proposed in 1948, was drawn up to combine four 
programs to improve the country's health (Saude), food, (ill-
mentagao), transportation, (Transportee), and power, (Energia) 
over a five year period and at a cost of approximately one billion 
dollars. The largest sumt four hundred mill:hon dollars, was 
to be expended for Transportee. (In 1948, Brazilts railroad 
15 "A Brazilian Post-War Plan," Inter-American [Monthly J, 
4:44, February, 1945. 
I 
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mileage was about one-half and its road mil_eage about one fif-
teenth that of the United States.) Alimenteyio was to come next 
with 185,000,000 dollars to be used for soil conservation and 
restoration, and also for the purchase of farm machinery. Next 
came Energia with 1503 000 1 000 dollars, followed by~ with 
137,000~000 dollars. 
The question of finances proved to be a serious obstacle 
to the adoption of the plan. Congress, facing a 100,000,000 
dollar deficit in the national budget far the oncoming year, 
(1949) was loath to impose new taxes. There was hope in some 
quarters that cridi t arrangements could be negotiated with the 
.. 
United States Export-Import Bank and the International Barik for 
Reconstruction and Development. President Dutra favored private 
investment as a sui table alternative. However, no agreement 
could be reached and the proposed pl-an was held in abeyance for 
two years.l6 
In September, 1948, a Joint Brazilian - United States 
Technical Commission was established to make a broad study of 
Brazilfs capacity for economic development. Mr. John lbbink, 
of the McGraw Hill International Publishing Corporation was 
appointed chairman of the commission. After six months of in-
tensive study the committee issued a report which contained the 
16 
"Brazil's Drive for Heavy Industry, 11 United States 
~and World R~ort, 25:24~ December 3, 1948. 
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following recommendations: 
Capital for industrial development could be increased 
by limiting real estate investment which absorbs two-thirds of 
Brazilian savings •. 
! Skilled Labor ~ couia be created by intensive 
vocational training and selective immigration. 
Transportation could be improved by coordinating presen.t 
transport services and by adopting an integrated plan for future 
development. 
Credit Control could be made more effective if some sort 
of federal reserve system were established. 
ForeigJt investment could be increased if present laws 
were modified to insure investorsof fair treatment. However~ 
Brazilians should not rely too heavily on such sources of capital 
since the use of domestic funds would eliminate excessive 
foreign debt services. 
The commission also made several general recommendations 
.ad vi sing against "seeking high :profits from a limited market." 
Instead, a business philosophy of mass production at favorable 
costs was suggested. It was also noted that Brazil still lacked 
resources and equipment for a general adva:nce on the entire 
economic front. Power and transportation development should 
be given top priority and the government should be alliSured of 
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a major role in primary developments of this sort.l7 
Filially, in May, 1950~ President Dutra approved legisla ... 
tion initiating the long discussed SALTE Plan. While.the prov-
isions of the plan as first proposed in 1948, remained essent-
ially the same, the advice of the .Abbink Comrrdssion with respect 
to finances was apparently heeded. The billion dollar five-year 
program was to b&:~inanced in the following manner: federal 
budget appropriations would provide 647,500,000 dollars; 250, 
000,000 dollars would be obtained from the issuef, of special 
SALTE Plan Bonds. The Banco do Brasil was authorized to provide 
100,000 ,000 dollars in loans .18 
At long last, Brazil was equipped with a plan which would 
assure her of a well integrated advance on the(,entire econGmic 
front. This is not to imply that progress had not been made 
during the five years prior to the initiation of the SALTE Plan. 
Indeed, during the period from 1945 to 1950, positive gains 
were recorded in all fields of economic activity. Let us now 
17 Report -- Joint Brazilian-- United States Technical 
Comrrdssion, Rio de Janeiro~ Brazil; Division of International 
Conferences, Department of State, March 10, 1949. See "By the 
Bootstrap," Time, 58:40, March 21, 1949, for a concise summary 
of the above report. 
18 "Brazil Launches Five Year, One Billion Dollar Plan," 
Business ~t June 24, 1950, p. 110. For a detailed account 
of the SALTE Pls.n see George Wythe, Royce A. Wight, and Harold 
M. Mid:ld$ , BRA.ZIL: An Expandi:mg Economy, pp. 349-362. This 
is the standard work on recent economic developments in Brazil. 
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proceed to examine some of these developments in greater detail. 
THE DRIVE FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION 
Iron and Steel Production 
~ ~· It has been estimated that :Brazil contains 
over one half the total iron ore reserves in Latin America. 
The most important known deposits are found in the state of 
Minas Gerais about 350 miles inland from the port of Victaria. 
The mountain peaks of .Aaue and Itab!ra are said to contain some 
of the best iron ore to be found anywhere in the world. Samples 
taken from the crest of Itab!ra proved to be 68 per cent pure. 
comparable to the finest iron ores in SWeden~ which are renowned 
for their high quality.l9 
Prior to the outbreak of World War II, mining operations 
in this area. were extremely limited. However, after 1942, 
President Vargas was urged by the Allies to develop :Brazilian 
iron ore production as rapidly as possible. He therefore pro-
ceeded to nationalize the major iron ore deposits in the Itab!ra 
area, and also took over the poorly run 375 mile railroad, which 
ran from the mines to the Port of Victoria. 
The Rio Doce. Valley Praject. Development of the Itab!ra. 
mining region was to be administered by 11mixed" company which 
19 11Mag1 c Mountain, 11 Time , 51: 38 , April , 5 , 1948. 
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came to be known as the Rio Doce Valley Company. Pri va.te and 
government investments amounting to 15,000,000 dollars were 
supplemented by a 19~000,000 dollar loan from the United States 
Export-Import Barik.ao During the first few years of operation 
very little iron ore reached the Port of Victoria. for trans-
shipment to United States steel mills. This was due primarily 
to serious technical and administrative problems which could 
not be solved with any great rapidity. 
Shipments of modern extractive machinery from the United 
States failed to arrive on schedule. The vital Victoria and 
Minas Railroad was found to be in worse condition than had been 
anticipated. Storage and handling facilities at the Port of 
• 
Victoria proved to be woefully inadequate. The government chose 
to staff the company with political favorites with the result 
that nepotism and feather bedding flourished.21 In due course 1 
many of these obstacles were overcome, an8 by 1945, for the 
period from January to ~. Brazil exported 128,000 tone of ore 
as compared with only 68,000 tons during the same period in 1944.22 
After the close of World War II, interest in the Rio 
Doce Valley Company diminished somewhat, but operations continued 
p. 114. 
20 "Magic Mountain, 11 loc. cit. 
21 "Magic Mountain, 11 1oc. cit. 
22 "Brazi1ts Iron Bed, 11 Business~, November 3, 1948, 
I ; 
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unabated. In 1948, it was reported that 177,000 tons of ore 
had been sold to the Carnegie Steel Corporation at a sizeable 
profit and that total exports for the year had reached 400,000 
tons. 23 However, it was felt that real progress could not be 
made if the facilities then in use were not improved. There-
fore, the government provided the company with a 19,000,000 
dollar credit, and a 7,500,000 dollar loan was negotiated with 
the United States Export-Import Barik.24 
A great deal of criticism has recently been levelled 
against the Rio Doce Valley Company and it is generally con .... 
ceded that its chances for survival would be slight indeed} if 
the government should withdraw '- ts sup:pOrt. However, the support-
ers of the project claim that it can not be judged by orthodox 
business standards since it is very closely integrated with 
the whole new industrial structure. which has been built up 
since 1942, particularly the new iron and steel plant at Volta 
Redonda.25 
Volta Redonda. The Volta Redonda Steel Plant, sometimes 
referred to as the ~eystone of Brazil's industrial system was 
launched as part of the program of cooperation between Brazil 
23 
"Brazil Steps up Industry, 11 Business ~. January. 
22, 1949, p. 120. 
24 "Magic Mountain," loc. cit. 
25 
"Ex .... Im.ts Headache," Business ~. March 4, 1950, 
p. 126. 
===~=-==If==============-===-=·=·-=-=~======================= 
127 
and the United states in the war effort. A loan of 45,ooo.ooo 
dollars was granted by the United States Export-Import Barik; 
and North American technicians were assigned the task of building 
the steel plant and supervising the first years of its operation. 
The plant was to be located in the Pa.ra!ba Valley about half 
way between the cities of Rio de Janeiro and .sB:o Paulo, the 
two largest consumers of iron and steel products. Iron ore 
and limestone were to be supplied from mines 240 miles e:way in 
the state of Minas Gerais. Some of the coal for mnelting was 
to come from the southern state of Santa Catarina,26 while a 
good deal of it would have to be imported from abroad. Much 
of the iron ore shipped to the United States, by the Rio Doce 
Valley Company was exchanged for coking coal. Late in 1942, 
equipnent and machines from the United States began to arrive 
and the construction job was begun. 
Four years and fifty million dollars later, the Volta 
Redonda plant became a reality. One blast furnace with a capac ... 
ity output of 300,000 tons a.nnuall,y was completed, but f1.1ture 
plans envisaged the addition of other blast furnaces with an 
ultimate capacity output of one million tons. Sheet; plate, 
rail, and structural steel mills stood ready to process the 
26 Santa Catarina coal is of very poor quality. Ten and 
one half tons of mined coal will yield only one ton of coke and 
the end product is said to contain thirty per cent ash. "BraEilrs 
Steel Mill," Business Week, April 7, 1945, p. 114. 
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metals produced by the new furnaces.27 
Since 1947, Volta. Redonda has increased its output of 
steel ingots nearly three times, pig iron about twice, and 
rolled steel by more than three times. In 1947, l44a879 tons of 
steel ingots were produced as compared with 420,188 tons in 1950. 
Pig iron increased. from 175,672 tons to· 339,062 tons, while 
roller steel advanced from 89,688 to 287,168 tons.28 
Transportationlill9., 0ommunications 
The improvement and extension of Brazil's decidedly inad-
equate transport system is undoub~edly the most pressing requisite 
for-the promotion of rapid development on all economic fronts. 
While the magnitude of the problem tends to minimize even the 
most substantial accomplishments in the field, the Dutra admin-
istration has patiently sought to improve and expand existing 
rail, highway and shipping facilities. 
Railways. M.lch of Brazil's railway system retains the 
ou~oded technical characteristics of an earlier age. The rolling 
stock is old, a variety of gauges g{atly limits operational 
efficiency, and the insufficiency of good domestic fuel further 
complicates matters. The obvious need for technical improve-
ment has made large new investment a mat$ercof';tital importance, 
27 "Ingots ~ the Future,• Newsweek, 28:48, July 8, 1946. 
28 "Output at Mills Triples in Four Years," Brazilian 
Bulletin, 8:2. May 1, 1951. 
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but the poor financial record of most o£ the railways in Brazil 
has greatly hindered the flow o£ private capital into this 
field. This situation, plus certain po~itical and military 
c0nsideratiems, has resulted in extensive :public financing 
leading to federal and state control of approximately 70 per 
cent of the na.tion 1 s railways.29 
Early in 1946t the government approved a plan for financ-
ing the purchase of vitally needed rolling stock, reconstruction 
o£ old roadbeds, and for the establisbment of a new line £rom 
Sao Paulo to Porto Alegre. A commission established at the 
same time was entrusted with the task of revising the basic 
transportation :plan issued by Vargas in 1934. The commissibn 1 s 
report, submitted in 1948, called for the continuation of 
railw~ extensions and interconnections already underw~, and 
for standardization of the L60 meter rail gauge throughout 
Brazil in conjunction with standard gauge equipment. 
We have already noted that the single largest appropri-
ation envisaged in the SALTE Plan was the 400,000,000 dollars 
alloted £or transportation. SALTE funds for railw~ develop-
ment were to be utilized in accordance with the new basic 
transportation plan, and were also to be used for the :purchase 
of locomotives, passenger and freight cars. The completion of 
29 Wythe, 2E.• cit., pp. 188-90o 
the work linking F.io de Janeiro with Salvador, as a means of 
developing internal markets, was given top priority.30 
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Highwa.ys. While :Brazil 1 s road network is fairly exten-
sive only one thousand miles or so of paved highways exist in 
the country. The most important paved highways incl ud.e the 
Rio-Petropolis (45 miles), stretches of the Rio-Sao Paulo high-
way and short stretches leading out of other major cities, 
usually to an outlying airfield. One of :Srazil 1 s most vi tal 
paved highways is the Via. A\nchieta connecting the port of 
Santos with the city of .lio Paulo. A marwel of modern highw:zy 
engineering~ the Via winds and turns some forty miles up the 
Great Escarpment which separates Sao Paulo from the coast. 
The Via .A:nhanguera (actually a continuation of the Via Ainchieta) 
is the trunk line from the city of Sao Paulo to Jundia! some 
35 miles into the interior of the state.31 
After a lag of so~e fifteen years. highway construction 
in :Brazil, has gained considerable impetus since the reorgan-
ization of the National Highway Department, and the creation 
of a National Highway Fund in December, 1945. Revenues for 
the highway fund are obtained from taxes lev~ed on petroleum 
and other liquid mine.ral. fuels. The federal highway department 
30 Wythe, .Ql2.· cit., p. 257. 
31 Facts About the ·state of Sao Paulo, pp. E)4...71. 
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appropriates 40 per cent of monies collected in this fashion, 
while 60 per cent is transferred to the states, territories, 
and the Federal District subject to certain administrative 
and financial prerequisites, established by the department. 
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- At the time of the establishment of the National High.,. 
way Fund, certain specific goals for the 1945~1950 period were 
established. The ultimate aim of the various projected inter .... 
city road liriks is a through-route from the Northeastern 
states to Porto Alegre in the South. Particular emphasis has 
been placed on the completion of the Rio-Sao Paulo, Ouri tiba.-
La.jes and Rio-:Bahia roads. 32 
Plans for national highway development have been serious-
ly hampered by labor and machinery shortages. A projected 
highway department budget covering the period 1948-1953 envis-
ages total expenditures amounting to 150,000,000 dollars, more 
than half of which would be for imported machinery, petroleum 
and cement, and engineering services. It has been suggested 
that a joint :Srazilian&united States commission be established 
to handle the details of further highway· development -programs, 
including the financing of needed machinery, to be obtained in 
the United Sta.tes.33 
32 ":Srenlian Communications, 11 :Bulletin of the Pan Amer-
ican Union, 82:470, .A.ugu.et, 1948. 
33 t Wy he, QE.· cit., pp. 205..,.8. 
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Shipping. In view of the inadequacy of :Brazil's rail. 
and highw~ systems, coastwise and river transportation have 
traditionally occupied an extremely significant position ~n 
the natiGnal transport and communications network. In 19~6, 
coastwise cargo handled that year totaled four million tons; 
or nearly half as much as :Brazil ts international. trade movement 
for the same period. It is estimated that nearly half of the 
goods transported by the coastal fleet consist of food stuffs 
produced in the northern and southern parts of the country end 
interchanged on what is essentially a barter basis. 
:Brazil 1 s most important coastwise shipping organization 
is the Lloyd :Brasileiro. Founded in 1890, the Lloyd, as it is 
generally known in :Brazil, was taken over by the gavernment in 
1937. On the basis of an annual two million dollar subsidy, 
it is required to Garry the mails free and to grant a. 30 per 
cent reduction on government treight and passengers. 
Immediately following the second world war, the Lloydts 
sixty ... nine ship fleet of 262,000 tans was rapidly expanded, 
and currently numbers somewhere in the vicinity of one hundred 
vessels totaling approximately 500t000 tans. 
In view of the fact that :Bra~il has over 25,000 miles 
of navigable rivers, about 15,000 miles of which are in the 
Amazon :Basin, river transportation is of considerable signi-
ficance to the nation. Ocean~going freighter~ply the Amazon 
~-cc=---~11==-==-=- --=== 
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as far as the interior city of Manaus~ and the Pa.raqu.a.y, as far 
as Corumba, close to: the :Bolivian border. While most of the 
cargo transported on the lakes and ri verwa.ys of :Brazil is handled 
by non~subsidized private firms, the federal goTernment has 
seen fit to grant sizable subsidies to a score of firms operating 
in the .Amazon region, and a number of states, notably Minas 
Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, subsidize concerns plying river--
ways of local importance. 
The principal river service controlled by the federal 
government is the Servi'io ~ Nav~i.o ~ ~ A.d.ministragio do 
Porto de Para· (SN.APP), which was formed in 1940 to take over 
the Amazon River Steam Navigation Cempany, and the port of. 
Para. Receiving an annual subsidy of 350.000 dellars SNAPP 
has as yet failed to register any marked gains in improving 
service to the inhabitants of the region. However, recent 
efforts have been made to recondition some of the vessels and 
to fit them with Diesel engines. Also, a limited. number of 
barges and tugs are under construction. 34 
Civil Aviation. No other Latin .American nation has 
witnessed so great an extension of commercial air transportation 
as has Brazil. During the brief period from 1940 to 1947, the 
number of commercial airlines operating in :Brazil increased 
from :four to eighteen. The number of pa.ssa.nger air miles flown 
34 Ibid •• pp. 208-12. ~ 
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in 1947, was 326,000,000 representing an increase over 1940 of 
1,159 per cent. 
Of Brazil's four leading airlines, three: Cruzerio do Sul, 
Viacoo Aerea Rio Gra.ndense (V.ARIG), and Vias;ao Aerea sao Paulo 
(VASP), were originally German controlled or influenced, and 
one, Panair do Brasil. was dominated by American interests. 
However, all three of the ex-German lines are now owned and 
operated by Brazilian nationals and American control over 
Panair do Brasil is rapidly diminishing. 
Until quite recently, the government's civil air policy 
was extremely lax and nearly everyone was free to operate an 
airline anywhere. However, since 1946, a genuine effort has 
been made to standardize and allocate routes on a rational 
basis and provide for uniform safety procedures. 
In that same year, the Air Ministry issued an important 
regulation prohibiting the organization of new air lines with 
a paid in capital of less than 2,500,000 dollars. This regula-
tion served to prevent further organization of countless 
numbers of small concerns which were being organized immediately 
after World War II. One important factor in the evolution of 
these 11 fly-by-night 11 organizations was the availability of sur-
plus army transport planes in the United States. 
Although the government does not operate any commercial 
air service, the For£a A~rea Brasileira (Brazilian Air Force ~ 
--- =-=--==-~-==-====== 
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FAB) does operate ~ extensive air mail and military transport 
service and also trains a ;Large number of FAB_ pilots. 
Although most of Brazil's commercial air routes are 
concentrated along the coast or within a fe-W.:·hundred miles of 
the coast, some lines do operate deep into the interior of 
the country. In addition, several carriers operate abroad, 
reaching Peru, western Europe, Egypt, Turkey, the United States, 
and Argentina. A bevy of international air services stop off 
at various points in Brazil. 
While most Latin American countries maintain airline 
rates far in excess of prevailing rates in the United States, 
Brazilian_ rates have generally followed the United States 
pattern despite the fact that operating costs in Brazil are 
substantially higher than in the United States •; For instance, 
while navigation and communication facilities must be established 
and maintained by the various concerns in Brazil, the CAA. 
maintains and operates such facilit~es for the benefit of all 
commercial airlines operating in the United States. What is 
more, low route density, slow maintenance, and higher labor 
costs as a result of less effective personnel organization) 
have, on the whole, served to make domestic airline operations 
in Brazil rather unprofitable ventures. The so-called air'-taxi 
services represent a notable exception to this prevailing 
situation. Operating from large urban centers to isolated 
towns and ranches nearby, they supplement the services of the 
--":. 
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regular airlines and perform a useful service for businessmen 
and landowners who can now, in a few minutes, reach points which 
would ordinarily require days of travel by more conventional means.35 
Electrification 
A survey conducted by the water Division of the Department 
of Mineral Production of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1948, 
estimated :SraziP s potential supply of hydroelectric power at 
14,500,000 kilowatts. According to the department, Brazil was 
currently utilizing only one tenth of this amount. The depart-
ment suggested that a hydroelectric development program be 
adopted by the national and state governments. This program 
would include the further utilization of the Paulo Afonso Falls 
on the sao Francisco River (maximum capicity 440,000 kilowatts); 
harnessing the Paraopeba River in Minas Gerais (102,000 kilowatts); 
erection of a power plant on the Macabu River in the state of 
Rio de Janeiro; rerouting of the Santa Cruz River in the state 
of Rio Grande do Sul , so that it joins the Santa Maria. River, 
with the two producing about 85,000 kilowatts; utilization of 
the Piabaiilia River in Areal, State of Rio; utilization of the 
~ara!ba River by the electric power plant of Loges in the state 
of Rio; addition of two units to the Cabatao Power Plant in 
the state of Sao Paulo; and further development of the Avan-
handa.ra Power Plant, also in Sao Paulo. The department has 
35 Ibid., pp. 215~23. 
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estimated that this plan should yield 1,397,200 kilowatts or 
almost as much as was then being produced in Brazi1. 36 
Petroleum 
Brazil 1 s lack of large deposits of good quality coal 
has not been balanced by the development of oil production. 
Commercially exploitable wells were not drilled until 1941, 
in the state of :Bahia. By 1947, one hundred wells had been 
drilled there, of which forty-five were producing oil. In 
September, 1946, President Dutra authorized the installation 
of a refinery to process Bahian oi1. 37 
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In an effort to stimulate national production, the govern-
) inent proceeded to set up the National Petroleum Refinery, a 
mixed company, one half of its stock being owned by the govern-
ment and the other half being owned by private capitar. 38 Mean-
while, the National Petroleum Council continued to search out 
new deposits in other parts of Brazil. 
:By ~949, :Brazilian oil had become a major political 
issue. The questi.on of who was to get Brazil's oil out of the 
earth and refine it became a matter of vital concern to all. 
36 11Brazil Plans to Double Electric Power Production," 
Pan American Union, 82:232, .April, 1948. 
37 Dorival Teixeira Vieira, "The Industrialization of 
Brazil, 11 Brazil! Portrait of Half a Continent, .Alexander 
Marchant and T. Lynn Smith, editors, p. 261. 
38 "Brazil Strikes Oil Again, 11 Bulletin of the Pan 
American~. 81:580, October, 1947. 
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A bill iimiting foreign holdings to 40 per cent in oil re-
fining ventures was taken up in Congress. The Standard Oil 
Company, interested in Brazilian oil development for many 
years, spent $140j000 in an advertising campaign to paint out 
th~t (1) Brazil was currently importing nearly all of its oil, 
and ( 2) that only a firm with a backlog of technical 11know-
how" such as the Standard Oil Company possessed, could. build 
such a complex industry for Brazil. Nationalistic cries of 
Q petrffileo ~ nosso (The oil belongs tot~), were voiced. in 
various quarters. 
The oil question became ~o controversial that it was 
projected into the 1950 presidential campai~ and congressional 
39 
action was postponed indefinitely. 
Brazil's National Motor Factory 
Brazil's National Motor Factory is located at the foot-
hills of the Serra d.a Mar; twenty miles from Rio de Janeiro. 
The factory came into being largely as a result of the wartime 
efforts of General Antonio Meniz of the Brazilian Air Force. 
Shortly after the outbreak of World War II, General Moniz was 
able to obtain financial aid from the United States Export-
Import Bank to develop an aircraft engine factory in Brazil. 
Construction began in July, 1942, and the plant was COWPleted 
in 1945, but it is said that ·only one engine was actually pro-
39 "Whose Oil," Time, 54:26, October 31, 1949. 
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In March, 1946, the National Motor Factory was trans-
formed into a mixed company with the government retaining 44 
per cent of the stock. At the same time it was announced that 
the factory would begin producing engines and parts for Brazil-
ian"""ll!ade tractors. The fabtory was granted substantial tax 
exemptions for a ten~year ~eriod and the Ministry of Agriculture 
placed a token order for ten thousand tractor engines to be de-
livered over a ten-year period. 40 
By 1947, it was reported that the factory was engaged;in 
the production of a variety of products ranging from tractor 
motors to re~igerator compressors.41 
Brazil's Rubber Industry 
Because of the growing demand for rubber by domestic 
industrt, Brazil's output of natural rubber is becoming less 
dependent on the ups and downs of the world market, and is ~o 
longer at the mercy of its competitors, particularly in areas 
of cheaper production in southeast Asia. Almost 80 per cent 
of Brazilian rubber production in 1947, was absorbed by domee-
tic industry. 
The manufacturing of rubber goods in Brazil advanced 
40 11Made in Brazil, 11 Inter-American [Monthly] 5:40, 
March, 1946. 
41 11From Alligators to Motors," Bulletin 2f the Pan 
American Union, 81:100, February, 1947 
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rapidly during the war years. The number of tires produced 
jumped from 30.:;421 in 1936- to 708,816 in 1946. and rose to an 
estimated 835,000 in 1947. The importance of such increasea 
to the country's economy may be readiiy seen if.we consider 
that as early as 1946, the value of crude rubber was about 
650,000,000 cruzeiros, while the value of rubber goods produ~~d 
was mpre than a billion cruzeiros. 
The government has taken broad measures to encourage 
rubber production. Under a decree of September 8, 1946, an 
Executive Committee for the Protection ~n~the Rubber Industry 
was established. The committee consists of three members re-
presenting the Credit Barik for Rubber, rubber producers, and 
the rubber manufacturing industry. It is responsible for 
controlling the quantity and quality of rubber stocks in indus-
trial centers and the importation of rubber and rubber products._ 
The decree e~tablished c~nde rubber prices up·to December 31, 1950, 
designed to guarantee a profitable market for producers, and gave 
the Commitee power to fix prices for both crude and manufactured 
42 
rubber, whenever necessary. 
Brazil's Cement Industrz 
Since the end of the wart· the ext ens live use of cement 
in urban building construction, notably in Sao Paulo and Rio 
de Janeiro, has resulted in se:v,ere shortages of this important 
42 "Brazilian Rubber Industry Finding New Worlds to Conquer," 
=-=---===---"'=· -·-·---·- ::s_ul_ ~-e_t_in of the ~ American ~U;;;n;;;i~o;;n~,~8~2~:=7~0~,~M;;;,a~r,~c,::;;h;;,,~l~9;::4;;8,;·=========H=~==== 
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building material. The Federa.gao das Industrias do Esta.do 
de Sao ~. after stll(lying this :problem, advised the federal 
government to allow the construction industry to import cement 
when domestic supplies failed to meet their needs. The. govern-
ment and the industry have endeavored to increase cement pro-
duction but all gains have been rapidly absorbed by the nation's 
builders. Recent indications are that the shortage continues 
unabated. 43 
Brazil's Cotton Textile Industry 
t 
During World War II, the axport~ion of Brazilian cotton 
textiles rose continuously. Not only did the volume and value 
of exports increase, but the number of importers increased also. 
Customers were foun-d in Latin .America, Europe and Asia. V(b.ereas 
nine countries imported Brazilian textiles in 1938, by 1947 this 
number had increased.to twenty-nine.44 
Bince the war, however, Brazilian textile exports have 
fallen off tremendously but the home market, :protected by 
tariff barriers. is supplied almost exclusively by the home 
establishments. Much new textile e~ui:pment has been purchased 
43 David I. Silk, Survey of Industrial Development in 
Sao Paulo (Eraxil), 1950, :p. 5, an unpublished report for Course 
No. LT952, Directed Study and Research on sao Paulo (Brazil) 
Region, Boston University Graduate School, Second Semester, 1950-
1951. 
~4 Dorival Teixeira, on .. cit. p. 256. 
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from England and the United $'tates since the war, but the in-
dustry as a whole is still considereddtficient in this respect. 45 
& Broad View of the Brazilian Economy During the Dutra Period. 
In view of the imposing problems of economic readjust-
ment which Brazil faced immediately after the second World war, 
the Duin-a administration did not perform too badly. ::However, 
·any balance sheet of the economic accomplishments and short-
comings of the administration must reveal a rather painful 
deficiency with regard to the all important issue of inflation 
control. Perhaps the most important single cause of the govern-
ment's failure to check the inflationary whirlwind which swept 
the nation in the years immediately following the wa~, was its 
total lack of consistency of purpose in dfafting so-called anti-
inflation measures. In the few specific cases in which the 
government was forced.to take drastic action to curb $pecul~~~on, 
particularly in foodstuffs, by establishing ad hoc ceiling prices 
and even participating directly in wholesale and retail marketing, 
such attempts were subverted by enterprising operators who were 
quick to develop thriving blaCk markets which met with little 
official opposition. 
In the field of trade· contr5;E~ the government 1 s policy 
also ran hot and cold, accurately reflecting the pressures of 
4 5 Silk, 2E: cit., p. 18. 
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the moment. During the years 1946 and 1947, when :Brazilian 
importers clamored for an easing of trade restrictions, in 
order that wartime reserves might be utilized to purchase 
foreign goods to meet the backlog of domestic demand for those 
goods which had grown up during the war period, the Govern-
thu.r 
ment readily complied and.opened the fiLood gates, allowing 
II 
non-essential luxury goods to pour in, rapidly depleting the 
wartime reserves which many had hoped would be used to foster 
basic domestic production. :By 1948, the pendulum had swung 
to the opposite pole and the President solemnly declared that 
future purchases abroad would have to be made on a selective 
basis, which was all very well, were it not for the fact that 
the horse was· already out of the barn and the act of closing 
the door at this particul~ time was, in essence, futile. 
Despite the administration's inept handling of the 
inflationary problem, the development of basic agricultural 
and industrial enterprises continued to make rapid progress. 
:Brazilian industry registered marked gains during the period 
1945 to 1950. In absolute terms, the number of industrial 
establishments in :Brazil reached the unprecedented high of 
78,734 in 1949,46 an increase of 29,316 over the 1940 figure. 
/ 
46 11 J3ra.zil, 11 United Nations Vforld, 4:38, October, 1950. 
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Domestic iron and steel ~reduction reached the highest level 
in Bra~ills history, and as we have already noted, civil con-
struction has been taking place at such a rapid rate that 
domestic suppliers of concrete have been unable to keep ~ace 
with the demand. 
The great state of sao Paulo held its preeminent ~osi­
tion in the industrial field during the Dutra period without 
apparent difficulty. By 1949, various ente~rises in that 
state accounted for 48.7 per cent of all ~urcha.ses of iron and 
steel ~roducts produced, at Volta. Redond.a. 47 Sic Paulo also led 
in the value of cotton textile goods ~reduced in the ~revious 
year, producing about 153,000,000 dollars out of a total of 
ap~roximately 350,000,000 dollars worth of goods.48 
In spite of these indications that a new industrial 
economy is in the making, percentage distribution figures in 
terms of value of Brazil's principal exports for the year 1949, 
point up the very real fact that Brazilts economy is still rather 
deeply rooted in the soil. In that year, coffee accounted for 
57. 6 per cent of the total, an increase of 23.9 per cent over the 
1937-1938 period. Raw cotton was next with 10 per cent, and cacao 
47 Boletim Informative do Centro ~ Federayao d.as Indus.-. 
trias do EstB.do de Sao Paulo, No. 25, March, 1950, p. 4. 
48 Institute Brasileiro de Geograf!a e 1Estatfstica, Anuario 
Estast{stico do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro~ 1950, 'p. 212. 
was third with 4.8 per cent, increases of 8.4 and of .8 per 
cent respectiv,ely ov.er the 1937-1938 figures. Tobacco,carnuba 
wax, castor beans, and pine lumber combined tot~lled 7.8 per 
cent;; an aggregate increase of • 7 per cent. Cotton textile 
production for export, the only manufactured item of any real 
significance, amounted to 1.8 per cent, up 1.3 per cent over 
the 1937-1938 figure.49 
Perhaps the most noteworth achievement of the Dutra 
government in the economic field was the creation and pro-
mulgation of the famed S.AL'IE Ji'lan. .Although some observers 
have contended that the plan is too broad in scope, few ~v.e 
~uestioned its intrinsic value as a catalyst for stimulating 
economic development in all of the major sectors of the 
Bxazilian economy .. 
49 Exports by Princip·al Products (Values in millions of 
~zeiros), B.anco .dQ.Brasil Y,._ -- Relat6rio de ~. as cited 
~~,E. Mal:t!nez, Economic Developments . .in :&"aozil 194,9-50. 
P• 42. See supra. Chap. II, p. 23, for source of 1937-1938 
figures .. 
CHAPTER IX 
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER DUTRA. 
EDUCATION 
In the field of education, the Dutra .Administration not 
only succeeded in enlarging and extending many of the programs 
initiated by the previous regime, but was also able to intr,o-
duce various innovations of decided value. 
Until the 1930 1 s, :Brazil t s educational system was vir-
tually free of federal control. The various states were 
responsible for the establishment a~d supervision of all edu-
cational activities within their respective jurisdictions. 
Federal participation was extended throughout the country with 
the establishment of the Ministry of Education and Health in 
1930, and the Constitution of 1934 decreed a national system 
of education• :By and'large, the new system of national edu-
cation was more apparent than real and the states and munic!pios 
continued to maintain much of their traditional autonomy in 
the field of education . 
. 'Shortly after the promulgation of the Constitution of 
1937, a decree law was issued which attempted to clarify and 
define the relation of the Ministry .of Education and Health 
to education, on the national, .state, and municipal levels. 
In brief, the decree asserted the right of the Federal Union 
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to exercise direct action in instituting, maintaining and 
directing educational services which might be necessary or 
desirable for the national welfare. Provision was also made 
for indirect aid in the form of subsidies to state supported 
and private institutions.l 
While this decree :provided a legal foundation for the 
extension of federal control, the Ministry limited its activit-
ies primarily to administrative and pedagogical reorganization 
in the major urban centers and then gradually sought to diffuse 
and extend newly developed methods and techniques to other 
parts of the country. 
The present constitution grants the government the 
right. to determine the basis and general lines of national edu-
cation. The constitution also prescribes that education is 
the right of everyone and shall be given in the home and in 
the sbhool; education in its different branches shall be 
administered by the public authorities and is open to private 
initiative, in accordance with the law. The federal govern-
ment is further obliged to devote not less than 10 per cent 
of its tax revenues to education; while the states and Federal 
Tiistrict must expend not less than 20 per cent of their general 
1 Law No. 378 of January 13, 1937, Chapter VI, Articles 
87, 88 and 89 as cited by A. Carneiro Leao, 11The Evolution of I Education in :Brazil, 11 Brazil: Portrait of Half ~ Continent, J Alexander Marchant and T. Lynn Smith, editors , p. 319. 
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tax revenues for the same purpose. Each state a.nd the Federal 
District may organize its own educational system a.nd may expect 
financial assistance from the federal government to help main~ 
tain elementary schools.2 
Co~ventional Educational Levels 
In recent years the federal government has done a great 
deal to standardize instruction-and to stimulate various sectors 
of the educational system. The primary course lasts four or 
five years and is established, maintained and supervised by 
the states. In the better urban schools a fundamental course 
of five years is given to children from seven to twelve years 
of age. Rural schools have only a three year course. In 1946, 
it was estimated that 60 per cent of the children between 
seven a.nd eleven years of age had no access to schools, the 
bulk of these living in rural areas where lack of transporta-
tion and the sparseness of population complicate matters enor-
mously.3 
The secondary level of education in Brazil is based on 
seven years of instruction split into two cycles. The first 
cycle is of four years duration (junior high school, or ginasio) 
followed by three years in a senior high school (colegio) where 
2 Constitution of 1946, a.rt. 's 166, 167. and 169. 
3 George Wythe, Royce A. Wight , and Harold M. Midkiff, 
BMZIL: .An Ex:pandip.g Econom..y, p. 257. 
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there is an option of a classical or scientific program. 
There has been a phenomenal growth in secondary edu-
cation in the past nineteen years. In 1932, there were apprax-
imately two hundred secondary schools in Brazil and about 
56,000 students were enrolled in these institutions. By 1947, 
there were over one thousand schools with 202,000 students. 
It is estimated that 80 per cent of the students were enrolled 
in private schools.4 
Professional academic preparation in the fields of law, 
medicine, dentistry, an.d engineering dominated Brazilian higher 
education until the third decade of the present century. In 
1931, the University of Rio de Janeiro was organized, and in 
1937, was converted into the University of Brazil. 5 At the 
present time there are seven other universities in Brazil: 
the Pontifical Catholic University and the Rural University, 
both in the capital of the country; the University of Sao 
Paulo, the Pontifical Cat~olic University of the same state; 
the University of Minas Gerais, the University of Porto Alegre 
in Rio Grande do Sul; the University of Bahia; and the Univ-
ersi ty of Pernambuco. Universities are being organized in 
Ceara, Para, .Amazonas and Parana. Nine are functioning fully 
4 ~ . Ioid., pp. 257-58. 
5 Ibid., p. 258. 
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and four others are very nearly complete. 6 Since independent 
isolated colleges were already in existence in all of these 
states, most of these institutions are government supported 
and are under the jilriS,d.iction of the Ministry of Education. 
Highly d.i versified programs have been introduced into the 
universities particularly in the faculties of philosophy. For 
example, the National Faculty of Philosophy of the University 
of Brazil possesses twelve different departments rangini from 
classical letters to modern journalism, education, geography, 
history, mathematics, and chemistry. .An increasing number of, 
students taking degrees in these various departments, have 
gone into secondary education and promise to provide Brazil's 
educational system with a wider degree of flexibility,? 
~ Departures 
The Rural University. The need for increasing rural 
education with sui table curricula and programs has been 
recognized. In 1941, President Vargas founded the Rural 
University of Brazil forty-seven kilometers from the nation's 
capital. The university is under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and is headed by Dr. Alvaro Fagundes, 
6 A. earneiro Leao, 2E.· £it., p. 332. 
7 Ibid., pp. 332-333. For a comprehensive treatment 
of Brazil's educational system see Fernando de Azevedo, 
Brazilian Culture, chap. IV, pp. 446--488, and chap. V, 
pp. 489-525. 
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who received most of his training at Cornell University. Tge 
main objective of the Rural University is to equip teachers 
and technicians with adequate training for solving many of 
the problems of Erazil 1 s rural population. 
Various states, notably; Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, Santa 
Catarina, Ceara and Pernambuco have established advanced or 
intermediary agricultural schools dedicated to the same goal 
as the Rural University.B 
Rural Schools. Until recently, rural schools were, by 
and large, oriented in the same direction as the urban schools. 
During President Dutra 1 s administration, plans were laid for 
the construction of several thousand rural school buildings, 
suitable for training programs based on rural needs. By 1949, 
over four thousand such schools had been built at federal 
expense, while the state governments provided for the teachers 1 
salaries. Tuition anii books are free to the students. Each 
of these schools is set up to handle eighty pupils on a two 
shift basis, forty in the morning and forty in the afternoon. 
The program also provides for the establishment of forty normal 
schools to train qualified teachers since there is a critical 
shortage of suitable teachers for carrying out an extensive 
rural training program~9 
8 Ibid., p. 328; see also 11 Kilometer 47", Time, 54:27, 
July 25 , 1949. 
9 Loc. cit. , and Wythe, 212..· ci t9 , p. 259. 
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Adult Education. In April, 1947, the Minister of Educa-
tion and Health, Professor Clemente Mariani, with the assistance 
of the Director of the National Department of Education, Prof-
essor M. Bergstrom Lourengo Filho, launched a new program for 
adult education with the objective of setting up ten thousand 
classes for illiterates over fifteen years of age.10 A year 
later the number of classes was up to 20,000 and over 500,000 
students were enrolled. It is estimated that about 1,500,000 
persons learned to read and write during the period~ 1947-
1948.11 
One interesting aspect of the adult education campaign 
has been the wide support which the program has received from 
private organizations, such as religious associations, industrial, 
commercial and agricul.~ural enterprises, or even private 
individuals who have volunteered to teach small groups of 
illmterates in their off hours. Almost 20 per cent of the 
classes have been organized in this way, while the states and 
municip{os, with the financial and technical aid of the federal 
government, provide their share of the resources and effort~ 
to promote the program within their respective jurisdictions.l2 
10 Wythe, loc. cit. · 
-11 A. C&rneiro Leao, 2:2.· cit. , p. 331. 
12 Ibid., p. 330-31. 
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Serious efforts have' been made net only t·o teach ·students 
to read and write, but also the rudiments of health, nutrition, 
and child care. Hundreds ·of thousands of copy-· books and other 
publications suitable for those who ·have already learned to read, 
have been distributed throughout :the count-ry ··by ·several air 
transport companies which have ·cooperated with ··the federal gov-
ernment to insure the program:' s success .13 
Educational .experts have opined· that· the· returns from 
adult teaching in general, are higher than--those· obtained in. 
Bra.zilJs elementary schools •.. Undouetedly, one ·of the most 
important factors responsible for. the success of the adjlt ed-
ucation program has been the papid · ind:astrialization of many· 
parts of the o0untry with its attendant emphasis on economic 
competition. More and more, it appears that· the ·people are 
becoming aware of the fact that lite-racy and instructien are 
essential requisites ·for ecenomic ga:in and advantage.14 
SENAI - Appren.ticc:e TraiBing·.l5 A new and important force 
in 4fte.- industrial training was introduced in 1942 with the establish-
13 UAdult Education Campaign in Brazil,-" Bulletin of ~ 
~ American Wn.ien, 82:474, August, 1948. 
:·.u A. Carneiro Leao, 12£• £!i• 
15 The Servile Nacional·.~ ·Arrendizagem·eemereial(Nat~enal 
Service of Oomm.erc al Apprent~ceship - SENAC), established ~ 1946, 
by the C0nfedera9ao Nacional ~ C0Illerei0 (Nati0nal 00nfederation 
l, e;f Oemmerce)' seeks to provide C0JIIDlercial workers with training 
oppertunities comparable to.those .provided for industrial workers 
by SENAI. 
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ment of the Servigo Nacional de Aprendizagem dos Industri~ios 
(National Service of Apprenticeship of Industrial Workers, or 
simply SENAI), under the direction of the National Confedera-
tion of Industries. SENAI is a semi-official service, main ... 
tained and directed largely by the employers rl th some measure 
of federal assistance. 16 
The primary objective of SENAI is to provide apprentice 
training to boys and girls between the ages of fourteen and 
eighteen, thus increasing their skills as industrial workers. 
Each pl~t is required to enroll anywhere f~om 5 to 15 per 
cent of its total personnel for apprenticeship training. 
Since most of the schools which have sprung up througgout 
:Brazil are located in the larger urban centers, industries 
outside the cities must send their prospective interns to 
organized centers equipped to handle such trainees. 17 
The length of the various courses varies from a few months 
to three years, and nineteen specific trades are taught. The 
activities of SENAI are not strictly restricted to technical 
training. Deficiencies in education are corrected; medical and 
denb.tU services are provided, and there are adequate restaurant, 
r.e.dreationa.l and social facilities available to the young 
16 Wythe, QQ_._2ii. p. 182. 
1? Loc. cit. 
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apprentices. At the end of a specific period of training, 
the apprentice receive~ a Carta~ 0ficio (diploma). This 
document is of real value in the industry to which the trainee 
will eventually return. 18 
~e SEN.A.I program has been of great importance not only 
in raising the technical ~bility of Brazilian workers but also 
in improving the health and general .education of the population. 
While it is true that not all industries support the plan, it 
is estimated that 70 per cent now cooperate with the National 
Confederation of :J:ndustries and the federal government.l9 
It is important to note that the plan was initiated by 
leading Brazilian industrialists who felt that such a program 
would provide the workers with the machinery for progresstve 
advancement, and thus diminish the attractiveness of extremist 
solutions~ including the trend,towards state paternalism intra-
duced by the Vargas regime. However, it might be argued that 
the industrialists have imposed their own ~ersion of paternalism 
on the workers, with the creation of the SENAI program. At 
any rate, the Dutra government has not failed to support the 
activities of SENAI. For example, during the ~ears 1946~1947, 
sixteen new schools were constnucted with federal assistance and 
18 J. V. Freitas Marcondes. nsocial Legislation in Brazil, n 
Brazi]; Portrait 2f Half a7 Continent, Alexander Marchant and T. 
Lynn Smith, editors 9 p. 394. 
19' Wythe, QE.• cit. p. 183 
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twenty-four additional buildings were nearing completion. 
What is more, extensive apprenticeship classes were organized 
in seventy national, state and private industrial schools. 20 
CBAI-Educational Cooperation~ The most noteworthy 
contribution *o the SENAI :program by the federal government 
was the creation of the Comissao Brasileira Americana de 
Educacao Industrial (United States Brazilian Commission of 
Industrial Education, or simply the C:S.AI). In January, 1946, 
an agreement was signed between the Brazilian Ministry of 
Education and Realth, and the Inter-American Educational Founda-
tion, :providing for a two-year cooperative program in the field 
of industrial education.21 
The two most important objectives cov~red by the agree-
ment were the development of a teacher training program and 
the :preparation of new teaching materials. The foundation 
provided a sroAll group of specialists to initiate in-service 
programs for teachers in the major cities of Brazil. A select 
number of instructors and administrators from the various schools 
were sent to Pennsylvania State College for an intensive fifteen~ 
20 
tt Indus trial Education in Brazil, 11 Bulletin of the Pan 
American Union, 32:498, September,l948. 
21 
"Brazil and the United States Cooperate in Industrial 
Education, 11 :Bulletin of the Pan American Union. 80:596, October, 
1946. 
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week course. 22 
The second major service of OBAI was the preparation 
of suitable teaching materials in the field of industrial ed~ 
cation. This consisted chiefly of tr~slation and republica-
tion of standard American texts in the field. One of the diffi-
culties encountered in this operation was that of cointng 
technical terms and phrases which hati no·'- equivalents in the 
23 Portuguese language. 
The million dollar program was jointly financed, with 
the Brazilian government providing $7p0~000 and the Inter-
American.Foundation providing the balance. The CBAI venture 
not only represented an instance of United States-Brazilian 
co:pperation in the educational field, but W~ii: alM an example 
. 24 of economic cooperation between the two countr~es. 
IMMIGRATION .AI.""'D COLONIZATION 
At no time dUring the period of the Dutra administra-
tion was Brazil t s immigration policy clearly defined.. This 
situation reflects the wide divergence of opinion which prevails 
23 11 The CBAI - Brazilian - United States Cooperation in 
Industrial Education, 11 Bulletin of the Pan .American Union, 
82:576, October, 1948. - - -- · 
24 ~-' p. 579. 
25 Ibid., p. 577. 
158 
in the country with respect to the imrrdgration issue. There 
are those who favor a revival of immigration on a substantial 
sqale as a means of stimulating economic development and rein-
forcing the European element:: in the population. Nearly all 
groups recognize Brazil's need for more agriculturists and 
technicians, but the country has failed to attract adequate 
numbers of such immigrants; primarily, because the advocates 
of a restrictive policy have, by and large, held sway. The 
main arguments put forth by the restrictionists are: that 
the rights of the native Brazilian worker must. be protected 
against infringement by new arrivals, that preference must 
be given to those who are best adapted to the country's con-
ditions and needs, and that persons. desiring to come to the 
already overcnewded cities to engage in superfluous activities 
must be ~ept out. 25 
In Spite of tight legillation·, in keeping with the 
restrictionist point of view, the government took positive':S!teps 
to secure suitable immigrants, particularly from war-ravaged 
countries in Europe. Indaed, Brazil was the first country to 
accept any of Europe's displaced persons. Between the close of 
hostilites and July, 1948, a Brazilian Commission operating in 
Europe recruited five thousand alleged farm workers. In August, 
25 Wyt}fe, 2.E.· £it. , pp. 230-31. 
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1948, a second program for bringing five thousand more 
displaced persons into the country was inaugurated. In 
December of the same year, the Brazilian Congress approved 
the constitution of the International Refugee Organization. 
As of March, 1949, a total of 14,165 immigrants had arrived 
and it was expected that the program would continue on the same 
basis. 26 
There kas been a great deal of debate as to the suit-
ability of the persons received under this program. Most of 
the;fnew immigrants were recruited for work on the coffee 
fazendas in the state of Sao Paulo, but it has been pointed 
out by critics of the program, that many of them were not 
bona fide farmers and the rate of desertion from the fazendas 
to the cities, has been very great. On the other hand, there 
are those who. claim that the fazendeiros have been the primary 
cause for the exodus of the new immigrants from the fazendas 
to the cities. Any any rate, the fazendeiros are looking 
more and more to the drought-ridden northeastenn states as a 
source of agricultural labor. 27 , 
Public lands suitable for European colonization are 
decidedly limited, largely because mf military considerations 
26 "Haven for the Homeless,n Newsweek, 33:46, April 11, 1949. 
27 Wythe, 2:2.· cit., p. 233. 
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and the desire to provide for thousands of Brazilians who are 
abandoning the drought-stricken areas of the Northeast. The 
National Security 6ouncil must approve grants of land in the. 
"defense zones,ll. The immigration and colonization laws pro-
vide that 30 per cent of the land in any colonization project 
be allotted to Brazilians. and that not mOre than 25 per cent 
be sold to persons of the same nationality, other than Brazil-
ian~ The present constitution states: 
The law shall facilitate the settlemen~ of the 
population in the rural areas, establishing plans 
for colonization and for the utilization of the 
public lands. In this connection nationals shall 
be given preference, especially the inhabi~ants of 
the impoverished areas and the unemployed. 8 
National .Agricultural Colony · 
Various agreements ~have been negotiated with the Dutch, 
Italian and Spanish governments determining· the basis for 
organized colonization in Brazil, but up to the present little 
progress has been made along_ these lines. The only government 
inspired colonization development which has met with any measure 
of success has been the Colonia Agr!cola Nacional (National 
Agricultural Colony) established in 1942, in the state of Goias, 
about seventy-five miles northwest of Anapolis, the terminus of 
the Goi~s Railway. Nearly all of the settlers in the colony 
have been native Brazilians. Both land and buildings are 
28 Constitution of 1946, Art. 156. 
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provided by the government, but such property can be held 
only as long as the occupant or his descendants, effectively 
farm the land. 29 
By late 1949, the colonia had 19,000 settlers and was 
enjoying a marked degree of prosperity. One.of the first 
difficulties encountered by the directors of the colony has 
been that of gaining access to ready markets for the products 
produced in the area. While a road was cut linking the colony 
with the railroad terminus at An'polis 1 a shortage of gasoliae 
in 1948, prohibited the movement of goods by truck to the terminus .. 
The following year, a part of the colonia's lands were devoted 
to sugar planting and a sugar mill was established. Enough 
alcohol was produced at the mill to provide sufficient fuel 
for the trucks bringing products to An~polis. Products from 
the colony have brought excellent prices in ga~ Paulo and 
Rio de Janeiro and the proposed extension of the Goi's Rail-
road to the banks of the Tocantins River will provide the 
colony with an outlet to Eel~m and other population centers in 
the Northeast. In recent years, notable gains have been mad~ 
in improving the living standards of the colonia. Outstanding 
among these have been the establishment of schools and modern 
hospitals. 30 
29 wYthe,~· cit., p. 235. 
30 
"Eoom in the Eacklands, 11 Time, 49:39, April 7, 1947. 
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Central.Brazil.Foundation 
One of the most ambitious plans for the exploration and 
eventual colonization of the West Central interior region of 
~razil~ was launched in 1943, under the aegis of Joao AlbertO 
Line de Barros, then head of the Fundaeao Brasil Central 
(Central Brazil Foundation). Joao Alberto was directly re-
sponsible for the organization of the now famous Roncador-
Xing~ expedition which was assinged the task of exploring 
the territory between the Araguaia and XlrigU Rivers in the States 
of Me.to Grosso and Para. The expedition led by Colonel Flaviano 
de Mattos Vanique succeeded in mapping out the area E!.nd estS~=< 
blishing rudimentary air strips, which were later improved and 
used as links in Brazil's expanded war-time air route system. 31 
In February, 1944, the town of Aragar~as was founded on 
the ~ariks of the Araguaia River. In 1946, Joao Alberto visited 
the United States and Europe hn an effort to obtain funds and 
immigrants to settle in the more habitable areas uncovered~y 
Vanique and his men, but this proposal met with little favor 
abroad and the plan was shelved indefinitely. 32 A report 
dealing with the activities of the Central Brazil Foundation 
31 Hernane Tavares de Sa, The Brazilians, pp. 126-28. 
Also see 11 Into the Green Hell, 11 Newsweekt 28:62, October 21, 1946. 
32 
"New Men for New Lands, 11 Time, 48:39, July 29, 1946. 
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in 1948, ·concluded that the building of Argargas and the attempt 
to colonize the territory explored by the Roncador-Xingn expe-
dition, were entirely premature.33 
Amazonian Development: 
The only serious attempt at colonization in the .Amazon 
Basin dates back to the establishment of the famed Ford rubber 
plantations in 1927, on the east bank of the Tapajoz River, 
a tributary of the .Amazon. Early in 1946, after nineteen years 
of unprofitable operation, Fordlandia, as the Ford enterprise 
was called, was sold at a fantastically low price.34 A new 
government service, the Insti tuto .Agronomico do Nort·e (Northern 
Institute of .Agronomy) , headed by Dr. Flisberto Camargo was 
charged with the administration of the former Ford holdings. 
Under the direction of Dr. Camargo, the lands in the 
Fordla...TJ.dia area have been successfully given over to cacao and 
hardwood tree production. Nineteen miles downstream at Belterra, 
the Institute is supervising the collection and preparation of 
a considerable amount of rubber, from disease-resistant trees, 
originally set out in 1934, by the Ford people, after ini t.ial 
attempts at Fordlandia had failed. While the rubber produced 
33 Paulo, Osario Jordao de Brito, 11! Fundacao Brasil Central, n 
Revista do Servi1Q Publico, Ano. XI, Vol. I, Nos. 1 & 2, (January, 
February, 1948), p. 59; as cited by Wythe, Q.P_ •. cit. , p. 237. 
34 llFord Withdraws from Brazil, 11 Inter-American [Monthly], 
4:41, January, 1946. 
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at Belterra could not compete on the worldmarket, a government 
subsidy has made· production for local use feasible. 35 
The chief difficulty which the Institute has encountered 
has been the same as that which obliged the.Ford Company to give 
up its holdings after investing fifteen to twenty million dollars; 
that is, -procuring and maintaining a suitable labor force in the 
area, Although an extensive sanitation campaign served to make 
the area suitable for habitation, the seasonal nature of the 
work left many workers unemployed once the rubber trees had been 
tapped and the latex collectad. 
In an effort to remedy this situation, the Institute has 
fostered agricultural and pastoral activities which COmPlement 
the short rubber-gathering season. For example, a sizeable 
~ntity of jute is now being produced in this region and 
increased coconut production has served to provide the serin-
gueiros (rubber gatherers) with another important cash crop. 
Local food consumption needs are being met by rice cultivation 
and improved cattle raising techniques. All of these develop-
ments are in harmony with the Insitute 1 s objective of improving 
the economy of the Amazon region through the wholesale raising of 
the standard of living of the Amazon workers.36 
35 11 Wait for the Weeping Wood, 11 Time, 52:27, July 26, 1948. 
36 
".Jma.zon lli!birth," Business Week, April 19,, 1947, p. 110. 
165 
Private Developments 
Two important private settlement projects have been 
under way in tllorthern Paran' and ..-estern Sao Paulo respectively. 
The ~aran~ development was originally promoted by Parana Planta-
t~ons, Ltd., of London. Land sale headquarters were established 
at the new town site of Londrina and plots averaging about eighty-
five acres were sold to settlers of many nationalities: Brazil-
ians, Poles, Germani, Czechs, Itali.a.ns, Spaniards, and Pertugu.ese. 
Before the London concern sold out to a Brazilian corporation in 
1944, approximately three million acres of land were sold to new 
settlers, and since then an additional two million acres have 
been sold. All told, it is estimated that 350,000 pe~ple have 
settled in this region since the late 1920•s~7 
Although the production of cotton, corn and hogs has been 
important t~ the economy of the area, the rapid extension ~f 
coffee growing from southern sao Paulo to northern Paran~~has 
made coffee the leading cash crop produced in the region. The 
post-war rise in coffee prices led to a tremendous increase in 
land values in and around Londrina, and widespread speculation 
has resulted in fat profits for enterprising middlemen. Just 
when and if the Paran~ coffee boom will bust remains to be seen. 
For the present, prospects continue to be good since world demand 
37 Wythe, ~cit., pp. 235-36. 
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for coffee remains far in excess of the available supply. 38 
Perhaps the most unusual colonization experiment con-
ducted under private auspices, is the settlement of Andradina 
in western Sao Paulo. 39 The site of the present settlement was 
originally purchased in 1938t by Ant~nio F. Maura Andrade, a 
prominent Paulista plantation owner. Intent on increasing the 
value of his property, Sr. Andrade resolved to break up the 
area into small plots suitable for homesteading. Realizing 
that few homesteaders could clear enough land to grow a crop 
which would feed and carry them through the next planting season, 
Andrade agreed to furnish the settlers with sufficient food and 
supplies to enable them to get through the first season. Repayment 
of all such loans and the mortgages held by Andrade on the 
individual- plots were to be made over an extended period of time, 
and at a reasonable rate of interest. Thousands of Paulista. 
share-croppers responded to this eminently e~uitable proposition. 
T'ne nucleus of the whole development, the town of Andradina 
(population 9,606) has ac~uired many of the attributes of a 
well~established community.40 The inhabitants point with pride 
to two hospitals, six batiks, a movie theat~r, a good 
38 
"Coffee Klondike," Life, 29:17, November 13, 1950 
39 This account of the Andradina development is taken from 
DesmondHollridge 1 s "The Promise of Andradina, 11 Inter-.Am.erican 
[Monthly], 5; 15, .August, 1946. 
· 
40 Annario Estatistico do Brasil, Institute Brasileiro de 
Geograf{a e Estat!stica-- Estado de populaqao III, Resultados-;re-
liminares do Recensamento Geral de l950, No: 5. Relacao das ci~es 
-- ----- -- ---- -- - ) ---
e vilas ~ 0 ula ao superior a 5 000 habi ta.ntes, lJ, 46. ~~============~======= 
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library, a rice mill t a saw mill t several brickyards and. 
many other small processing plants stretched out along a first 
rate railroad siding. 
Agricultural production in the area has been highly 
diversified and' settlers who have planted such varid cn~s as 
rice, cotton, coffee, sugar cane, corn and or~ges have done well. 
The fact that 60 per cent of the colonists are clear of all debt, 
is one very striking indication of the success of the Andradina 
development. 
Something of a political philosopher and economic theorist, 
Ant6nio Andrade once said the following about the ideological 
significance of his colonization experiment;. 
Communism is growing in Brazil and no one does 
an~thing about it beyond suggesting Fascism as 
an alternative: like poisoning the patient to 
cure cancer. When our men of wealth put their 
money into non-productive enterprises~-and let 
the mass of the people live miserably in the big 
cities, while land in this, an a.griculr~ural coun-
try, lies empty, Communism naturally takes root 
and flourisheS.. The theory behind my Andradina · 
development was that men who own land have some~ 
thing to work for and are more productive than 
serfs on an absentee landlord's farm. Prosper-
ous small farmers are immune to Corrillrumism be-
cause the culture in which the microbe breeds has 
been removed from their lives.41 
While many observers believe that ~razil 1 s economic de-
velopment would be accelerated by the.encouragement of voluntary 
European immigration and controlled colonieation projects; there 
are, as we have seen, many practical obstacles to the implementa-
41 "The Promise of Andradina." 212.· cit. p. 16. 
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tion of such a_program. The introduction of foreign labor 
will undoubtedly continue to be a major obstacle for some time 
to come. Restrictive and discriminating legislation reflecting 
this attitude. has made it difficult for Brazil to attract the 
farmers and tec!L~icians which she needs. Overlooking this 
aspect of the problem, and turning to any future colonization 
projects to be developed under official auspices, we may con-
clude that those projects which are carefully org~~ized and 
which offer colonists a reasonable prospect for a decent stan-
dard of living, will meet with some measure of success. Too 
often in'the past. colonists have been transported into the 
wilderness and left to struggle with a hostile envir0nment ': 
out of trb;I!Lch with civilization+ The present need is to work 
out colonization projects which will justify the cost of pro~ 
viding transportation, sanitation, electric power, hospitals, 
schools, and other facilities for combatting the dangers and 
hardships of frontier settlement. 
HEALTHAND SANITATION 
One of the most pressing problems in present day Brazil 
is that of health. It is significant that saude, or health, 
comes first in the government's SALTE plan, since a heal thy 
population is undoubtedly an essential requisite for economic 
development. 
In Chapter I, we noted that the lowest urban infant 
------=== c=======JI==== 
169 
mortality rate in Brazil was 125 per one thousand live births, 
or about t~xee times higher than comparable figures for the 
United States at large. We also observed that an estimated 
two thirds of Brazil's people suffered from chronic mal-
nutrition and that the incidence of parasitic diseases was 
very high, largely because of inadequate sanibation facilities. 
The urgency of the problem is, therefore, very great indeed. 
While the Ministry of Education and Health maintains 
various national services dealing with the principal diseases 
sue~ as malaria, yellow fever, and tuberculosis, the main 
responsibility rests with the states and munic!pias ._ The 
health section of the SALTE plan provides for the extension 
and support of existing health services carried·on by state 
42 
and local governments. 
Joint United States-Brazilian Health Service. 
Prompted by the need for strategic raw materials such 
as natural rubber, hardwoods and minerals, and cognizant of the 
fact that extensive production of such materials could.~ot take 
place without first improving health conditions in areas where 
. 
such products were a~ailable, the United States, in 1942, 
sponsored the creation of a cooperative health service for 
combatting typhus, yellow fever and malaria in the .Amazon and 
Rio Dace Valleys. This service, known at the Servi~o Especial 
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~ Saude Publica ( SESP) proved to be one of the most import-
ant cooperative projects to come out of the.war. 
While the tasks assigned the Servi9o were based on 
temporary wartime needs, a real effort was made to establish 
facilities of long term value. ~ree hospitals, thirty health 
centers, EL~d thiDty-nine sub posts were established. Every 
effort has been made to encourage community participation 
wherever health centers or suo posts were established. In many 
communities like Cameta the residents have been so· impressed 
by the improvements which have been effected by the SESP that 
the local authorities have made genuine efforts to help finance 
• 
the Service. 
The accomplishments of the SESP in the Amazon town of 
Cameta are typical of the work it has promoted in many small 
communities. Under the direction of a staff of fourteen trained 
medical specialists, the townspeople of Cameta drilled an arte-
sian well capable of providing all inhabitants with an ample 
supply of unpolluted.-dntnking water, built an ad~quate sewage 
disposal system in the town, and encouraged the co:atroction of 
privies in the outlying districts; brought malaria under con-
trol by draining all swamps and pools which might serve as 
.tna 
mosquito breeding grounds, ..,by making extensive use of DDT 
preparations provided by the SESP. The staff at the health 
service station undertook to improve the diet of the inhabitants 
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of Camet~ by cultivating a demonstration vegetable garden and 
distributing seeds and information to those who seemed inter-
ested in the project. The fact that the SESP has been unable 
to handle all of the requests Wh~ch have been made for its 
aervices, is further evidence of the confidence which it enjo~s, 
among many Brazilians. 43 
T'.ae SESP 1 s most drastic undertaking was its malaria 
control and general health program in the Rio Doce Valley, 
in connection with the reconstruction of the Vitoria and Minas 
Railway, at a time when an ever7· increasing movement of Itabira 
iron ore, and other strategic materials, was of vital importance. 
The marvelous success of the program is clearly described 
by the .following paragraph taken from the report of the Intee't" 
national Development Advisory Board, which was submitted to 
President Tmnnan in March of this year: 
Absenteeism on the Vitoria-Minas Railroad was cut 
dramatically by effective malaria control. This 
has made it possible to reduce maintenance crews by 
one-third, which, in turn, has cut the cost of ex-
tracting and transporting iron ore and mica from 
the Rio Do ce Valley. At the same time, the death 
rate ~ong adults and infants in the valley has 
been lowered because of the pure water, safe sew-
age disposal, and conmnL~l!Y health services in the 
main population centers. 
The financial and managerial aspects of the SESP have been 
conducted on a very satisfactory basis. While the United States 
43 "Men In White", Time, 53:37, September 13, 1946. 
44 Partners in Progress, A Report to President Truman by 
the. International Development Advisory Board, Nelson A. RoCkefeller, Chm rman , p . b4. 
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carried the bulk of t·he costs during the early war years, 
later contributions have been made on a diminishing basis. The 
budget for 1948-1950 provided for a United States expenditure 
of less than a million dollars, as against the Brazilian budget 
of five million dollars. Expenditure of all funds is jointly 
approved by the head of the Brazilian section, Dr. Marcalino 
Candau, and the local United States representative, Dr. Eugene 
D. Campbell, of the Institute of Int er,;i'.Arileri can .Affairs. 45 
LABOR AND SOCIAL SE~ITY 
Labor legislation in Brazil, prior to establishment of 
the Ministry of Labor, in 1930, was not only fragmentaxy, but 
lacked any sort of sonsolidation or machinery for enforcement. 
Under the tutelage of President Vargas, this situation changed 
radically. Existing labor law was consolidated and organized 
on a rational basis and many far-reaching extensions and nww 
provisions were grafted, by decree, to the pre-1930 code. 
In May, 1943, a decree law·was issued reconsolidating 
all existing laws. Some of the principal provisions follow: 
Each worker must have a work card (carteira profissional) 
on which a record of employ~ment and compensation 
must be kept. 
The working day is normally limited to eight hours, 
but labor contracts may allow two hours overtime 
which is paid at a rate 20 per cent higher than 
pay for normal hours. 
Provision is made for minimum wages, the rates for 
which are established from time to time. 
45 _Wythe, .QE_. cit., P. 254. 
==lF==-=-=- ~-
Provision is made for inspection to ensure 
health and safety. 
Certain types of employment are governed by 
special provisions. 
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Two thirds of the employees of any establish-
ment must be :Brazilians, and two thirds of 
the payroll must go to :Brazilians. 
Special·protection is given to women and minors. 
Employees dismissed without l~wful cause shall 
be compensated at the rate of one month's wage 
for each year of work. The first year's em-
ployment is considered a trial period. An 
employee who has been employed for more than 
ten years shall not be dismissed except on 
account of serious offense or force majeure, 
duly established by competent authority. 
A weekly rest of twenty-four hours must be 
granted. 
Every employee is entitled to fifteen days ann-
ual vacation with pay.46 
To this body of relatively advanced labor legislation, 
the Dutra government added certain new features of a progressive 
nature. Article 157 of the Constitution of 1946, provided for 
higher wages for night work, prohibited child labor and en-
dorsed profit sharing by the workers as a general principle . 
.k_st 
However, this procedu:ce has yet to be implemented. The Con-
/1 
stitution also provided for the recognition, by management, 
of labor grievance committees, syndicates or unions. Juris-
diction over local labor management disputes is allocated to 
the labor courts and conciliation boards.47 The right to strike 
is affirmed, subject to regulation. through the exercise of law. 48 
46 Ibid, p. 237-38. 
47 Constitution of 1946, Art. 157. 
48 
.Art. 158. 
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Constitutional provisions for dealing with labor-
•' management disputes were clarified and defined in a labor law 
.,.._,.. 
issued in March, 1946. This law divides the nation's economy 
·iiJ:J.to fundamental and accessory activities. Fundamental 
.aeti vi ties are defined as those concerned with transportation, 
~pmmunication and the supply of water power. light and gas, 
~.d essential comrnodi ties. Under the latter are included all 
normal agricultural activities as well as the operation of 
schools, banks, pharmacies, hospitals, funerai services and 
industries basic to national de£ense. All employers and 
employees or their representative associations are required 
to notify the Department of Labor authorities, of any dispute 
capable of causing a work stoppage, giving the cause of the 
disagreement and the solution desired. These authorities 
will then proceed to try to arbitrate the question. If they 
do not succeed in ten days, conflicts involving fundamental 
activities will be submitted to a labor court, which must hand 
down a decision within twenty days. In the case of disputes 
involving accessory industries, strikes or lockouts, may be 
resorted to if arbitration fails. 
Strikes by employees engaged in accessory activities before 
fulfilling the arbitration requirements are not tolerated, and 
any strike by employees engaged in fundamental activities, will be 
considered a grave offense and will justify the cancellation 
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of labor contracts. Lockouts or the suspension of services 
resulting from labor disputes undertaken before complying 
with the procedures outlined in this law, or failure of employ~ 
ers to comply with the decisions of the labor courts, will 
carry the penalty of paying double wages.49 
Labor Organizations 
For the most part, Labor organization during the Dutra 
period continued to develop along autonomous, trade, craft or 
professional lines. Efforts to consolidate syndicates or 
unions on a national basis met with official disfavor. The 
Confederacao dos Trabalhadores do Erasil (Con6ederation of ~~~~~~-~= ---
Brazilian Workers --CTE), organized by a national syridical 
Congress in 1946, was declared illegal on May 7, 1947, by the 
same decree which outlawed the Communist Party. The govern..-
memt alleged that the CTE was Communist dominated.. 50 
The activities of. all syndicates have been closely 
scrutinized. by the Ministry of Labor to prevent financial 
abuses and also to prevent Communist infiltration. In his 
1948 message to Congress, the President announced that the 
government had. been forced. to intervene in 15 per cent of the 
nationf s unions to check "extremist elements which tried. to 
use thts organization, representing the working class, for 
49 
"Labor Law in Erazil and. Ecuador, 11 Bulletin of ~ 
Pan .American Union, 81:54, .April, 1946. 
50 Wythe, op. ~~.:_L!'-=· ~2~3~9~·========== 
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attaining political ends contrary to the interest of the country.n51 
In view of official control over the activities ·of the 
syndicates, the development of democratic labor unions has been 
seriously retarded and independent and constructive labor leader-
ship has not been forthcoming. In the final analysis, it can 
be stated that the syndicates have functioned primarily as 
welfare organizations. :ID:nployees are obliged to pay the eg_uiva-
lent of one dayts salary per year, whether or not they are 
members of a syndicate. This sum is deducted by the employer, 
and placed in a fund managed by the :Sank of :Brazil. The syndi-
cates have attempted to collect small monthly dues but have 
not met with any appreciable success. 52 
Social Securi t~ 
:Sra~ilts social welfare institutions, while progressive, 
lac~ the uniformity and integration which characterize the 
United States Social Security system. The :Brazilian system 
has five "institutes 11 and thirty 11 funds 1!;' The nationally 
organized 11insti tutes'' provide for seamen and dockers, railw~ 
men, and employees of public utility servic·es; while the 11 fundstt 
are established by workers of a particular company or employees 
of a single state or municipality. In addition, civil 
51 "Message of the President of :Brazil," :Bulletin of 
the~ American Union, 82:523, September, 1948. 
52 Wythe, ~· city·~ p. 240 
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servants and the armed forces have their own social insurance 
and welfare organization~. However, a large part of the work-
ing force, including agricultural and domestic workers, have 
not yet be~n covered.53 
177 
Since 1945, employees in all five 11 institutes'1 have 
generally been required to contribute 5 per cent of their earn~ 
ings while the employers and the government have each been 
required to contribute a like amount. Eligibility for benefits 
vary considerably in the different 11 inst~tutes511 ~ but most 
cover old age, death, industrial accidents and occupational 
disease, sickness and maternity.54 
Several important semi-official institutions have grown 
up over the past five years, which have served to complement 
the 11 insti tutes 11 and 1!funds11 created by the government. In 1946, 
the Service Social de. Industria (Industrial Social Service 
SESI) and the Servico do Oomercio · (Commercial Social Service 
SESO), were established by the Confederagao Nacional da 
Ind~stria (National Confederation of Industry) and the Confed-
erSfiao Nacional do Oom~rcio (N·ational Federation of Commerce), 
respectively, with the support of the government. Funds for 
both organizations are dertved from a 2 per cent payroll tax 
53 Ibid. , pp. 240-41. 
54 Ibid., p. 241. 
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paid only by employers. These servicos were charged with the 
task of promoting social welfare among the industrial and 
commercial workers, helping to raise their standard of living 
and increasing their educational and cultural activities.55 
As the SESI and SESC programs developed, oenefits were 
provided for medical and hospital care and dental service, 
supplying foods, medicine and other necessities at cost, legal 
assistance, funeral benefits, maternity assistance, language 
and technical classes, housing and recreation.56 
A.s in the case of the industrial and commercial appren~ 
ticeship services (SENAI and SENAC), the SESI and SESO programs 
have been lauded by industrialists and merchants alike, as 
constituting genuine protection against state paternalism and 
extremist doctrines~ despite the fact that all four programs 
ere controlled by the industrialists and merchants in the 
best paternalistic tradition. While there is little doubt 
that ~razil 1 s industrial and commercial workers have welcomed 
the services and benefits which these programs provide, there 
is some question as to just how long they will continae to 
accept these boons passed down from above. 
We have thus observed that notable progress has been 
55 J~V~ Freitas Marcondes, ~·cit., p. 397. 
"Social Service Organization for Brazilian Workers, 11 
of the Pan American Union, 81:56, January, 1947. 
56 Wythe, QJl· cit .• p. 242. 
Also see 
Bulletin 
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made in the field of educa~ion. Not only were the SENAI, 
SENAC and rural education programs , begun during the Vargas 
period, strengthened and extended, but the entirely new adult~ 
education campaign launched in 1947, has proved effective in 
combating illiteracy. 
Erazil 1 s_imm1gration and colonization policies during 
the Dutra period were never clearly defined and often proved 
contradictory in nature. This situation undoubtedly reflects 
the underlying division of public opinion in the country on 
this issue. While Brazil's falta de br~os (shortage of hands) 
is generally recognized in principle, rising nationalist senti-
ment has frustrated moves to put a large-scale immigration 
and colonization program into operation. In a country which 
some observers believe capable of eventually supporting 
500,000,000 inhabitants, the arrival under a five-year program 
of hardly more than 15,000 immigrants, cannot be called 
tremendously significant. 
In the field of health, little has been accomplished 
beyond the continuation of the SESP which was launched in con~ 
junction with the United States during the war. However, with 
President Dutra's approval of the SALTE Plan, it was expected 
that health conditions would be substantially improved in the 
near future. 
Despite the many liberal guarantees accorded labor by 
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Brazil's present constitution, subsequent la~s interpreting 
the rights of labor seriously limit organized labor activity 
in the country. As for Brazill s social security system, it 
still remains overwhelmingly urban. The institution of indus-
trial and commercial social services (SESI and SESC) in 1946, 
intensified this basic pattern, although proposed plans for 
the organization of an agricultural social service, hold some 
promise for the great bulk of Brazil 1 s agricultural workers. 
By way of summary then, it can be said that social 
developments in Brazil during the Dutra period followed the 
basic patterns established by the previous regime. In most 
cases considerable progress has been effected in extending and 
improving the institutions and programs initiated during the 
thirties and early forties and in a few instances, new depar-
tures have been successfully undertaken. 
) 
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P.ART THREE 
THE RETURN TO VARGAS 
CHAPTER X 
THE ELECTIONS OF 1950 
THE PBE-C.AMPAIGN PERIOD 
Although President Dutra1 s election to office in 
December, 1945, was widely hailed as a symbol of the return 
of democracy to Brazil, the acid test of the democratic nature 
of his government was scheduled for the fall of 1950, when, in 
accordance with the Constitution of 1946, the voters of Brazil 
would go to the polls to chooEB his successor .1 
Toward the close of 1949, the nation1 s major political 
parties began mapping out their respective campaigns for the 
crucial months ahead. The most pressing problem facing the 
various political groups was that of drawing up pr-ospective 
partt slates. The selection of president:tlil candidates proved 
an extramely complex and discordant affair. The pivotal figure 
in the many and varied arrangements which transpired during 
this preparatory period was Get~io Vargas. After his election 
to the Senate in 1945, Vargas went placidly about his business 
lining up support for his Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro 
(Brazilian Labor Party--PTB) and mending his political fences 
in various parts of the country. Although the PTE failed·to 
1 According to the Constitution of 1946, the president 
cannot immediately succeed himself. 
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register any marked gains in the local congressional elections 
of 1947, it was generally recognized that Vargas's popularity 
with the masses was still very great. Indeed, upon his return 
to Rio in February, 1946, to claim his senatorial seat, an est-
imated 50,000 people flocked to the airport to give him a 
roaring welcome. 2 Although Vargas remained nominally non-
committal about becoming a candidate in 1950, the leaders of 
the other major parties, felt certain, and not a little afraid, 
that the ex-president would eventually choose to run. 
Cognizant of Vargas•s potential strength, the government 
party (PSD) undertook the delicate task of unearthing a candi-
date who might prove acceptable ~o the Uniao Democratica 
Nacional (National Democratic Union~-UDN) and the Partido 
Re~ublicano (Republican Party--PR).3 
Early in December, 1949, :Benedi to Va.ladares, regional 
head of the PSD in the state of Minas Gerais, proposed a slate 
of four possible presidential candidates with the expectation 
that one of the four might prove acceptable to the UDN and the PR. 
While this proposal met with the approval of the UDN organization 
2 Austin F. MacDonald, Latin American Politica and 
Government, p. 159. 
3 The PR is one of the more important of :Brazil's many 
minor politic~l parties. In the main, it represents the conserva-
tive "old-guard11 Republicans of the pre-Vargas period and is led 
by former President Arthur :Bernardes. The PR has commonly aligned 
itself with the UDN on all major issues. 
• 
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in Minas, the National Council declined the PSD bid on the 
grounds that all fqur prospective candidates were PSD stal-
warts. However, the National Council indicated that it would 
fa~or continued efforts to unearth a candidate unico, or coali-
tion candidate, and agreed to delay its plans to announce the 
candidacy of Ai~ ·Brigadier Eduardo Gomes.4 
Obviously· disgruntled by this turn of events, the PSD 
adopted a new tactic which many observers interpreted as an 
attempt to pressure the UDN into accepting a coalition candi-
date chosen by the PSD~ With the approach of the Christmas 
holidays, reports of a proposed accord between the PSD and 
Vargas's PT.B pegan appearing in the press. The holiday visit 
of Ernani de Amaral Peixoto to the Vargas fazenda at sao Borja, 
Rio Grande do Sul, was widely discussed in DDN circles. ~is 
discussion arose mainly because Peixoto, in 1945, had broken 
off relations with Vargas (his father-in-law) and had since 
joined forces with President Dutra's PSD. It was believed that 
Peixoto had visited his father-in-law in order to decide upon 
a dandidate acceptable to both the PSD and the PT.B. Upon his 
return from Sao Borja, Peixoto suggested that the Dutra and 
Vargas forces might support Walter Jobim, governor of the state of 
4 "O Memento Pol!tico," Estado de Sao Paulo, December 6, 
1949, as cited on page 4 of an unpublished paper entitled Events 
Preceding the 1950 Presidential Elections in Brazil, p~pared by 
Miss Evelyn Reisner as a seminar report for Course No. LT. 452 
Seminar in Latin American Regional Studies, Boston University, 
College of Liberal Arts, Second Semester, 1949, 1950. 
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Rio Grande do Sul. Elected to the governorship as a PSD 
candidate, Jobim had pnrsued policies fa~ored by Vargas. 
Peixoto 1 s announcement failed to alarm the UDN unduly, de-
spite the fact that the implementation of such a plan would 
leave the party in dire straits. DDN leaders were of the• · 
opinion that since Jobim was actually controlled by Vargas, 
the latter would be in a position to exact such haavy concessions 
from the government party, that it would not dare run the risk.5 
Subsequent events upheld the validity of this point of view, 
since the allegedPTB-PSD alliance failed to materialize, despite 
the fact that both parties reportedly maintained some degree of 
contact throughout the first three months of 1950. 
It is worth noting that the PSD representatives were in 
touch with:the UDN during this same period, particularly in the 
state of Minas Gerais. It would appear that various political 
parties in that state were intent on nominating a Mineiro presi-
dential candidate. By February, 1950, it appeared very likely 
that Milton Campos, then governor of the state and an outstanding 
member of the UDN, would emerge as the long sought-after coalition 
candidate. Rumor had it that even President Dutra favored Campos's 
nomination. 6 However, the highly regional character of Brazilian 
§ "Q Momenta Politico," Estado de sao Paulo, December 23, 23, 
1949, as cited by Reisner. 
6 11
.Q_Momento Politico," Estado de Sao Paulo, January 29, 1950, 
as cited by ReiRner, p. 10. 
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politics was made manifest at the very moment when it appeared 
that definite progress was being made. 
The sao Paulo section of the UDN came out strongly against 
the activities of the party in Minas, asserting that the selection 
of a presidential candidate was outside the province of any state 
organization. If further asserted that the Minas group had 
failed to recognize the fact that most of the other UDN state 
organizations, including that of Sao Paulo, were solidly behind 
Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, and that the Mineiros were, in effect~ 
sabotaging the party 1 s national unity. Should. the Minas group 
and the PSD agree on a candidate unacceptable to the other UDN 
chapters, all would be lost. 7 Disturbed by the unfa~orable 
rea~tion of the Paulistas, the UDN-PSD negotiations in Minas 
collapsed and hopes for a candidate unico waned. 
While these fruitless negotiations between the UDN and 
the PSD were taking place, certain developments which proved 
to be considerably important in the elctions of 1950, were 
transpiring between GetUlio Vargas and the governor of Sao Paulo, 
Adhemar de Barros. 
Adhemar de Barros is undoubtedly one of Brazil's most. 
colorful and important political personages. A physician by 
profession, de Barros came to take a lively interest in politics 
? "Q. Espiri to das Negociacoes, 11 Est ado de sao Paulo, 
February 16, 1950, as cited by Reisner, p. 11. 
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and succeeded in being elected Deputy to the Sao Paulo Legis-
lature in 1935. In 1938, de Barros was appointed by Vargas as 
Interventor of the state of Sao Paulo. During his term of office, 
Dr. de Barros initiated a program of social and economic reform 
which earned him the support of many Paulistas. Some observers 
believe that Adhemar 1 s dismi,ssal in 1941 was directly related 
to his increasing popularity. After his ouster, de Barros re-
tired from the politiaal scene until the raurn of civil liberties 
in 1945, whereupon he energetically set about organizing his own 
political party, the Partido §QgiaJ Progressista (Progressive 
Social Party--EB:S). In the off-year elections of 19i)li7, the PSP, 
with some assistance from the Communist Party, succaeded in 
electing Adhemar as governor of the state of Sao Paulo. 8 
Adhemar 1 s political stature greW' steadily after his election, 
and the influence of his PSP spread rapidly to many other states 
outside of~ Paulo. 9 
When preparations for the elections of 1950 began, de 
Barros's name was bandied about in many quarters as a possible 
presidential candidate. 10 Although Dr. de Barros was not averse 
8 It is generally believed that Adhemar' s aacFJptance of 
Communist support did not involve any major concessions on his 
part, but was merely based on his assurance that the party would 
be allowed to carry on normal political activities unmolested, 
should he be elected, 
9 
nour Adhemar, 11 Time, 50!34, July 21, 1947. 
10 
"Wonderful People ,n Time • 55:25, January 2, 1950. 
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to becoming a candidate, he fully realized that his PSP was 
hardly strong enough to ins-ure his election. He therefore began 
casting about for Su-.flport· · paxticularly from his one-time chief, 
Getnlio Vargas. Several meetings between the two men at Vargas's 
fazenda at Sao Borja failed to produce any perceptible results, 
although the opposition parties revealed grave concern over the 
possibility of any sort of PTB-PSD alliance. 11 
Although few observers following the course of Adhemar 1 s 
activities lrnew a great deal about what was transp.ring behind 
the scenes, all lrnew that he would be obliged to make a decision 
before long, since the electoral law provided. that cabinet mini-
sters and state governors seeking higher office must resign their 
posts six m~nths prior to the date of any election in which they 
intend to be a candidate. April 3, 195G, the day of decision, 
came and. went and Adhemar remained in office as governor of the 
- . 12 
state of Sao Paulo. It thus became apparent that Adhemar had 
been unsuccessful in his attempts to muster the support necessary 
to place him in the presid.entia1 palace. Only one question re-
mained unanswered: which political paxty weald obtain the support 
of Adhemar and his powerful PSP? Subsequent events were to reveal 
that t·he master of the. fazend.a de Itu at Sao :Borja :o.ad not lost 
his persuasive powers since his "retirement 11 in 1945. 
1l ng_ Memento Pol:ftico," Estado de Sao Paulo 1 December 14, 1949, as cited by Reisner. 
12 
"Coy Candidates, 11 Newsweek, 35:43, May:;.TI.,l950. 
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Indecision and confusion continued to characterize the 
Brazilian political scene for many weeks. New rumors and inti-
mations .concerning possible candidates and party alliances 
cropped up continuously, but positive comrrdtments failed to 
materialize. However, early in Januavy, 1950, Getulio Vargas 
delivered a speech which strongly suggested that he was interested 
in raising a vital issue which might well be utilized in any 
projected political campaign. Referring to the speech made by 
former United States Ambassador Adolphe A. Berle, Jr., at 
Petropolis early in October, 1945, in which .Ambassador Berle 
has expressed the view that the best means of achieving demo-
cracy was to practice it, Vargas cha£ged that this speech had 
encouraged his enemies to move against him late that month. l3 
II That speech was inspired., It Vargas said.. 11Berle, simply an 
ambassad.or, would. not have taken that responsibility. En route 
from Argentina where he had. just left his post as .Ambassad.or 
to take up the post of Assistant Secretary of State, Brad.en 
stopped. in Brazil where he conferred. with Berle regarding our 
situation. As a consequence of the instructions he gave to his 
subordinate, Berle took the stand. which is known to all~n14 
This assertion evoked an immed.iate reply from Mr. Brad.en, 
who by this time was no longer connected with the State Department. 
13 Supra, Chap. V, p.'10. 
14 "Vargas Lays Fall To Braden, Berletl, New York Times. 
January 13, 1950. 
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"My policy was clear and well known, 11 said :Braden, III put 
in a strict prohibition against American ftationals partici-
pating in any election. I told :Serle to read his speech to 
Vargas when he mentioned it to me, on my way back to Washington. 
And he did so sometime later.n15 There the issue rested for 
the moment although Vargasrs statement undoubtedly ·c~eated 
considerable consternation in the United States State Department. 
However, many observers believed that Vargas's twisting of the 
eagle's tail feathers was purely a matter of internal politics. 
Not until early June, did the political picuqre come 
into sharp focus. The final outcome of all the Iv.&?ious maneuvers 
which had transpired in the course of the past eight months was 
not entirely unexpectdd, although the situation, at times, 
appeared fluid enough for any number of ~~usual developments. 
First of all, a~tempts by the PSD and the UDN to find a coali-
tion candidate. failed, both parties deciding to go their own 
separate ways. This would seem to indicab.e that serious differ-
ences exi~sted between the parties regarding the handling of the 
many important social, political, and economic problems then 
facing the country. Wiat these differences might have been ~as 
never revealed in the course of the camp~n. In the case of 
the UDN, the Sao Paulo faction emgrged tri urnphant in May~ when 
the party's national convention chose Air :Brigadier Eduardo Gomes 
as 'residential candidate. In June, the government party was 
15 Loc. ill.• 
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finally obliged to.bow to the wishes of President Dutra in 
choosing Cristiano Machado, a man whom the President considered 
a worthy successor. 
Machado, then a Federal Deputy from the state of Minas 
Gerais, had a spotless record as a former Barik Director, 
Prefect of the city of Belo Horizonte and Delegate to the 
Constitutional Assembly of 1946. His honesty and integr&ty 
were beyond reproach, and he iiaa reputed to be a man of strong 
democratic convictions. Machado's chief political asset was 
his popularity in his native state of Minas Gerais, a keystate 
generally considered to be a UDN stronghold. On the debit 
side of the ledger, Machado was not well known outside of 
Minas, and could hardly be termed a colorful political figure 
capable of enlisting extensive mass support.l6 
After weeks of ardent wooing by the Brazilian Labor 
Party, the Senator from Sao Borja finally agreed in June, to 
sacrifice his 11 deserved rest" and become the party• s candidate. 
His position was strengthened immeasurably by the decision of 
.Adllemar de Barros to support his one time mentor and later 
adversaryl-7 With the opposition divided, and assured of PSP 
support, Getillio' s political future 8IJpeared bright indeed. 
16 Hispanic American Report for May 1950, Vol, III, 
No. 6, p. 38. 
17 "Coy Candidates," QJl· cit. 
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Position of the Mili tarx 
Throughout the pre-campaign period, &here were persistent 
rumors that the military was extremely dissatisfied with the 
manner in which matters were proceeding. Certain factions in 
the various_ military establishments were particularly concerned 
over the prospect of Vargas' becoming a presidential candidate. 
Many political leaders feared that a military cou~ aimed at 
keeping President Dutra in office might be perpetrated. In 
his 1950 Message to Congress, the President added to these 
fears by intimating that the armed forces would protect the 
welfare of the nation and guarantee its republican institutions 
against inadvertant blows. 18 Canrobert Pereira da Costa, 
then Minister of War, sought to abate such fears by indicating 
that the predominating opinion in high military circles was 
essentially democratic and that rumors of a coup were entirely 
without foundation.l9 It should be noted that General Pereira 
da Costa was himself a possible presidential candidate. 
When Vargas finally accepted the PT.B 1 s bid to become 
its candidate, many observers believed that the army'would 
move to cancel the elections scheduled for October. :But 
altered circumstances within the important Club Militar de 
18 11QMomento Pol:ltico, 11 Estado de Sao Paulo, January 3, 
1950, as cited by Reisner, _QR. cit., p. B. 
19 Loc. cit. 
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Rio de Janeiro (The Rio de Janeiro Military Club) served to 
mitigate the threat of a coup. Early in June, the club held 
its annual election of officers and a new slate triumphed over 
the old guard traditionally opposed to Vargas. The newly 
elected group soo~ made it known that it would offer no inter-
ference if Vargas were constitutionally elected.20 The danger 
of a COUJ2. thus seemed past, assuming that the new faction 
could maintain control of the situation. 
Violation of Civil Liberties During the lli-Gamoaign Period 
The guarantee of civil liberties provided by the Consti-
tution of 1946 has been widely violated on the state level by 
governors who have been able to carry on as laws unto them-
selves. The critical pre-election period served to point up 
the arbitrary, semi-dictatorial manner in which the chief 
executives of certain states handled political gDoups or 
factions opposed to their administrations. 
One of the most flagrant examples of high-handed action 
by state officials occur:ed in the northeastern state of 
Alagoas. Governor Silvestre Pericles de Goes Monteiro has 
earned an unenviable reputation as a chronic violater of the 
rights of dissident minorities. Re had been particularly 
ruthless in his dealings with the UDN party leaders in that 
state. 
20 11 GaU.Cho 1 s Return, 11 ~. 55:42, June 19, 1950. 
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On December 24, 1949, the official UDN party organ of 
Alagoas, Q. D:fario do Povo ~ was seized by the state mi1i tia. 
Rui Palmeira, director of the D!ario and a Federal Deputy from 
Alagoas, was banned from the premises, and his employees were 
forced to sign declarations promising never to work for him 
again.21 Realizing that the statets judiciary would not provide 
him with an impartial hearing, Palmeira contacted the Minist·er 
of Justice, Adroa1do Mesquita da Costa, and demanded that his 
constitutional rights be upheld by the federal government. 
However, the Minister of Justice merely referred the matter 
back to Governor Monteiro requesting the latter to investigate 
the affair. Palmeira was informed that the federal govern-
ment had no right to intervene since the state authorities were 
directly responsible for the implementation of all federal 
laws. To all practical intents and purposes Palmeira was thus 
left without any further means of seeking redress for his 
grievance.22 
The Governor of Alagoas again made news late in January, 
195D, when word was received in Rio of the attempted assassination 
21 IIViolences of the Governor of Alagoas Against an 
Opposition Newspaper, 11 Estado de Sao Paulo, December 25, 1949. 
See Present Status of Civil Liberties in Brazil, pp. 1-2, an 
unpublished paper prepared by Miss Mary R. Clancy as a seminar 
report for Course No. LT 452, Seminar.in Latin .American Regional 
Studies, Easton University College of Liberal Arts, Second 
Semester 1949~50. 
22 11Minister of Justice and the Case of Alagoas, n Este.d.o 
de Sao Paulo, December 30, 1949, Present Status of Civil Liberties 
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o£ PSD 1 s State Deputy Oseas Cardoso, by men allegedly hired by 
the governor. Cardoso eseaped with his 1i£e only after shooting 
it out with his would be assassins.23 Less than a month late~. 
however, Cardoso 1 s father, Joao Cardoso, was mortally wounded 
by a group of assailants whom the victim identified, just before 
expiring, as members of the Alagoas Police.24 
The reaction in the National Congress against Governor 
Monteiro was immediate and vociferous. Ismar de Goes Monteiro, 
a senator from Alagoas and brother to the governor, joined with 
the opposition i~ protesting to the federal administration 
against the terroristic practices which had recently taken 
place in his native state.25 Ismar declared that President 
Dutra was co-responsible with the governor for the crimes being 
committed in Alagoas. By way of response, President Dutra 
insisted that it was not within the presidential powers, as 
defined in Article 87 of the Constitution, to proceed against 
those who make attempts against the physical integrity of 
citizens. The President declared that federal intervention 
in Brazil, p. 2. 
23 11 Terror in Alagoas, 11 Estado de Sao Paulo, January 29, 
1950. See Present Status of Civil Liberties in Brazil, p.4. 
24 11New Political Crimes in Alagoas Denounced in Senate, 11 
Estado de sao Paulo, February 18, 1950. See Present Status 9f. 
Civil Liberties in Brazil, p. 4~ 
25 Loc. cit. 
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was not only unnecessary but would be illegal in this ca.se, and 
expressed confidence in the ability of the Judiciary of .Alagoas 
to exercise its punitive functions.26 
This carefully delineated legalistic effort on the part 
of the federal government to avoid a slash with the Governor 
of Alagoas. clearly reveals the degree of autonomy which many 
-the. 
of state administrations have developed. Had the President 
" 
been confident of his authority over the states, he as titular· 
head of the PSD would have made some effort to prevent the 
intimidation of PSD state deputies, by a PST governor.27 
A serious violation of the right of assembly occurred 
in Rio de Janeiro in November~ 1949. The League for the 
Defense of Democratic Liberties held a meeting in that city to 
protest against some of the more repressive features of the 
National Security Law. Although the meeting had l1een authorized 
by the authorities, the police without any apparent provocation 
fired into the crowd killing several persons and wounding 
countless others.28 The incident provoked an immediate reaction 
26 Mary R. Clancy, Present Status of Civil Liberties in 
:Brazil, p. 5. 
27 The Partido Social Trabalhista (Social Labor Party), 
organized in 1946, has elected two senators, fourteen deputies 
and two governors. 
28 11 The Police and Politics," Estado de Sao Paulo, November 
9, 1949. See Present Status of Civil Liberties in :Brazil, p. 13. 
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in the Chamber o-f Deputies. Several deputies who had attended 
the meeting, reported that the action of the police was entirely 
unjustif'iable. .A. senator declared that the attack was part ·of 
a deliberately planned campaign to curb dissident political 
factions.29 
On the other hand the authorities claimed that the 
Police harl been justif'ied in their actions since a large n~ber 
of' Communists had attended the meeting. The Estado de Sao 
Paulo, never known to lend sympathy to any cause remotely 
associated with Communism, sought to refute this argument by 
pointing out that, although Communists m~ have been present, 
no Communist had spoken or taken any direct part in the meeting. 
They had created no disturbance.30 
Earlier in the year the town of Tupa in the state of' 
Sao Paulo, was the scene of' an incident similar to that which 
occurred in Rio. In this case, four people were shot and killed 
in a police raid on a meeting.31 In various other states 
notably Para!ba, Ceara, Goias, and Maranhao, many rather serious 
civil liberty violations were reported to have taken place on 
the eve of' the electoral campaign. However, as in the case 
29 
"Protest in Chamber of' Deputies Against Police Vio-
lence, 11 Estado de Sao Paulo, November 20, 1949. See Present 
Status of Q!.Y!1:. Liberties in :Brazil, p. 14. 
30 "The Police and Politics," loc. cit. 
31 "The Events of Tupa," ;Estado de Sao Paulo, December 8, 
1949. See :Pre.sen..t S'tatus, .2f Ci'V'i'l. Li be.rta.'i:is inc :Sra.-zil., pp. 6-7. 
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of Alagoas, the federal government remained aloof, despite the 
severe criticism leveled against it by the various groups and 
parties which had suffered at the hands of state and local 
authorities.33 
Increased Violations During the Campaign Period 
..... · .. 
From June, until the elections in October, the number of 
incidents of violence resulting in the death of one or more 
persons increased markedly. In July, at Campina Grande, in 
the state of Para!ba, three persons were killed and nine seri-
ously wounded, when police broke up a Socialist demonstration 
by firing into the as sembled crowd.~ 
A political feud of long standing between Boulanger Pucci, 
Prefect of the town of Ubuaba in Minas, and Alves Filho, 
brother-in-law of the local president of the PTB, resulted in 
the assassination of the former by the latter .. Pucci, who 
had been elected Prefect by the PTB incurred the wrs.th of Alves 
Filho, by seeking a seat in the Federal Chamber of Deputies 
as a PSP candidate, without first consulting PT:B party leaders 
in the area. 34 
32 Mary R. Clancy, El'. cit., pp. 6--9, and 18-20. 
33 Estado de Sic Paulo, July 11, 1950, p. 3 as cited on 
p. 4 of an unpublished paper entitled Pre-Election Disorders 
in :Brazil, prepared by Miss Cesidia Lombardi as a seminar report 
for Course No. LT 451 - Seminar in Latin American Regional 
Studies, :Boston University, College of Liberal Arts, First 
Semester 1950-1951. 
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In Goias , two persons , including Federal Deputy Getuliano 
Artiaga, were killed and several were wounded when a group o-f 
alleged PSP partisans attacked a PSD meeting in the town of 
I 
Ipamirim. The incident was referred to PSD leaders in Rio 
and the party was able to force a motion through Congress 
ordering the Minister of War to send troops into the area, to 
guarantee order and the free exercise of political propaganda 
activities.35 
In the city of Santana do Livramento of Rio Grande do 
Sul, the clandestine efforts of a group of Communists to put 
up a series of posters were discovered by the police. A 
lively exchange of gunfire ensued, resulting in the death of 
four Communists and the wounding of five policemen.36 
As the scheduled date for the elections neared, persist-
ent reports of intended intimidation of the voting public 
began appearing in the press. Such reports usually concerned 
the appointment by local authorities of electoral inspectors 
charged with the maintenance of law and order at the polls. 
34 
'Estado de sao Paulo, September 12, as cited by Lom-
bardi, p. 6. 
35 
'Estado de Sao Paulo, September 13, as cited by Lom-
bardi, pp. 7-8. 
36 Estado de Sao Paulo, September 26, _as cited by Lom-
bardi, P· 14. 
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However, dissident elements opposed to the various local 
regimes, charged that such inspectors would attempt to control 
the vote by intimidation. The Estado de Sao Paulo carried 
many reports of complaints registered with the Minister of 
Justice, by various minority parties against the potential 
threat presented by so-called inspectors. In most cases such 
complaints were accompanied by requests for federal forces to 
counteract-the influence of these inspectors.37 
A fitting climax to the series of disturbances which 
had plagued the state of Alagoas throughout the pre-election 
period occurred on election day itself, in the city of Mata 
Grande. A veritable gun battlg broke out in the streets of 
the city resulting in one death and the wounding of several 
persons, including Senator Ismar de GOes Monteiro. On this 
occasion federal troops were despatched to the scene immediate-
ly. The situation was found to be so critica,l that the 
commander of the contingent sent there, asked for reinforcements 
shortly after h~s arriva.1. 38 
According to a report submitted by the Minister of War, 
Canrobert Pereira da Costa, dealing with the activities of 
the military during the course of the campaign, six states 
37 Oesidia Lombardi, Pre-Election Disorders in :Brazil, 
pp. 15-19. 
38 ES':tado. ~e ~ae ~o, October 4, 1950, ·as cited. .by 
Lombardi,· 1f. :31. 
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and 155 munic!pios received military assistance in order to 
insure free and honest elections. 39 This, of course, represents 
a reversal of President Dutra•s original hands-off policy and 
clearly indicates the mounting tensions which typified the 
final phase of the campaign. 
Although numerous instances of civil liberty violations 
were recorded throughout the electoral period, one should not 
exaggerate their significance. If we consider the vast terri-
torial extent of Brazil and the relative inexperience of the 
Brazilian populace with the democratic processes, the issue 
of civil liberty violations during this period can be viewed· 
in proper prospective. In the final analysis, the very fact 
that the scheduled elections took place without any major 
disturbgnce clearly indicates that the incidents described 
above were not of vital significance. 
THE CAMPAIGN 
Political activity throughout the country was stepped 
up markedly after the selection of the candidates by the 
three major political parties.40 Air Brigadier Eduardo Gomes 
and Cristiano Machado soon set out an extensive campaign ~ours 
39 Estado de Sao Paulo, October 5, 1950, as cited by 
Lombardi , p. 21. 
40 The Partido Socialista Erasileiro (Brazilian Social 
Party - PSB) was the only minor party to nominate a presidential 
candidate. Rather than compromise their principles by joining 
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travelling mostly by air to various remote parts of the country. 
:Both candidates, undoubtedly, sensed the need to reach as many 
of the people in the outlying regions as was humanly ~ossible 
in order to counteract the tremendous influence which Vargas 
wielded in the hinterlands. Both candidates must also have 
sensed the inherently weak ~osition which each had been forced 
to accept as a result of the inability of their respective 
parties to agree upon a single candidate. 
In many respects, Gomes' campaign closely paralleled 
that of l945, when he and Dutra vied for the ~residential 
chair. Despite his many virtues as an honest, upstanding 
administrator and party-leader, Gomes has never fired the 
imagination of the masses. .A.l though many of the campaign 
issues underlined by Gomes in the campaign, such as the need 
for higher wages, more education, honesty in government and 
stringent measures for controlling inflation, may·have made 
sense to the Brazilian worker, Gomesr seeming aloofness led 
many to question his sincerity. 
Cristiano Machado also lacked the common touch and 
failed in his attempts to appeal to the masses despite his 
promises to increase and extend the benefits of the country's 
social security system, foster new housing development programs 
and continue the administration's policy for rapid industrial-
ization by way of the SALTE Plan. 41 Being the official 
41 lt]razil Five Year Plan Backed by Machado, 11 New ~ 
Times June 26 1950 
candidate, Machado was obliged to bear the brunt of the crit-
icism levelled against the administration .. for its failure to 
check the inflation which had plagued the nation since 1945. 
While Machado sought to point out that the inflation had been 
generated by international economic dislocations and that the 
best means of curbing it was through industrialization, the 
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chief victims of the inflationary whirlwind, the masses, demanded 
a more immediate solution. 
Candidate Vargas, apparently in no great haste to climb 
into the political arena, did not officially begin his campaign 
until .early in August. Starting at Pnrto Alegre, the capital 
of his native state of Rio Grande do Sul, Vargas proceeded to 
deliver a series of vitriolic speeches in most of the major 
cities along the coast, including Santos and Sao Paulo, and 
climaxed his tour with a triumphant entry into the natiod s 
capital on the twenty-first of the month. Here he was greetefr 
by a teeming throng of thirty-thouSand cheering Cariocas; 
many persons in the cfowd carried posters reading 11 Lets go 
back to the good old days, 11 and 11 :Sread, 1940-ten cents; 
:Bread, 1950-thirty-two cents!ff Thousands aheered wildly when 
Vargas declared, 11 The people will climb the palace stairs 
with me, and I will govern with them. 11 He charged the in-
cumbent administration with bringing on inflation, by encour-
aging black markets and spending billions of cruzeiros on 
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worthless projects. Referring to the Brazilian Exped~tionary 
:force which he had sent to Italy in 1944, he said, HQur forces 
then occupied first place among the nations of South .America, 
but as a result of the bungling and ineptitude of the present 
administration, they have lost it today. 1142 
Over and over again Vargas appealed to the working man, 
promising a return to the good old days when things were 
accomplished. That Vargas had often assum~d dictatorial 
prerogatives during his stay in office from 1930~ 1945, was 
of little conse~uence to the Brazilian worker. What did 
·matter was that Vargas tinha sempre lembrado da gente, (had 
always remembered the people). At Campinas in Sao Paulo he 
had promised them a middle of the road program opposed both 
to Communism and to Fascism. 43 No one could deny that Vargas 
was still immensely popular with the masses, that his campaign 
platform pleased them immensely, or that his political 
alliances were extremely well chosen. These political faits 
accomplis undoubtedly influenced the parties of the opposition 
to negotiate the extremely curious electoral agreements which 
we will now examine. 
1950. 
42 "Vargas Plus Nostalgia, 11 Newsweek, 35:46, August 21, 
43 Milton Bracker, 11 Campaign Issues Missing in Brazil, 11 
New York Times, September 24, 1950. 
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The PRP-UDN Alliance 
On the twenty-second of July, the National Convention 
of Plinio Salgado 1 s Partido de Representaqao (Popular Representa-
tion Party-- PRP). on recommendation of the party 1 s National 
Directorate and the National Council, voted to support the 
candidacy of Air :Brigadier Eduardo Gomes. 44 For several weeks 
prior to this announcement, there had been a great deal of 
speculation as to whether the PRP would support Gomes or 
Machado. It was reported that elements of the PSD were 
actively seeking PRP support and were offering the portfolios 
of the Ministries of .Agriculture and Education in exchange 
for such support. 45 On the afternoon of the twenty-third, 
Salgado addressing the party convention, confirmed these 
allegations and added that Gomes, on the other hand, had made 
no offers of a material sort. 11Re merely accepted an invitation 
to take part in the battle against those forces which we 
instinctively rise to oppose.n46 
On that same afternoon Gomes delivered an acceptance 
speech before the PRP Convention. This speech proved to be 
1950. 
44 11PRP Adopts Gomes, 11 Estado ~Sao Paulo, July 22, 1950. 
45 11PRP to Support Gomes, 11 Est ado de Sao Paulo , July 21, 
46 11 0ration by the President of the PRP, 11 Estado de ~ 
Paulo, July 23, 1950. 
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of considerable importance because it not only revealed Gomes' 
basic conservatism but also suggested that his ideological 
position might not be too far distant from that of "the 11 ex:-
Integralists.11 The :Brigadier launched his acceptance speech 
with a general statement to the effect that this was a period 
in :Brazil's history characterized by moral desolation and 
spiritual despair. The :Brigadier went on to say: 
A contemporary sage has analyzed this problem thusly, 
'When a nation finds itself in such a depressed state, 
the usual tendency is for it to look outside itself 
for a solution. .A:ny hope which is based on such a 
solution is bound to be insecure because it rests on 
foreign precepts. If, on the other hand, such a 
solution is repudiated and that nation comes to 
consider that it can tailor its future history in 
accordance with its own will then the effects and. 
indeed, the sacrifices eXpended in putting such a 
theory into practice will restore a proper equil-
ibrium, which will bring with it the serenity, 
assurance, and satisfaction that accompanies pos-
itive accomplisbment.47 
Such· a task requires that we fortify our demo-
cratic institutions, not merely in the mechanistic 
sense, but above all, in the spiritual sense. 
Brazilian society can rest only on Christian 
foundations. Such a society is, of necessity, in-
compatible with any way of life which relegates 
man 1 s spiritual autonomy to any but the highest 
pinnacle. 
I have affirmed on previous occasions that under 
our regime the government is obliged to be an organ 
dedicated to the promotion of political tranquility 
and order. This is absolutely necessary it the 
government is to carry out·:: its mission effectively. 
In those countries, such as the United States 
and England, where public opinion is perpetually 
47 The :Brigadier fails to identify the "contemporary 
sage , 11 but Plinio Salgado might well have been the author of 
such material. 
split, the general will soon escapes the particular 
group which may have lJerrti?orarily mustered sufficient 
support to win th~ day ... subjecting it once again 
to the vicissitudes of partisanship and thus weaken-
ing its ability to carry out the people's will. 
Gentlemen, never f'orget the motives which prompt-
ed you to support me in the campaign which we now 
face together. Always remember thosepropositions 
which will ensure individual rights, the internal 
and external security of our great nation, :promote 
respect for its traditions, and guarantee its mater-
ial and moral order.48 
:By and large, public reaction to the P.BP-UDN alliance 
followed party lines. PSD adherents, overlooking the fact 
that certain elements in their party.had actively sought to 
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enlist the support of the.PRP, lambasted Gomes for associating 
with Salgado and his Fascists, asserting that the move would 
cost him dearly at the :polls.49 
Despite repeated assurances by Gomes and other UDN 
leaders that the P.BP had received nothing from the party in 
exchange for its support, many in the opposition were extremely 
sceptical. By wa;y of reply Plinio Salgado gave a three column 
statement to the Estado do Sao Paulo on the twenty-eight"h.of 
July. After a brief dissertation on the lack of idealism 
which prompted so many people to question the alignment of the 
PRP with the UDN, Mr. Salgado proceeded to analyze the alleged 
48 
nDiscourse by the :Brigadier, 11 Estado de Sao Paulo, 
July 23, 1950. 
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49 11 vrave of Bad Faith," Estado de Sao :Paulo, July 28, 
agreements which supposedly served to seal the alliance. 
It has been said that the PRP came to support the 
Brigadier in return for UDN support of the PRP sena-
torial candidates in the states of Rio Grande do Sul 
and Minas Gerais. Such allegations fail completely 
to take cognizance of political actualities. 
In Rio Grande do Su1, the influence of the UDN 
is very slight indeed, since it is composed mainly 
of small idealistic coteries. The value of such 
support to the senatorial candidate in the gaUcho 
state is truly most inconsequential and could hardly 
constitute the basis for a political deal.50 
In the case of Minas, the UDN long ago intimated 
that it might endorse the PRP senatorial candidate in 
that state in return for state PRP support of the 
Brigadier. However, the personal qualifications of 
the PRP 1 s candidate cannot be overlooked. Mr . .Amaro 
La.nari is enthusiastically praised and admired by many 
diverse parties.51 
On the very day on which Salgado 1 s article appeared in 
the Estado, Nx. Odilon Braga, President of the UDN52 held a 
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press conference at which he sought to explain the motives which 
prompted the UDN to accept PRP support. 
The Brigadier was constantly kept informed by me 
as to what was transpiring. However, his personal 
intervention was limited to receiving Mr. Salgado 
when the latter came to announce the decision of his 
party to support the former. At the same time, Mr. 
Salgado asked the Brigadier to be present at the 
PRP Convention meeting scheduled for that afternoon, 
50 The PRP senatorial candidate in Rio Grande do SuJ. 
was Salgado himself. Both he and the Minas candidate, Amaro 
Lanari, were not elected . 
. 
51 
"The PRP and the Brigadier, 11 Estado de Sao ~. 
July 28, 1950. 
52 
Mr. Braga was subsequently chosen UDN vice-presidential 
candidate. 
in order that he. might formally accept the sup:port 
which had been accorded him... . 
These contacts came at theprecise moment when 
the PRP decided to support Mr. Cristiano Machado, 
mainly because the UDN h8A refused to ind~cate 
which guberna.torial candidate it would support in the 
state of Minas Gerais. This decision by the PR ser-
iously affected the UDNts position, not only in 
Minas, but also ·in the country at large. This 
situation •.• led us to realize the necessity of tap-
ping all sources of democratic support in order that 
our g-reat leader might come to head the national 
government. Indeed, this became ow primary objective. 
At a subsequent meeting Mr. Salgado and the PBP 
Deputy, Mr. La-q:eiro .Junior reaffirmed their position 
of unqualified support for the ::Srigl3,dier. However, 
given the principle of reciprocity, we were asked to 
consider the possibility of supporting various local 
PBP candidates. Discussed at length was the question 
of our supporting the PBP Senatorial candidate in 
Minas Gerais, Mr. li:maro Lanari. It was decided tha.t 
the matter lay entirely with the state UDN organization. 
In a few days the state party council convened and 
voted to support Mr. Lanari 1 s candidacy. 
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Asked about UDN support for Mr. Salgado, who was seeking 
the senatorial chair for the state of Rio Grand.e do Sul, Mr. 
Braga replied that the matter was also to be settled on the 
state level. 
Several reporters then asked Mr. Braga to comment on 
reports that the :Brigadier, by accepting PEP support • had 
aliena.ted. certain elements within his own party. In answer 
to this question Mr. :Braga replied, 11 ••• I would refer such 
indi vid.uals to the words of the Divine Master when he said, 
~o_ se who are not against you are with you. t 1153 
53 11 0ffers o:f PSD t.o PBP Enough to Bring on Vertigo , 11 
Est ado de Sao Paulo , .July 29, 1950. 
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After all was said and done it could easily be discerned 
that promises of reciprocal support· had been exchanged and 
that the skeptics were quite correct in their cynical asser~ions. 
It is impossible to determine conclusively whether the 
DDN gained or lost votes as a result of its alliance with the 
PRP. However, a report which appeared in the Estado, early 
in September, revealed that the op~osition, eager to discredit 
the Brigadier, circulated posters bearing a photograph.of 
Gomes altered in such a manner that he ~pears to be wearing 
a green shirt. 54 Such efforts to brand by intimation the 
:Brigadier as an Integralist may have had some effect on those 
voters influenced by ideological considerations. But in 
Brazil, as in so many other Latin-American countries, few voters 
are par~icularly concerned with ideologies and most tend to 
vote for or against personalities rather than issues. 
Certainly, political expedience supplied much of the 
motivation for the alliance~ particularly in view of the in-
ability of the UDN and the PSD to find a common standard 
bearer, and the mounting. strength of the Vargas forces, but 
examination of Gomes' speech of acceptance of PRP support,in-
diaates that the Brigadier's political philosophy did not 
differ markedly from that of the PRP in certain rather 
54 11 The Communists and the Elections, 11 t'Estado de Sao 
Paulo, September 9, 1950, p. 3, cols. 6-8. 
211 
important particulars. 
The Government and the Communists 
-- --·-
Few realistic political observers believed that the 
official outlawing of the Communists in May, 1947, would bring 
their activities to an abrupt close. 'Yi\0!~: Lawrence, New York 
Times correspondent, estimated in January, 1950, that the 
Communists had a well-knit underground organization of perhaps 
40,000 to 50,000 card carrying members.55 
Throughout the campaign period there was a considerable 
amount of speculation as to which faction the Communists would 
support in the election. The belief generally held,early in 
the campaign, was that they would support Vargas. Indeed, it 
was asserted that Vargas had accepted Jo.ao Cafe Fi1ho as 
running mate only because the latter. reportedly held a franch-
ise on the Communist vote. Those who'held this view, pointed 
out that Cafe Filho was something" of a political liability 
since he was openly opposed by the Catholic Church.56 
This hypothesis was seemingly weakened in September, 
when reports of an alliance between the Communists and the 
Government Party began appearing in the press. .According to 
55 Lawrence, W.H., 11 :Srazils Reds Busy Though Outlawed, 1~ 
New York Times, January 2, 1950, 
56 "-Support of the Communists for Mr. Cristiano Machado 
and the Cotton Adventurer , 11 ·Est ado de Sao Paulo_, September 10, 
1950. . 
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the Est ado do Sao Paulo, the government had assured the Comnun-
ists that the registration of disguised Communists on legal 
party slates would be overlooked by the electoral tribunals 
if they would support Cristiano Machado for the presidency. 57 
Obtaining the government 1 s tacit sanction with·,·respect 
to the registration of their candidates with legally constituted 
parties represented a tremendous victory for the Communists. 
The speedy and. effective manner in which they took advantage 
of their newly gained lease on life is clearly revealed in the 
following item taken from the Estado. 
Rio, September 12, (Ey Phone) --Now ~hat the Dutra-
Prestes Pact is seal·ed the Communists have begun to 
organize 'Committees for Cristiano' all over the country. 
In Rio, the first of these is being put into operation 
by the university~£Udents of this city. Components 
of the. outlawed PCE.are being resurrected everywhere 
as a result of the ignoble doings of the Catete (Pres-
ident Dutra's official residence.) · 
While organized ostensibly for the purpose of sup-
porting the government's candidate, these committees 
·are more concerned with promoting the registration 
of Communist candidates in various legal parties •.. 
Upto the present the Communists have registered 
candidates in ten states with ten different parties, 
including the PSD ... 58 · 
The agreement between the government and the Communists 
soon became fraught with difficulties ana complexities. The 
opposition (UDN) press exposed many Communists registered on 
57 11 The Communists and the Elections,u 12.£ . .ill-
58 11 Communists Organize Committees for Cristiano,n Es~ado ~Sao Paulo, September 13, 1950. 
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legal party slates. In most cases the parties involved feigned 
surprise and indignation and requested the regional electoral 
tribunals to take action against the 11 infiltrators .'1159 However, 
most electoral officials took the view that the problem was 
largely one of internal party discipline and that the parties 
themselves were responsible for supervising their own tickets. 
The government party found itself in a damnably equiv-
ocal position. Certain elements in the party, having opposed 
the agreements with the Communists from the very beginning, 
threatened to bolt the party. They expressed grave concern 
over the possible alienation of the Catholic vote as a result 
of the recently contracted unholy alliance.60 Mindful of such 
complaints, Cristiano Machado reporte~ly asked the President 
to explain the situation to Cardinal Jaime Camara. The 
President's mission apparently was not in vain since Machado's 
name was included in the list of approved candidates issued 
by the Church a few weeks later. 61 
Meanwhile government spokesmen flatly denied that any 
agreement had been effected between the PSD and the Communist 
59 11 Communists Not Wanted,n Correia da Manha, September 
10, 1950. 
60 11 The Communists and the Elections ,u 212.· ill· 
61 
"Communists Organize Committees for Cristiano," 
gp_. cit. 
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party. Both President Dutra and Cristiano Machado expressed 
grave concern over substantiated reports of Communist infiltra~ 
tion of the B3D in certain states· and promised tha.t appropri~t.e 
action would be taken on the local leve1.62 Ebwever, the 
promised "housecleaning" never took plac~. 
Toward the end of September the situation was further 
co~licated when Luis Carlos Prestes issued a Manifesto on 
the elections in which be denounced all of the candidates, 
including Cristiano Machado, calling upon all of his followers 
to cast blank ballots as a protest against the enemies of the 
Brazilian working class.6.3 Thus it appears that both parties 
were intent on covering their tracks behind then, but the 
agreement remained in force nevertheless. at least insofar 
as the ISD was concerned. As we shall note shortly, the Comm~ 
unists characteristically effected a turnabout which was not 
apparent uhtil after the votes began to be counted. 
In the final analysis the PSD-FCR accord was ~sed 
on strict political expedience. In view of Vargas' mounting 
strength and of its failure to support a single candidate in 
conjunction with the UDN, the PSD was virtu~lly obliged to seek 
support from any group whatsoever, including the Commuhists. 
62 "Basis for the Accord Be:tween the Government and the 
Communists," Estado de Sao Paulo, September 17, 1950. 
6.3 "Policy of Despair, 11 Corre io da Manha, September 21, 
o. 
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As for the Communists, the matter of neutralizing the electoral 
tribunals in order that their candidates might safely register 
with the legally constituted parties, was. vitally important to 
them. Being the party currently in control of the government, 
only the PSD could guarantee the Communists that the tribunals 
would be so disposed. In short then, the arrangement m~ be 
said to have clearly resembled a carefully considered business 
arrangement. Certainly ideological considerations were totally 
absent. However, when worE: of the accord leaked out the 
government was subjected to a virtual barrage of snide comments 
voiced by the opposition press to the effect that the govern-
ment had fallen prey to the Communist Doctrine. The Estado 
commented, nSuch an alliance truly represents an abandonment 
of principle and symbolizes to the people of Brazil that the 
Communists have either ceased to be the enemies of Democracy 
or that Dutraism has replaced Stalinism.n64 
Election Day .Arrives 
On October 3, 1950, the s~irited electoral campaign 
which had been the focal point of Brazilian interest for the 
preceeding ten months, cameto an orderly and dignified close.65 
The Republic of Brazil had taken another long step forward 
64 liThe Ultimate in Political Facetiousness~" Estad.o ~ Sao Paulo, September 10, 1950. 
65 The only important disturbance occurring· in the city 
f a . o Mat a Grande, State of .A.Igoas, Supra, -o. 2~09. 
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in the direction of orderly self-government. Although the final 
tot~ls for the election were not issued until three months 
later, the earliest tabulations disclosed_ a pattern which re-
mained constant as the countingcontinu~d. Vargas came first; 
Gomes was next, with Machado a poor third. The official figures 
released by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal on January 18, 1951, 
were as follows: 
GetUlio Vargas 
Air :Brigadier E. Gomes 
Cristiano Machado 
3,829,560 
2,288,110 66 1,653,521 
Q Getulio tinha voltado (GetUlio haa returned.) 
Many of the causes leading to the decisive victory at-
tained by Getillio Vargas have already been discussed or' intimated 
in the preceding pages, but a certain amount of recapitulation 
and elaboration seems appropriate at this time. 
The ever-increasing inflation with its attendant rise 
in the cost of living and popular dissatisfaction was undoubtedly 
the most important single factor responsible for Vargas' 
success at the polls. According to statistics issued by the 
International Monetary Fund, taking 1937 as the base year, 
the index of the cost of living in the city of Sao Paulo, the 
nation's leading industrial center, jumped from 249 in 1945, 
66 " . " Vargas Proclaimed President, New York Times, January 
19 t 1~51. 
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to 402 as of April, 1950. 67 
The inability of the Dutra administration to check in-
flation represented its greatest failure. Although factors· 
outside the national economy were responsible for inflationary 
conditions in Brazil, the adndnistration did not follow a con-
sistently firm exchange control program. Throughout 1947, and 
the early part of 1948, a large part of reserves accumulated 
during the war years were expended on luxury goods and super-
fluous commodities. Subsequent efforts to clamp down on 
unnecessary imports, came much too late. 
The administrations ineptitude in this respect proved 
to be Vargas 1 · main political weapon in the campaign and he 
apparently convinced many voters of his ability to correct the 
situation should he be elected. This was the golden promise 
of the return to the good old days, when inflation was in its 
infancy. 
Shortly after the election. the Rio daily Q Globe 
quoted Vargas as saying that the heavy vote he had. received 
was attributable partly to the people's dissatisfaction with 
the present high living costs.68 
67 Cost of Living Index for the City of Sao Paulo. "In-
ternational Financial Sta,tistics ~ 11 May and· June, 1950, Inter-
national Monetary Fund, as cited by Jose F. Mart:fnez, Economic 
Developments in Brazil 1949-50, p. 65. 
68 11 Vargas Seen Forming a National Coalition," New 
York Times, October 10, 1950. 
218 
Another important factor in the Vargas victory wa~. the 
man r s infinite political skill, his patience and timing prior 
to and during the campaign. In contrast to the petty bickering 
and disorganization which characterized the efforts of opposition 
parties to organize a popular fro~t against him, Vargas merely 
bided his time carefully enlisting the support of powerful 
allies, such as the former governor of Sao Paulo. Adhemar de 
:Barros. 
Shortly after the vote-counting began it was learned 
that Vargas had also gained the support of two other signi-
ficant political factions. the POE amd a sizable segment of 
the PSD. It thus became apparent that the Communists' pledge 
of support to Machado had been purely nominal and that the 
government, by. neutralizing the electoral tribunals, had 
gained nothing.69 The Communist support of Vargas is extremely 
difficult to understand, in view of Prestes' order that his 
followers cast blank ballots, and the bitter criticism heaped 
upon Vargas by the Communists during the campaign. One possible 
explanation is that many Communists considered Vargas' victory 
a certainty and hoped ~hat by backing the winner they might 
look forward to gaining concessions in the future. 
The case of the PSD is not so involved. First of all, 
69 11 Communists Vot·e for GetUlio, u Oorreio da Manh.S:, 
October 20, 1950. 
• 
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many in the PSD were extremely dissatisfied wi tl:l. .. the weak and 
colorless Machado, and felt that since the party had been un-
able to gain any major s~~port from any of the more important 
parties, Machado • s cause was a lost one. It should also be 
recalled that many in the PSD had originally worked under the 
tutelage of GetUlio Vargas. .After the coup of October, 1945, 
the PSD became the haven of many of GetUlio's adherents.70 
It wcy- seem somewhat superfluous to add that Vargas in 
no wa:y underestimated his popularity ·with the masses. .Again 
and again. in 'his campaign speeches he clearly revealed that 
he had not lost his ability to address the people sympathetically, 
scoring the problems and difficulties which they constantly 
experienced in their daily lives. Ris promise of a return to 
the good old da:ys proved to be a sound analysis of what they 
desired. 
70 11 The 1945 Front was Reactivated Via a Trojan Horse , 11 
Correia ~ Ma.nha, October 7, 1950. -
, CHAPTER XI 
TEE BETU:BN OF VARGAS .AND THE FUTURE 
With the elections relegated to ~he past and the daily 
returns making it more and more apparent that Vargas was, 
in fact, President-elect, ~he opposition forces, and indeed 
most Brazilians, found themselves facing an uncertain f~ture. 
Indications were that Vargas himself was not entirely certain 
of the policies and programs which his government would pursue. 
Sheltered from the public at his Pazenda in Sao Borja, GetUlio 
limited his activities to receiving top PTB leaders and 
keeping abreast of election returns. He undoubtedly devoted 
much of his time to serious consideration of the many complex 
problems facing the nation at that time. 
Finally, on the twelfth of October, Vargas met with a 
group of reporters associated with the famed Brazilian news-
paper chain, D!arios Associados, owne~ and operated by 
Francisco de Assis Chateaubriand. Vargas used this occasion 
not only to claim the elections but also to indicate the 
general orientation which his government would adopt. Asserting 
that he had 11 come to power with a heart clean of hate and 
resentment, 11 the President-elect promised that he already had 
definite plans for making his new regime a government of 
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nevolution not revolution. 11 .Also claiming a parliamentary vic-
tory for the PTB, he declared that the party would represent 
the new mentality and spirit of progress that the Brazilian 
~eople desired so much. 1 
Coming to the ideological framework within which the 
new government would function, Vargas said 
I shall make a government of Laborite orientation 
on the example of what is occurring today in some 
of the most civilized and advanced countries in the 
world. I refer specifically to England and the 
Scandinavian countries , Sweden, Norway and Denmark, 
which are considered nations of model organization.2 
He promised that Brazil, under him, would continue to 
respect international commitments already made and would seek 
close collaboration with the countries of the Southern Remis-
phere and the improvement of South American continental 
solidarity. 
He denied that he harbored any ill feeling toward the 
United States, declaring that a small group of representatives 
and lawyers (Brazilians and foreigners) had "always tried 
to monopolize relations between Brazil and the United States, 
and had tried to create strife between the two countries .n3 
1 This claim later proved to be incorrect. 
lators in Congress placed third following the PSD 
Infra, p.2~Z. footnote No. 2~. 
PTB legis-
and the UDN, 
2 
nvargas Claims Election, Vows ±o Pu.t Brazil on Demo-
cratic Path in Laborite Direction," ~York Times, October 14, 
1950. 
3~. 
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He·promised to fight such groups and to promote the Good Neighbor 
Policy established by President Roosevelt, and now carried on 
by President Truman.4 
Vargas said that he favored foreign investment, both 
United States and European, but said that in the case of 
European capital his policy would depend on :Brazil 1 s avail-
ibility of exchange, and the question of transferring interest 
and amortization on such investments. He said, however, that 
he was against permitting foreign investment of "merely para-
si tical 11 capital in sectors that :Brazilian capital was capable 
of covering or in sectors that should be controlled by national 
capital "due to interests of national sovereignty or defense. n 5 
While Vargas 1 pronouncement temporarily served to calm 
those who had feru:ed that he was intent on sweeping away the 
constitutional basis upon which the Dutra government had been 
predicated, considerable criticism was voiced concerning the 
new Socialist orientation which Vargas claimed for his govern-
ment. The bulk of such criticism came from many traditional 
4 This was in keeping with the line which he had adopted 
during the campaign: After his initial blast against :Serle and 
:Braden in January, 1950, (Supra, Chap. X, pp. 189-90) he refrain-
ed from any further criticism against the United States. Indeed, 
it was said that reports. had reached proper channels indicating 
that if Vargas were elected there would be no major change in 
the heretofore cordial relations between :Brazil and the United 
States. 
5 11 Vargas Claims Election, Vows to Put :Brazil on Demo-
cratic Path in Labori te Direction , 11 .2:12.· cit. 
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economic liberals, mostly members of the PR and the UDN. Partic-
ular reference was made to the difficulties currently being ex-
perienced by the Labor regime in :Sri tain. The relatively 
immature development of :Brazil 1 s economy, the critics<argued, 
was entirely unsuited to the regimentation and control which a 
Socialist regime would entail. :Brazil was not at all ready to 
become a Sweden or Norway, they said. 
On the other hand, there is some question as to just 
how serious Vargas was in his declared intent to make :Brazil 
over in the Socialist image. Many observers were of the opin-
ion that this pronouncement was designed solely for po:pular 
consumption, There is little question that a regime premised 
on such a program would meet with considerable public favor. 
Vargas, in choosing the Scandinavian countries as models, 
chose rather well since all three have succeeded in working 
out what are generally accepted as rather efficacious solutions 
to many important social problems without going to extremes. 
Here were fine working examples of what could well be termed 
middle of the road regimes with something of a vias in favor 
of the working classes. Whether or not Vargas will be able 
to fulfill his promise of putting such a program into operation 
in Brazil~ remains to be seen. 
Efforts to Thwart Vargast Inauguration~ 
Early in November, the new President was obliged to de-
vote much of his attention to a more immediate and, insofar as 
he personally was concernedt more important political problem. 
Indeed his very status as President-elect was being threatened. 
It was reported that Federal Deputy Aleomar Eoleiro of the 
UDN had persuaded a number of his colleagues to support his 
allegation that Vargas had not been constitutionally elected. 
Deputy Eoleiro based his contention on the clause in the 
constitution which declared that a president must have a major-
ity of the votes cast. According to Eoleiro, the framers of 
the constitution had intended that such a majority be absolute, 
that is, more than 50 per cent of the total number of votes 
cast. 6 Although Vargas was well ahe~ of his nearest contender~ 
Eduardo Gomes, the combined total for Gomes and Machado was 
slightly greater.? 
Vargas in a statement to the press, declared that such 
efforts tn invalidate his election were suicidal maneuvers 
and that he placed his confidence in the integrity of hhe 
Superior Electoral Tribunal. 8 However, Vargas could hardly-
be expected to place his entire faith with the tribunal. 
Reports to the effect that GetUlio was busily enlisting the 
6 "Vargas Victory Disp¥-ted," New York Times, November 1, 
1950. 
17 S:rmra, chap~ X, p. 816. 
1950. 
8 11 Vargas Outlines, Reforms, 11 New~ Timesj November 8, 
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support of the various military leaders, soon filtered out of 
Rio. 9 For the moment, the opposition was checked but efforts 
to prevent Get-6lio • s inauguration on January 31, 1951, were 
still being actively considered. 
The opposition soon devised a more subtle technique when 
it began circulating petitions in Congress calling for an 
extension of the current session to March 9th, 1951, in order 
to complete the heavy load of work then facing the legislat~e. 
Incumbent legislators who had lost their posts in the October 
elections were scheduled to leave Congress on Inauguration 
Day (January 31~ 1951), although their successors were not to 
take office until March 14, 1951. 
Towards the end of November, it was reported that 177 
deputies had signed the petition requesting an extension and 
that it had been referred by the chairman of the Chamber to the 
Constitutional Committee for a ruling as to its legality.lO 
The immediate objective of this move was never made 
quite clear although it was known that the ultimate aim of the 
dissidents was to embaress Vargas and if possible, prevent 
his taking over th~ reins of government in January. It was 
reported that the malcontents even prevailed upon President 
9 11 Vargas Offsets Plot, 11 New York Times, November 19, 
1950. 
10 11Brazil Deputies Petition, 11 New York Times, November 22. 
1950. 
a as 
Dutra to aid. them in their cause. They argued that· since the 
constitution had not been ~ut into effect until Se~tember 18, 
1946, his term in office did not begin offi'cially until that 
date, and that he was therefore.entitled to remain in office 
until the eighteenth of t'September, 1951. The President cate-
gorically refused to endorse such a plan and reaffirmed his 
intention to turn his office over to Vargas on the scheduled 
date. 
The implications and inevitable consequences of these 
moves to ~revent Vargas from taking office, had they been 
successful, could not have brought anything but grief to the 
nation at large. Irrespective of the merit of the various 
charges and insinuations concocted'rby the opposition it can 
safely be affirme~ that the more than three million persons 
who cast their ballots for GetUl~o, f-ully expected their candi-
date to be duly installed in the Presidential Palace on the 
thirty-first of January. Should any of the proposals initiated 
by the dissenters take root, which did not prove to be the 
case, there is little question that GetUlio would have been 
able to call upon his supporters to·':nnforce the mandate they 
had registered at the polls in October. In short, Brazil 
would most likely have be~n ~lunged into a bloody civil war. 
The very fact that the opposition finally chose to overlook 
the issues· which it had raised, lends credence to this assertion • 
. ·_ ·~>', . : .. 
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Perhaps the opposition did not consider this the proper time 
for a civil war. 
It should be recalled that the :Brazilian economy was 
then doing very well. The Korean conflict which had broken 
out in June, created an immediate demand in the United States 
for many strategic raw materials which :Brazil was capable of 
supplying. What is more, world demand for :Brazil's chief 
export crop, coffee, was the highest in history due primarily 
to increased consumption in the United States, and a reviving 
European market. Obviously, a civil war at this particular 
time would have benefited no one. 
Meanwhile, Vargas continued living in isolation· at his 
fazenda de Itu at Sao Eorja,periodically releasing reports con-
cerning his plans for the future. On one such occasion he 
declared that he planned greater aid to poorly paid. workers 
and an improvement in their living standards. He added that 
he envisaged a nation wide plan for improved nutrition. Measures 
would also be taken to curtail exaggerated profits and that a 
better tax collection system would be devised.ll 
~-In a later interview granted to the Gazeta Sao Paulo 
~~--
Vargas gave some indication as to his intended plans in the 
fields of exchange control, labor and agricultural development. 
11 "Vargas Outlines Reforms," New York Times, 212.· cit. 
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He declared that one of his first acts would.be to revamp the 
foreign exchange system which he called deficient. He said 
that he hoped to kill the dollar black markets. Respecting 
labor, he said that :Brazil had ample labor legislation but that 
wages would have to be adjusted in order to meet high prices. 
He also discussed plans for a rural bank to stimulate agricultural 
production. 12 
No further major announcements were forthcoming from 
president-elect Vargas until after the eighteenth of January, 
when the Superior Electoral Tribunal officially proclaimea 
Vargas the duly-elected President of the Republic ana Joao 
Cafe Filho, as vice-I>resident. The Tribun~l ruled that under 
the constitutional definition of a majority, Vargas, by attain--
ing a majority over his closest opponent, had earned the 
right to take over the office of chief executive on the 
thirty-first.13 
On the nineteenth of January, at Campo Jord.ao, in the 
state of Sao Paulo, Vargas held his first official press 
conference. Covering a multitude of topics, Vargas asserted 
that he was extremely anxious to organize a national coalition 
government. He said, 11 There is much to be done in :Brazil and 
1950. 
12 uvargas Outlines Plans, 11 ~ York Times, November 29, 
13 uvargas Proclaimea President," New York Times, 
January 19, 1951. 
--
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only by the union of all Brazilians . can that be accomplished. 11 
Vargas emphasized that only such a coalition could successfully 
counteract the Communists whq he charged, had lately been 
trying to foster unrest in the country through advocating 
a so-called peace conference and attacking t~e United States. 
This last statement clearly reveals Vargasl acute sense of 
timing and great political skill. Although election returns 
indicated that many Communists had cast their ballots for 
t\.,e 
GetUlio, despite the fact thatAparty leadership had officially 
denounced him, Vargas chose to overlook their voting support 
and utilize their official opposition to him as justification 
for his firm stand against them and all their works.l~ What 
is more, this move is a further indication of his intention 
to court the favor of the United States. 
·Asked about the inflationary situation in the country, 
the new President asserted that he could not perform miracles. 
uHowever, 11 he said, uby combatting the black market and 
eliminating the handicaps in product-ion now facing farmers 
and by supplying better transport, the cost of living should · 
drop. ul5' 
Vargas went on to state that although national industry 
14 Supra, chap. X, p. 218. 
15 11New Brazilian President To Try To Out Costs. Vargas 
to back U.S. Aim on Reds in .Americas, 11 New York Times, 
January 20, 1951. 
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should be helped, he opposed high tariff protection fo:r such 
industries that did not produce enough for the domestic market. 
However, he felt that national prod.uction_of steel and rubber 
should be protected and e:x:panded.l6 
The New :Bureaucracy ~ Congress 
Finally, Inauguration Day arrived amid jubilant demon-
strations by the rank and file of Vargas 1 adherents. High 
ranking diplomats representing forty~nine sovereign states 
were present at the ceremonies which culminated with the 
admininstration of the presidential oath by ~ernando Melo 
Vianna, President of Congress. After the new chief executive 
promised to maintain, defend and fulfill the Constitution of 
the Republic, observe its laws, promote the welfare of :Brazil, 
support the Federal Union, its integrity and its independence, 
Mr. Vianna, in the name of Congress, declared GetUJ.io V~gas and 
Joao Cafe Fi1ho duly inaugurated as President and Vice-President 
respectively. 
Vargas then delivered an address in which he praised 
General Dutra as having earned the thanks of the :Brazilian 
people for having led an administration that culminated in a 
model election. It thus appears that Vargas had momentarily 
dropped the bitterness and rancor which had characterized his 
16. ttl{ew :Brazilian President 
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denunciation of the Dutra administration during the electoral 
campaign. Perhaps now that he was duly inaugurated he could 
afford to show a little magnaminity. Vargas also promised 
a fight on the high cost of living as the primary aim of his 
domestic policy. Earlier in the day at a crowded open air 
press conference. Vargas had promptly replied to a g_uestion 
as to his assertion a year ago that his downfall in 1945, had 
been due to the influence of Adolf A. Berle, Jr. , then United 
States Ambassador, and Spruille Braden, then Assistant Secretary 
of State for Latin American Affsirs.l7 The new President 
replied, 11My original statement fully explained my point of 
view on the matter. I merely want to add that the traditional 
and permanent relations of frEendship between the United 
States and Brazil were in no way affected by the attitude of 
any individual officials, who may have misinter:pr~ted those 
ideal and served them badly.nl8 
This reply represented an official confirmation of 
earlier reports that United States-Brazilian relations would 
not be subjected to any radical changes; but apparently, Vargas 1 
personal enmity towards Messers. Berle and Braden continued 
unabated. 
17 Supra, Chap. X, pp. 189-90. 
18 Mil ton Bracker, 11 Vargas is Sworn in as President. 
Pledges Closest .Amity with U.S. ,n New York Times, F-ebruary 1, 
1951. 
The composition of the new President 1 s cabinet, made 
public on Inauguration Day, confirmed earlier statements by 
Vargas that his government would be organized on the basis of 
a national coalition. 
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Only one member of the new cabinet was a member of Vargas' 
own PTE. Four were drawn from Eurico Dutra's PSD, one from 
Adhema)p.e :Barros• PSP and another from Eduardo Gomes 1 UDN. 
The ministers representing the various branches of :Brazil's 
armed services were non-political and were chosen in accordance 
with nominati0n-s made by the departments of War, Navy and 
Aeronautics, respectively.l9 The names and party affiliation 
of the members of the new cabinet follow: 
Foreign Affairs - Joao Neves da Fontaura (PSD) 
Justice - Francisco Negrao de Lima (PSD) 
Transportation and Public Works - Alvaro Pereira de Souza 
Lima (PSP} 
Labor, Industry and Commerce- Danton Coelho (PTE) 
~iculture - Joao Cleofas (UDN) 
Education and Health - Ernesto Simoes Filho (PSD) 
Finance - HOracia Laf er (P~} 
War - General Newton Estilae,; Leal 
Nayy - Admiral Nelson Guilhobel 
Aeronautics - :Brigadier Nero Moura 
The appointment of Joao Cleofas of the UDN was of 
particular importance since the UDN was the only party which 
refused to join forces with the PTE in Congress.20 However, 
19 Hispanic American Report, for January, 1951, Vol. IV, 
No. 2, pp. 37-38. 
20 On January 29, the PSD announced that it would support 
the Vargas administration, thus assuring the new President of a 
strong and substantial majority in Congress, since, the PSP. ll,eldS.y. 
• • • ,,.. ........... :!'' 
' . _,.~ / ~;~~~:,;~~~8A::. 
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if GetUlio • s appointment of Mr. Cleofas was based on hopes of 
gaining the sup~ort of the UDN, the move was not successful 
since latest reports emanating from Brazil would seem to indi-
cate that the party of Air Brigad~er: Gomes still functions as 
the sole opposition pa?y in Congress. 
Other important appointments announced at this time ~n-
eluded millionaire lead king Bicardo Jafet (PSP) aa President 
of the ]arik of Brazil, General Giro de Rezendes as Chief of 
Police for Rio)and Lourival Fontes as head of the president 1 s 
civil staff. Fontes was formerly director of the Department of 
Information and Propaganda (DIP) from 1937 to 1942. The posi-
tion of prefect or mayor of Bio remained in the hands of Angelo 
Mendes de Morais.21 
the largest number of seats, followed by the UDN. ~argas's 
party, the PTE is third and that of .A.dhemar de Barros is fourth. 
Close ties between the PSD and the PTE seemed assured with the 
election of .Amaral Peixoto as National Chai>rma.n of the PSD. 
Peixoto, who was elected governor of the state of Rio de 
Janeiro, is married to Vargas's influential daughter, Alzira. 
(See Hispanic Ameri~an Reports for January and March, 1951, 
Volume IV, No., 2, p. 38, and No.4~ p. 45.) According to 
a dispatch entitled, 11 Envoys of 40 Lands Will Honor Vargas, n 
which appeared in the New York Times on the thirtieth of 
January, 1951, Vargas also succeded in winning the support of 
Plinio Salgado's PRP. The PRP shift represents a very curious 
political maneuver, since many of the old line Integralistas in 
the party were avowed enemies of Vargas, having suffered griev-
ously an his account during the late thirties, proving once again, 
that political ideologies mean little in Brazil, and that most 
political factions in the country operate primarily on the basis 
of opportunism. 
21 Hispanic AmericmReport for January, QJ2... cit., p. 38. 
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The appointment of General Pedro Aurelio de Goes Monteiro 
to the post of Chief of Staff of Brazil's armed forces in Feb-
:u 
ruary, came as something of a surprise. General Monteiro, it 
will be recalled was one of the chief plotters of the couo of 
October, 1945, which resulted in Vargas•s enforced retirement 
to his fazenda in Rio Grande do Sul. ~> This is another excellent 
example of Vargas•s skill in juggling former friends and enewies. 
The influence of Vargas's political ally, Ad.b.emar de Barros, 
seemed to be waning. It had been expected that Dr. de Barros. 
would be given a ministerial post or the prefecture of the city 
of Rio de Janeiro, but his name was not proposed for any of these 
positions.23 It was reported that Adhemar had, however, accepted 
an offer to become the first Brazilian, post-war ambassador to 
Germany. .As of this writing, he had not yet assumed the post. 
With respect to t4e latter post, it was reported that De Barros 
would not accept a non-elective position. According to the 
Constitution of 1946, the president is authorized to appoint 
the prefect of the national capital. 
22 Eisnanic American Report for February, 1951, Vol. IV, 
No. 3~p .. 3~. 
23 Ibid., p. 33. 
I 
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The New Government's Social and Economic Policies. 
---- . --
With the round of inauguration formalities and the fest~-
vities of the pre-Lenten carnival out of the way, President 
Vargas set about implementing the program which he had previously 
enunciated in his brief encounters with the press and the few 
occasions on which he had delivered formal speeches. 
In the field of labor legislation, Vargas approved a 
recommendation of the new labor minister, Danton Coelho, which 
urged immediate revamping of ~razil 1 s labor laws. Coelho 
stressed the necessity of extending the benefits of labor legis8 
lation to rural workers as: a means of stopping the great exodus 
from farms to cities which is seriously hurting agricultural 
production. Re futher pointed out the need to roquaint both 
employers and employees with their mutual obligations andre-
sponsibilities. 24 
On March 16, 1951, President Vargas submitted to a joint 
session of Co~ress, a 264-page address on the state of the union. 
The President again underlinei the major aims and gbjectives of 
his a:lministration. Re declared that a major aim of his govern-
ment would be the realization of economic and social democracy 
through protection for the worker and the improvement of the 
Irving conditions of the masses. With respect to international 
24 Hispanic .American Report for February, 1951, loc. cit. 
• 
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affairs, the President pledged Brazil to military and economic 
collaboration with the democratic nations, especially those of 
the Western Hemisphere. 
Much of the message was devoted to economic, social, and 
financial affairs. The two main objectives of the government 
in these fields, Vargas declared, would be the lowering of the 
cost of living by combatting inflation, and creating new sources 
of production and employment through a program of industrial and 
agricultural expansion. In order to stimulate agricultural pro-
duction and to curtail the rural exodus, :he :proposed social 
legislation to give farm workers benefits equivalent to those 
enjoyed in industry. He also :promised to encourage immigration, 
improve :public health, education, labor and social security, as 
well as housing. 
With reference to foreign capital, Vargas declared him-
self in favor of the entry of all foreign capital which is 
:prepared to cooperate in the development of basic industries 
and the creation of new ones which would utilize Brazilian 
raw materials. His sole opposition to private foreign capital 
would be in fields already taken care of by domestic capital or 
in areas which should be controlled by domestic dapital in order 
to protect the national interest • 
President Vargas endorsed, in :principle, the foreign 
exchange and import control policies initiated by General Dut~. 
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He declared that these policiew saved needed foreign exchange 
and stimulated economic development at home by encouraging es-
sential imports and restricting the importation of u_~ecessary 
i terns. His administration would not only continu.e··.bhem, but 
would implement them with the utmost determination, thus correct-
ing the previous administration's abyssmal failure in this regard. 
Vargas noted that the continuing preponderance of agri':-' 
01\~ 
cultural products such as coffee, cotton,~cocoa a~ong Brazil's 
exports, clearly indicated that the Brazilian economy was still 
extreme:tt dependent on external market conditions. -He therefore 
urged that e~ports be diversified, new markets discovered, and 
old ones broadened in conjunction with increased production in 
all fields.25 
One of the most pressing problems facing the new admini-
stration was that of public finances. Upon taking office in 
February, Finance Minister Horacia Lafer, one of the nation's · 
leading industrial~-:; · figures, found that the nation faced a 
deficit of seven billion cruzeiros. He immediately set about 
devising a. p~an to balance the budget. In essence, the plan 
provides for the reduction of non-essential government expenses, 
close coordination among the various governmental departments 
to avoid duplication, and improved tax collecting techniques. 
25 Hispanic American Reports for March and April, Vol. IV, 
No. 4, p. 46, and No. 5, pp. 34-35. 
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.According to the Treasury, this last proposal would bring in 
an additional five billion cruzeiros annually, since current 
26 
tax measures are flagrantly violated. 
In an effort to make good on his promises to check 
inflation, Vargas has sought to restrict the amo·unt of cur-
rency in circulation. Not only will no new currency be issued, 
but approximately nine billion cruzeiros, released by the pre-
vious administration, will be recalled. Vargas has asserted that 
new national production will be financed by borrowing from 
federal savings banks and the national insurance institutes, 
rather than through currency emissions. Other measures to be 
adopted in the fight against inflation include credit control, 
increased production of basic necessities and controls against 
commodity speculation. Efforts to implement such a program 
call for the granting of extensive powersto the Uentral Price 
Commission, which suffered such neglect at the hands of the 
previous administration, that it was forced to suspend opera-
tions in December, 195o.27 
The stimulation a:r,?.d development of national agricultural 
and industrial development, another primary objective of the 
Vargas regime, is to be fostered by a liberal government qredit 
policy administered by the Eanlc of Brazil. Small and large 
26 Hispanic .American Renort,for April, 1951, p. 36. 
27 Hisnanic American Report for April, lee. cit. 
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producers in basic industry and those engaged in the produc-
tion of materials which are not easily procured abroad, will 
be a~le to obtain credit readily. Farm cretlit for the purchase 
of machinery, fertilizers, et cetera, will also be made avail-
28 able. 
There have been indications that the new government plans 
to undertake a rather ~read agrarian reform program. A report 
issued by Minister of Agricutture, Joao Cleofas, based on a 
two-month, nationwide survey, indluded several noteworthy 
recommendations. Included among these were: 1) populating 
isolated, but productive farm regions with farm workers; 
2) mechanization of agricultural practices; 3) expansion of 
tr8.l';:lsport facilities throughout the country. 29 
Brazilians who have been wary of Vargas since he took 
office in January, expressed grave concern when the President 
asked for legislation granting·him broad economic powers, and 
Labor Minister Danton Doelho, addressing the National Convention 
of the PTB, declared that constitutional reform was imperative 
to enable the President to carry out his program of national 
reconstruction. Mr. Coelho went on to say, "President Vargas 
cannot carry out his promises to the people ... if Brazilian 
28 Ibid. • p. 37 
29 11Agricul tural Reform is Planned in Brazil, 11 New York 
Times, April 10, 1951. 
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La.borites are "Wlable to destroy the shackles that are holding him.n30 
The national directorate of the UDN issued a formal 
statement declaring that the party was opposed to any proposed 
constitutional reforms.31 The Rio newspaper, Diario Carioca, 
strongly opposed PTB plans for constitutional reform, de-
claring that such reform would serve as a base for Hperonizingll 
Brazil, and also charged that Vargas was seeking to institute 
a socialistic era.3~ 
The·economic controls requested by the President were 
incorporated in three bills submitted to Congress, late in May. 
The first, was designed to empower the government with the ne-
cessary authority for buying basic commodities directly from 
the producer, and selling them directly to the consumer, when-
ever high prices or shortages made consumer buying difficult. 
The second., concerned the reorgani-zation of the Central Price 
Commission, while the third, would strengthen existing regula-
tions against commodity speculation. Opponents of the bills 
contended that such measures would place control over the 
sources of vital food supplies into Vargast hands, thus giving 
him a stranglehold upon the people. However, UDN party leaders, 
30 11Jlide Asks Changes to Free Vargas. 11 New York Times, 
June 10, 1951. 
31 Hispanic American Report for June, 1951, Vol. IV, No. 7, 
p. 37. 
32 11 Vargas Foes Warn of Dictatorship , 11 New York Times, 
June 17, 1951. 
241 
being aware of the need for some form of controls for checking 
rising living costs, finally agreed to support the measures 
proposed by Vargas. 33 
The bill dealing with commodity speculation was passed 
by Congress later in the month. The new law provided that per-
sons found guilty of such speculation would be subject to fines, 
impD±sonment, or both. In addition, the Minister of Finance 
instructed all ba.nks, holding deposits guaranteed by the govern-
ment, to refuse loans to any merchant fou.'lld guilty of having 
taken advantage of present market conditions to increase his 
prige. Since most speculators operate on borrowed funds, pur-
chasing goods at low prices and holding them for higher prices, 
34 
'such a plan'fcaused considerable concern among them. 
The administration won another victory when the Chamber 
of Deputies, by a vote of 120 to 69, agreed to modify the SALTE 
Plan. 35 The administration had considered the plan too extensive 
in view of Erazil's present financial condition. Only that part 
of the program Which was considered currently feasible was approved. 
Public projects already under way and new projects con~idered 
neceasary were confirmed, but the Chief Executive was instructed 
33 Hispanic American Report for June, ~· cit., p. 38. 
34 
"Erazil Will Punish Speculators In Food, 11 New York 
Times, June 20, 1951. 
35 Hispanic American Report for June, loc. cit. 
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to eliminate non-essentials from Dutra's old.five-year plan. 36 
In line with the administration's campaign to check 
inflation, the Minister of Finance announced, towards the end 
of June, that plans for revising the import licensing system 
were being developed. The objective of the new plan would be 
to increase the supply from abroad of scarce goods, thus 
lowering~ currently exorbitant prices. The importation of 
articles similar to those produced in the country would be 
permitted, whenever domestic production proved incapable of 
meeting the normal demand at reasonable prices. In order to 
prevent speculation by wholesale and retail distributore:,of 
such imported goods, resale ppices would be established by the 
government, assuring the merchants a reasonable margin of profit. 
The adop.tion of this policy does not in!icate that the govern-
ment plans to abandon trade controls; restrictions on non-essential 
goods are expected to continue in force.37 
Brazil and the Fourth Inter-American Conference of Foreign '.M'..inisters. 
In the field of international relations, the new govern-
ment 1 s most important activity was its participation at the 
Fourth Inter-American Conference of Foreign :Ministers, which 
opened in Washington, D. C., on March 26, 1951. Fore~ Minister 
36 11Brazil Will Punish Speculators in Food, 11 New York 
Times, o-o~cit. 
37 His-panic American Re-port for June,~· cit.,:PP· 38-39. 
•• 
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.Joao Neves de Fontoura began pt:lreparing agenda on economic and 
social matters as early as December, 1950. Both President Vargas 
and Minist.er Fontu:ura have made it clear on various occasions 
that Brazil does not intend to repeat the errors of 1942, when 
Brazilian production of eB'sential raw materials for export was 
stepped up tremendously, while the importation of vitally 
needed manufactures (primarily from the United States) waned 
and eventually came to a virtual standst~ll. In his sp~ech 
accepting h~s post as Foreign Minister in the Vargas cabinet, 
Mr. Fontoura succinctly SUTh~arized the government's attitude 
towards the present world crisis. 
11 The depository of a large treasure of economic 
possibilities and of raw materials indispensible to 
the life of other nations, Brazil will know how to 
preserve this treasure against any foreign domina-
tion. We shall fight on a basis of equality for the 
establishment of a policy of reciprocal advantages 
in all domains so that the efficient development 
of our riches may be realized. Particular attention 
will be paid to our economic emancipation and to the 
industrialization within Brazil of our raw materials 
so as to raise the standard of living of Brazilians, 
enlarge the domestic market, and create new items 
for export in addition to agricultural products and 
minerals. tl 
Minister Fontoura further stated that the nation's needs must 
be 11 heeded and understood and met by our powerful ally, the 
United States . 1138 Here in effect was an affirmation that Brazil 
would be willing to cooperate with the United States during the 
current emergency, in return for guarantees by the United States 
38 Hispanic American Report for February, 1951, ~· cit., p. 34 
244 
that basic materials essential to Brazilian industry would be 
supplied at reasonable cost. 
Hopes that Brazilian demands would be met were bolstered 
by the arrival in Rio of Secretary of state for Latin America, 
Edward Miller, on the nineteenth of February. Secretary Miller, 
who spent five days in the nation 1 s capital, met with President 
Vargas and Foreign Minister Fontoura and discussed a program 
for joint economic, military and political cooperation between 
Brazil and the United States. The talks were deemed quite 
satisfactory by Brazilian officials since Secretary Miller 
assured the new government that the United States stood ready 
to aid Brazil in its defense and the development of its economy 
by and for Brazilians.39 
Shortly after the arrival of the Brazilian delegation 
in Washington, it was disclosed that Minister Fontoura had been 
selected to reply to President~ Truman 1 s welcoming address pri-
marily because Brazil had been host to the last Foreign Ministers 
Conference which met in Rio in 194~. Fontoura, in his reply~ 
stressed the necessity for placing probla~s of economic coopera-
tion ahead of those concerned only with military and political 
matters. Recognizing the Brazilian Minister's competence in 
dealing with economic problems, the Conference elected him 
chairman of the Committee on Economic Cooperation.40 
33 Ibid., p. 35. 
40 Hispanic American Report for March, 1951, ~cit., 43-44. 
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After the close of the Conference members of the Brazilian dele-
gation publicly expressed satisfaction with the results of the 
meeting. Euvaldo Lodi, president of the National Confederation 
of Industry, upon his return to Rio, told reporters that Brazil 
had been able to obtain approval for all of the fundamental 
points which it had presented to the Conference, while Minister 
Fontoura, in an address to the Pan American Society in New Y~rk 
City, also expressed satisfaction with the results of the meeting. 41 
However, wide discontent was voiced in Brazilian circles over 
the unilateral action taken by the United States government in 
establishing ceiling prices on ~azil's major export crop, coffee. 
Brazilian producers charged that they had not been given any 
opportunity to present their case. They have contended that 
the ~rice rise was not attributable to the XGmean War, and should 
not be subject to the same rollbacks as other goods. 42 
Argentine~razilian Relations 
One phase of the new governmentrs foreign policy, its 
relationship with Argentina, has evoked considerable apprehension 
in certain ~uarters, both in Brazil and in the United States. 
Almost as soon as it became known that Get~io Vargas would be 
a caadidate for the Brazilian Presidency, some observers in the 
41 His~anic American Re~ort for April, 1951, o~. cit., p. 38, 
42 Hispanic American Report for July, 1951, Vol. IV,, No. 8, 
pp. 47-48. 
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United States opined that a Vargas victory might well result 
in a rapprochement between Vargas and Argentinats General Juan 
D. Peron. Certain events occurred during the campaign which 
did lend credence to such allegations. 
In a speech delivered before a group of visiting Brazil-
ian students on J~y 17, 1950, General Per6n argued for the 
unification of Argentina and Erazil, as well as Chile, as a 
defense against imperialism. In part. General Per6n asserted, 
11 The only solution for these countries (Argentina, 
Brazil ~~d.Chile) is union- a really very simple matter. 
If our countries chose to unite, they can first do 
so economically and then proceed in terms of greater 
unity, or they can unite all at once, in all fields 
and thus present a united front against the battles 
of the4future ... (by implication between the East and West.) 3 
During the Brazilian campaign the peronista press strongly 
attacked the policies of outgoing President Dutra, while vigor-
ously supporting the candidacy of Get~io Vargas. The Correio 
da Manha, a Rio daily of high prestige, which supported Eduardo 
Gomes r candidacy analysed Peron r s motives thus: 
u ••• What Per6n seeks to accomplish is to tie Brazil 
to Argentina in order to promote his adventurous 
foreign policy with respect to the continent, secur-
ing alliances with us for the sole purpose of realiz-
ing his delirious dream of becoming the leader of 
South .America. 11 44 
A week after election day, President-elect Vargas visited 
43 , , 
"General Peron Addresses Brazilian Students, 11 La. Nacion, 
Buenos Aires, July 20, 1950. 
44 11 ~rossness and Insolence," Correio da Manha, October 10, 
1950. 
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the fazenda of a certain Mr. Joao ~atista Luzardo, former 
Ambassador of ~razil to Argentina and intimate friend.of 
General.Per6n. Luzardo and his guest were subse~uently vi-
sited by a contingent of important dignitaries from the Argen~ 
tine. Included in the Argentine delegation were Mr. Hortensia 
Quijano, Vice President of Argentina and General Velasco, 
Governor of the province of Corrientes.45 The purpose of this 
extra-official meeting was never made public, but informed 
sources have claimed that Vargas and Quijano merely discussed 
the pessibility of future trade agreements between the two 
countries.46 
In his address of October 12, in which he claimed vic-
tory in the elections, Vargas pledged strict collaboration with 
the nations of the Western Hemisphere. The Correia da Manhli, 
asserting that this statement was much too ambiguous, had this 
to say: 
11Mr. Vargas pledges t strict collaboration' with 
the nations of our hemisphere. With which nations 
of the hemisphere? With the United States of Roose-
velt, or with the Argentina of Peron? 
In truth, he cannot be referring to the former. 
No form of rinsp1ration 1 can erase from the memory 
of the ~razilian people, the famous, and indeed 
notorious, discourse given on the day of Riachuelo 
of 1940, in which the president~dictator declared 
war on the rpetrified spirit 1 of the Democrats 
Wilson and Roosevelt, thereby opening our doors to 
the material and spiritual influence of those Fascist 
45 "Vargas Confers with Argentine Vice President," Correia 
da Manha, August 15, 1950. 
46 11Argentine Advisor?,lt Correia da Manha; October 20, 1950. 
countries in another hemisphere which is not ours. 
Today that same fascism lies adjacent to the 
fazenda de Itu. The collaboration referred to 
by Mr. Vargas represents collaboration in the 
sense in which it was used in France by the 
French traitors. It is the promise of the be-
trayaJ. of our country. n47 
In February, a series of talks between Minister Joao 
Fontoura Neves and the Argentine Foreign Minister Hipolito 
Jes~s Paz resulted in the signing of a new, far-reaching 
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trade and friendship agreement between the two countries which 
is expected to help remove the suspicions and misunderstandings 
that have contaminated their past relations, and institute a 
new era of mutual trust ~~d good will.48 
According to an item which appeared in the Brazilian 
Embassy's Washington Bulletin for August L, of this year, 
General Peron is scheduled to visit Brazil early in 1952 to 
sign a long'"""term .A.rgentine-Br~zilian trade agreement, which the 
Bulletin reports, will be completed in February or March of next 
year.49 
'While the various incidents·related above have lent ere-
dence to the view that a Vargas~Peron alliance might materialize, 
there are certain factors which tend to belie this hypothesis. 
47
nvargas and his· Ten Points, 11 Correia d.a Manhi_, October 14, 
1951. 
· 
48 Hispanic American Re-port for February, 1951, £12.· cit. , p. 35. 
The contento: of these agreements was not discussed in the Report. 
49 :IDnba.ixada do Brasil ~ Washington :Bole tim, Radiote1egra.fico 
do Ministerio das Relaqoes Exteriores, August 1, 1951. 
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First of all, those who hold this position assume that Varg53-f}~ .. 
will follow Peron's lead in any such accord. In view of Vargas's 
past performance, this appears rather unlikely. Certainly, 
Peron himself must be fully aware of the fact that GetUlio Vargas 
is the only political fig~e in Latin America capable of chal-
lenging his pretensions. It should also be recalled that 
Argentine-Brazilian relations have traditionally been rather 
cool, if not bitter. 
Those in the United States who have expressed concern 
over a possible Argentine-Brazilian entente harbor a decided 
fear that such CF6Ilove will greatly weaken the economic bar-
gaining position of the United States in~.i ts dealings with these 
governments. It is argued that in view of the present world 
crisis, such a turn of events would be particularly unfort~~ate. 
Vargas's attack against United States diplomats Braden and Berle 
in January of 1950, did not apparently bode well for the future. 
It did, indeed, appear that Vargas would make 11Yankee interven--' 
tionism11 a live campaign issue, lining up squarely behind Peron 
on this theme. However, as we have already noted, such fears 
proved to be without foundation. Vargas not only ·dropped the 
matter very hurriedly, but has given every indiaation of his 
intent to maintain cordial relations with the United States. 
It cannot be asserted with absolute certainty that Vargas is 
completely immune to the :ireology emanating from the. Rio de La 
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Plata, but it is quite apparent that he does recognize American 
economic power. 
The New Regime and the Dutra Heritage. 
At this writing, the new Vargas government has been in 
power for some nine months. During this relatively short period 
of time, the regime has not gone nar beyond ~rawing up, and in 
a few cases initiating, its general program for meeting some of 
Brazil's more pressing economic and social needs. On the whole, 
the government's policies for cuTiing inflation, bolstering 
industrial and agricultural production, improving transportation 
and balancing the federal budget, et cetera, have followed what 
are generally considered to be orthodox lines. 
Vargas 1 s selection of cabinet ministers ·.would also seem 
to indicate that no'·; sharp changes in the traditional economic 
and political direction of affairs are being contemplated, at 
least for the time being. However, his appointment of Horacia 
Lafer and Ricardo Jafet, both important industrial figures, as 
Minister of Finance and President of the Earik of Erazil, respec-
tively, would seem to indicate that the nationrs industrial mag-
nates will enjoy considerable official support. 
It should be borne in mind that the President's party, 
the PTB, constitutes a minority force in the present Congress, 
ranking third aftter the PSD and the UDN~ This situation calls 
for a wide degree of prudence and co~ciliation of the part of 
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the Chief Elcecuti.ve:, i..f an effective coalition is to be 
maintained. 
lutionary. program .have, . UJildoubtedly'-' ·· suffered ·. c-endidera~le dis-
app0intment. Howef'er:, President· V';argas· hims·elf ha:s maintained 
that he. should .not be · eons'ider:ed a· worker of·1II±racles·, and 'it 
seems apparent ·that many·])0Wer:fu:l elements i.n the ·count-ry- 'Would 
rise to oppose the President· should he· choose te adopt such a 
role •. However, it has· been .conjectured-that the· ·disappointment 
of the masses over ·Vargas·•. failure to take·· rapid· steps··te im-
prove their let· may:pram.pt·~··hfnr·te reverse ·his present· ·ceurse, 
even at the risk o:f challenging the op])Ositien -to a bitter, 
list ditch battle in the legislature. There a:re t·hose 'Whe ·con-
, 
tend that the new President :·might .·even hazard effecting a coup-
similar .to that. of tNov.emb'er·, ·19.37,·· and again· rule witheut·· 
benefit of Congress. Those 'Who hold. this view attach eensiderable 
importance to Danten Coelho:' s. ca:ll, in June·, for constituti.ona:l. 
.reform, in order to giv:e President Vargas. sUfficient power to 
enable. him.. .to fulfill. his .promi~res:--te the pe0ple. 50 ,Altheugh 
Mr. Coelho diG: not· :indieate .. precisely :what· reforms might ·be 
. necessary, th0se .of the oppesit:ien:have.mainta'ined·that the Vargas 
government. is. ihtent upon emasculating. the. natioa r s fundamental law 
50 SUpra, PP• 239-40. 
• 
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in such a manner as to provide the President with dictatorial 
powers . 
Early in Beptember, news of Minister Coelho's resigna--
tion came as a distinct surprise to many observers both in 
Brazil and in the United States. CoeThho,had been president of 
the PTB until June, of this year, when he relinquished his post 
to President Vargas. The sole member of the Cabinet affiliated 
with the PTB, Mr. Coelho was reported to be one of ~argas 1 s 
closest friends and advisors. 51 According to the opposition 
press, the Minister had recently been upbra!ded by the President 
for failing to expedite the construction of low cost housing units 
for workers. Vargas was particularly anxious~ to discover what 
disposition had been made of the money lent by the workers' 
savings banks for such purposes. It was said that he had called 
for an investigation. It has been contended that a full-dress 
crisis may not be too far off, since other ministers and top 
officials have allegedly received notes asking for information 
on pending matters and demanding explanations as to why such 
matters have not been handled with greater dispatch. 52 The 
opposition has sought to make capital of this situation by 
51 
lfVargas' Moves Watched, 11 ~ York Times, September 7, 1951. 
52 Loc. 6it. 
• 
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asserting that Vargas is back to his old. tricks, and. is gra.d.u-
ally trying to take over all important functions. 
All of these dire interpretations of President Vargas' 
future course of action are, of course, strongly colored by his 
previous. record, particularly during the era of the Estado Novo. 
This continual harking back to the past creates a situation 
whereby the opposition is extremely aensitive to even the slight-
est suggestion that the Presid.ent may overstep his constitutional 
limits. This state of affairs makes it extremely d.ifficult for 
the outsid.e observer to place much stock in ·reports of a rad.ical 
shift in the course of what, up to now, has been generally con-
sidered. a rather cautious regime operating along democratic 
constitutional lines, Whether Presid:ent Vargas t desire to ful-
fill his campaign promises will supply him with sufficient motiva-
tion for- sloughing off the democratic processes restored by the 
Constitution of 1946, is of course, a question which only time 
can answer. However~ we should not lose sight of the fact that 
Erazil has been travelling along the democratic path since the 
coup of October, 1945, Shortly after the election of Eurico Dutra 
in December of that year, all of the major institutions of re-
presentative government were restored and. they have functioned. 
more or less successfully since that time. There have beemmany 
other ind.ications that the democratic tradition is becoming d.eeply 
rooted in the national consciousness. 
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In the past six years, Brazil has been the scene of two 
Pre-sidential elections, both of which were conducted :in an atmo-
sphere of freedom and dignity. Duly elected representatives of 
the people have taken their places in Congress and have carried 
out their legislative duties in accordance with the provisions 
of the Constitution of 1946. Organized political parties with 
moderately well~fined programs have come into being. This 
phenomenon is particularly significant since it has provided 
the people of Brazil with a series of alternative programs forthe 
future development of their country. What is more, the evolution 
of political parties has presented the group in control of the 
government with an articulate opposition capable of cha~lenging 
official po~icies which it (the opposition) might consider con-
trary to the best interests of the cou_~try. The opposition is 
not only given ample opportunity to present its case in the 
legislature, but is also at perfect li~erty to reach the people 
through its press and other propaganda media. It should also 
be noted that in the final analys~s. many of the policies which 
have been proposed by the Vargas government merely represent a 
continuation of sfumilar policies initiated during the Dutra 
period. Where important shifts in policy have occurred, as 
with the SALTE Plan, we have noted that the new government has 
adopted a decidedly more conservative approach. Indeed, its 
present economic progtt.am may be characterized as one of re-
trenchment. 
\. 
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In his efforts to curb inflation and lower the cost 
of living, President Vargas has endorsed such unpopular, but 
effective measures as practicing economy in the federal adrnini-
stration, boosting taxes, enforcing trade controls drawn up to 
keep out non-essentials, suspending further currency emissions, 
and restraining commodity speculation. 
Vargas undoubtedly recognizes that the future of his 
regime rests on his ability successfully to implement such mea-
sures and to make good his promise to check the rising living 
costs which the previous government had been unable to control. 
However, this new economic program represents the only ~jar 
' deviation from the program established by the previous regime, 
which, in and of itself, constitutes a mute tribute to the old 
retiring General who had served as Brazil's Chief Executive from 
1945 to 1950. It may well be said that General Dutra received 
few tributes during his term of office, but in the words of 
C. H. Haring: 
11 It is conceivable that in years to come 
his presidency will be looked u~on as the 
time when the Third Republic was firmly con-
solidated by his quiet but wise and stead-
fast direction of affairs .u53 
53 . 
. C. R. Raring, 11 Vargas Returns in :Srazil, 11 Foreif?.E_ 
Affairs, 29:313, January, 1951. 
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A Short Bibliographical Note 
The following bibliography is complete in the ·sense that 
every item cited in the text is included. The order of arrange-
ment used follows the basic pattern outlined below. 
\ 
A. Books and Monographs. All books and monographs are 
listed alphabetically according to the first letter of the 
author's surname. except where the name is unknown or inapplicable, 
in which case the first letter of the first wor:et in the title 
of the work is used. 
B. Newspaper Items. All newspaper i terns used are 
arranged in clearly delineated groups according to the part-
icular newspaper from which they were taken. Those taken from 
the Correia da Manha come first followed by those from the 
Estado de Sao Paulo, La Naci6n (Buenos Aires) and the New York 
Times. The various i terns in each of these groups are arranged 
in alphabetical order according to the first letter of the 
first word of the caption, the.only exceptions being those 
few cases in which a feature article is accompanied by a 
11 by-line 11 in which case the first letter of the writer 1 s surname 
is given preference. 
C. Periodical .Articles. These are arranged in precisely 
the same order as are the newspaper items. The Boletim Informative 
comes first followed by the Boletim Radio~telegra.fico do 
Ministerio das Relacoes E:x:teriores, etc. 
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:BI:SLIOGR.APHY 
A. :BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS 
(:Books which supplied more than general background 
are annotated.) 
Anua.rio Est at:! stico do :Brasil, Insti tuto :Brasileiro de 
Geograf:!a i Esta.t!stica, Rio de Janeiro j 1950. An annual 
compilation of vital statistical material covering the 
physical, demographic, economic, social~ cultural, and 
administrative situations in :Brazil, a veritable mine 
of factual, current, information. 
Azevedo de, Fernando, :Brazilian Culture. New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1950. 
Constituicio da Republica dos Estados Unidos do :Brasil 1946. 
:Biblioteca da Livrari~a.demica, 1948, Edicaa SarBIVa, 
Sio Paulo. ~is is the original Portuguese text of 
:Srazil 1 s Constitution of 1946. 
Carma do, J. A. Pinto, Diretrizes Partidarias. Bio de Janeiro: 
Irmaos Pongetti, Editores~ 1948. 
A very useful directory of most of :Brazilts political 
parties. In most cases the author surveys the individual 
party 1 s history, official program, and strength at the 
time of writing (1947). 
Dl;lgga.n, Laurence, ~.Americas. New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1949. 
Facts About the State of Sao Paulo, published by the :Sri tish 
Chamber --of Commerce of s-ao Paulo and Southern :Brazil, Sao Paulo, 1950. 
Gordan, Wendell C., The Economy of Latin America. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1950. 
James, Preston E., Latin .America. Revised edition; New York: 
The Odyssey Press, 1950. 
An extensive and authoritative socio~geographic treat-
ment cowring the entire Latin .American area. The section on 
:Brazil is especially valuable and runs ho some 250 pages. 
B59 
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Loewenstein, Karl, :Brazil Under Vargas. New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1942. 
The standard political treatise on the first twelve years 
(1930dl942) of Vargasr first reign. 
MacDonald, Austin F., Latin American Politics and Government. 
New York: Thomas Y~ Crowell Company, 1949. 
A timely political survey of the governments of Latin 
America. Useful for quick reference on current political 
background. 
Marchant, Alexander, T. Lynn Smith, editors , :Brazil: Portrait 
of Half a Continent. New York: The Dryden Press, 1951. 
~compendium of :Brazilians consisting of nineteen essays, 
each on a separate topic and each prepared by a specialist 
in :Brazilian affairs. Some of the more important include: 
Reynold E. Carlson, ":Brazilfs Role in International Trade" 
and "-The :Bases of :Brazil r s Economy; 11 A. Carneiro Leao , 
"The Evolution of Education in :Brazil; 11 J. V. Freitas 
Marcondes, 11 Social Legislation in :Brazil.;" Arthur Ramos, 
11 Tb.e Negro in :Brazil;" T. Lynn Smith, liThe People and 
Their Characteristics;" Dorival Tei,.eira Vieira 1 11 Tb.e 
Industrialization of Brazil." 
Mart:!nez, Jos~ F. , Economic Developmen~s !!!, :Sra~dl 1949-illQ.. 
Washington, District of Columbia: Pan American Union, 
1950. 
Partners in Progress. A Report to President Truman by the 
International Development Advisory :Board. New York: 
Simon and Schuster, publisherw, 1951. 
Peaslee, Amos J., Constitutionsof Nations, Vol. I, Concord, 
New Hampshire: The Rumford Press, 1950. Contains the 
standard English translation of Brazil's Constitution 
of 1946. AlthoUgh adequate for most purposes, a detailed 
study would require direct reference to the original 
source. (See above p. 259, third entry.) 
Report: Joint :Brazilian~United States Technical Commission. 
Rio de Janeiro, :Brazil; Division of International 
Conferences, Department of State, March 10, 1949. 
-...... 
A topical and comprehensive study of the :Brazilian Economy 
designed to analyse its capacity for industrial development. 
Much of the report is concerned with specific recom.'nendations 
for dealing with some of :Brazil's more serious economic 
problems. 
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S~ de, Hernane Tavares, The :Brazilians. New York: The John 
Day Company, 1947. 
A succinctly written analysis of the people of :Brazil, 
their strengths) weaknesses and idiocyncracies. The author 
not only describes the national character, but also deals 
with its whys and wherefores. 
Wells, Sumner, Where ~ We He~ing? New Yorkz Harper and 
:Brothers, 1946. 
Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, Dom Pedro ~Magnanimous. Chapel 
Hill! University of North Carolina Press, 1937. 
____ , The Peoples and Politics of Latin America. Revised 
edition; :Boston: Ginn and Company, 1945. 
Wythe, George; Royce A. Wight, and Harold M. Midkiff, BRAZIL: 
.An Expanding Econom;y:. Baltimore: The Lord Baltimore 
Press, 1949. 
This is generally considered the standard work on 
recent economic developments in Brazil. 
Zweig, Stefan, BRA.ZIL Land of the Future. New York: The 
Viking Press, 194~ - --
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::S. NEWSPAPERS ITEMS 
"Argentine .Advisor?" Correia da Ma.nha, October 20, 1950. 
"Communists Not Wanted, 11 Correia da Manha, September 10, 1950. 
"Communists Vote for GetUlio, 11 Correia da Manha, October 00, 
1951. 
"Grossness and Insolence," Correia da Manhi., October 10, 1951. 
"Policy of Despair," Correia da Manhi, September 21, 1950. 
11 The 1945 Front was Reactivated Via a Trojan Horse'*" Correia 
da ManhS:, October .7, 1950. 
"Vargas and his Ten Points," Correio ~Ma.nha, October 14, 1951. 
"Vargas Confers with .Argentine Vice ... President, 11 Correia da 
Manna, August 15, 19504 
11
::Sasis for the Accord :Between the Government and the Communists," 
Estado de Sao Paulo, September 17, 1950. 
"Communists Organize Committees for Cristiano," Estado de 
sao Paulo, September 13, 1950. 
"Discourse by the :Brigadier," Este.do de Sao Paulo, J"uly 23, 
1950. 
11 0ffers of PSD to PRP Enough to :Bring on Vertigo)" Este.do de 
~ ~. J"uly 29 t 1950~ 
11 Oration by the President of the PRP, 11 Est ado de Sao Paulo, 
J"uly 23' 1950. 
"PRP .Adopts Gomes, II Est ado de Sao Paulo, J"uly 22, 1950. 
11 PRP to Support Gomes," Estado ~.Sao Paulo, J"uly 21, 1950. 
"Support of the Communists for Mr. Cristiano Machado and the 
Cotton .Adventurer, 11 Estado de sao ~. September 10, 
1950. 
• 
11 The Communists and the Elections, tt Est ado de Sao Paulo, 
September 9, 1950 • 
II The PBP and the :Brigadier' II Est ado de sao Paulo' July 28' 
1950. 
tiThe Ultimate in Political Facetiousness," Estado de Sao, 
Paulo, September 10, 1950. 
nwave of :Bad Faith," Estado de Sao Paulo, July 28, 1950. 
"General Per6n Addresses :Brazilian Students," La Naci6n, 
(:Buenos Aires) July 20, 1950. 
".Agricultural RefoTm is Planned in :Sradl, 11 New~ Times, 
April 10, 1951. 
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11
.Aide Asks Changes to Free Vargas," ~ ~ Times, June 10) 
1951. 
:Bracker~ Milton, "Campaign Issues Missing in :Brazil, 11 New 
~ ~. September 24, 1950. 
----• "Vargas is Sworn in as President. Pledges Closest 
.Amity With U.S. ,n ~York Times, February 1, 1951. 
":Brazil Deputies Petition, 11 ~ !2.!!£ ~, November 22, 1950. 
11 :Bradl Five Year Plan :Sacked by Machado, 11 New I2.!!£ Times, 
June 26, 1950. 
":Brazil Will Punish Speculators in Food, 11 New XQ.Es Times, 
June 20, 1951. 
Lawrence, W. H., 11:Brazil 1 s Reds :Busy Tho~ Outlawed," ~ 
York Times, January 2, 1950. 
11New :Brazilian President to Try to Out Costs. Vargas to :Sack 
U't'S,.. Aim on Reds in .Americas," ~York Times, January 20, 
1951. 
"Vargas Claims Election, Vows to put :Brazil on Democratic Path 
in Laborite Direction," ~~Times, October 14, 1950. 
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"Vergas Foes Warn of Dictatorship, 11 New !.Q!!s. Times, June 17, 
1951. 
"Vargas Lticy"s Fall to :Braden, :Serle, 11 ~York Times, January 13 t 
19q0. 
ttVerga.s Moves Watched," New York Times$ September 7, 1951. 
. . 
"Vargas Offsets Plot, 11 New York Times, November 19, 1950. 
. . 
"Vargas Outlines Plans, 11 ~YorkTimes, November 29,1950. 
11Varga.s Outlines Reforms, tt Nevt York Times, November 8, 1950. 
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Although Brazil wa,s settled by the Portuguese in the first 
years of the sixteenth century, Brazilians have long since lost 
much of their Ibero or Hispanic cast, largely as a result of co-
habitation between the settlers and the aborigines during the 
early period of colonization and later as a result of intermingling 
with Negro slaves. 
The latter were brought into the country to work the sugar 
plantations and mills which formed the base of Brazil r s economy 
until the close of the seventeenth century. Inefficient methods 
of production and West Indian competition ended this, the first 
of three major exploitive, monocultural cycles which have punctu-
ated Braz.ill s economic development down to the present. Gold 
mining, which held sway as Brazil's main revenue producing activity 
during most of the eighteenth century was second; while doffee 
production, the third. and still extent mainstay of the economy~ 
came to the fore in the early decades of the nineteenth century. 
Politically, Brazil has run the full gamut from colonial 
dependency, to Empire, to constitutional Republic. It is worth 
noting that these transitions were effected with a notable lack 
of disorder. However, serious disturbances occurred intermittently 
beginning in the early Nineteen Twenties. The aggregate economic 
pressure generated by the First World War and the great depression 
were the causes of these new tensions and gave rise to an economic 
~-~=r========================~====~=== 
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philosophy which advocated economic independence through agri-
cultural diversification and expanded. industrialization. The Na-
tional Liberal Alliance led by Get6lio Vargas, then goTernor of 
the state of Rio Grande do Sul, became the main advocate of the 
need for change. In October, 1930, Vargas and his followers 
marched on Rio de Janeiro and succeeded in ringing down the curtain 
on the old Republic of 1891. 
Under Vargas~ Brazil edged towards the implicit goals 
espoused by the National Alliance, but much of the progress 
effected during this period cost many Brazilians dearly, sinee 
political freedom in Brazil was often seriously curtailed. 
During ~ight of the fifteen years of the Vargas Regime, he ruled 
without benefit of Congress. 
Finally, in October, 1945, a developing crisis brought 
about by World War II resulted in a coup which forced Vargas to 
leave his post. Tb the satisfaction of the liberal political 
leaders throughout the country, free and honest elections were 
held in December of that same year. MUch to the surprise of many 
political observ~rs, General Eurico Gaspar Dutra, who only a few 
months earlier had served as Vargas' Minister of Tar, was elected 
to the presidency. 
Under instructions from the President, the newly elected 
Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, immediately set to 
work drafting a new constitution for Brazil. The fruit of the 
A .A.ss:ambly's labor, the Constitution of 1946, prov.ed to be a fairly ~~==~================================~====== 
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liberal document from the political point of view with orienta-
tion in social and economic matters towards a. mild form of the 
welfare state. 
Perhaps the thorniest political problem which the Dutra 
government was obliged to solve centered about the legal status 
of the Communist Party of Brazil. This problem was brought into 
sharp focus when Luiz Carlos Prestes, leader of the party a.n.d a. 
duly elected Senator, publicly expressed views which indicated 
that his loyalty to Moscow took precedence over his alleged 
loyalty to the newly reconstituted Republic of Brazil. Although 
public reaction to Prestes 1 statements was mixed, the government 
finally moved to have the Superior Electoral Tribunal declare 
the Communist Party of Brazil "opposed to democra.cyn and thus 
illegal. 
The administration's record in the economic sphere was only 
moderately successful. The development of basic agricultural 
and industrial enterprises moved along at a steady pace and the 
creation and promulgation of the much discussed SALTE plan greatly 
stimulated development in all major sectors of the economy. 
However, the new government's handling of the post war inflation-
ary problem proved to be decidedly inadequate. 
Social developments in Brazil. during the Dutra period 
were somewhat limited in scope and were based largely on long-
standing policies initiated by the previous regime. The nation's 
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immigration policy purporting to encourage the settlement of dis-
placed Europeans proved to b~ ineffectual. Although several 
grandiose programs were widely discussed, Brazil received fe~er 
than twenty thousand immigrants during the period 1945 to 1950. 
The only significant gain in the field of education was 
the institution of a nation~wide program for dealing with 
illiteracy. Although the Constitution of 1946 granted labor 
such fundamental guarantees as the right to bargain collectively 
and the right to strike, the trade unions remained under close 
government supervision. As for Brazil 1 s social security system, 
it remained predominantly urban in outlook and the institution 
of semi-official industrial and commercial services in 1946, 
merely served to intensify this basically urban pattern. 
The acid test of the democratic nature of President 
Dutra1 s government came in October, 1950, when Brazilians went 
to the polls to choose his successor. Ironically enough, Dutra's 
former mentor, Get~lio Vargas, was returned to power by an in-
disputable majority. The final count gave Vargas 3,829,560 
votes as against 2,288,110 for his nearest contender, Air 
Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, leader of the Uniao Democr!tica 
Nacional (National Democratic Union). Vargas' return to power 
dramatically revealed his political adroitness as well as his 
popularity with the masses. Indeed, the political campaign 
of 1950 was replete with dramatic incidents, including sub-rosa 
and open dealings between the major political parties, the 
• 
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Communists and Integralists (old line ~razilian Fascists). 
Although some observers believe that Vargas may eventually 
slough off the democratic processes restored during the Dutra 
period and revert to the dictatorial techniques which he utilized 
during his first administration, the record at the time of this 
writing would seem to indicate that he plans to follow a rather 
cautious path and operate along democratic, constitutional lines . 
